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HomeOpinionThe real impact of reviving Chushul airfield is psychological

The real impact of reviving Chushul airfield is psychological

China has not specifically protested about the revival of advanced landing grounds. However, given the historical and tactical significance of Chushul, it may make an exception.

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The Ministry of Defence, as per media reports, is planning to revive two defunct Advanced Landing Grounds located close to the Line of Actual Control with China — at Chushul in Eastern Ladakh and Anini in Arunachal Pradesh’s Dibang valley. The Anini ALG is a relic of World War 2, when it was used to provide air transport logistics support from India to China via ‘The Hump’ route, which got its name from the treacherous terrain of the high eastern Himalayas over which pilots would fly. The Chushul airfield, meanwhile, played a significant role in the 1962 India-China War and went into disuse thereafter due to perceived sensitivities of China.

These initiatives are part of the Indian Air Force’s plans to build up forward airpower capabilities. Since 2008, ten ALGs have been revived — two in Ladakh at Daulat Beg Oldie and Nyoma and eight in northeast at Along, Tawang, Mechuka, Pasighat, Tuting, Vijayanagar, Walong, and Ziro. The Fukche ALG, in the Demchok sector of Ladakh, was proven to be operational by landing an AN-32 aircraft in 2008, but with the development of the Nyoma airfield, it has lost its relevance.  The development of the ALGs is need-based. Most of these ALGs will be primarily used for air transport, helicopter, and Unmanned Aerial systems (UAS). However, Nyoma, located 35-40 km from the LAC, has been developed for use by fighter aircraft as well.

The development of some of these ALGs in close proximity to the LAC is also crucial to assert territorial sovereignty as the whole of Arunachal Pradesh is claimed by China and the area up to the LAC in Ladakh is under its illegal occupation. Daulat Beg Oldie, which is about 10 km from the LAC and was reactivated in 2008, and Chushul, 1.2 km from LAC, can now come under direct fire in hostilities. So far, China has not specifically protested about the revival of the ALGs. However, given the historical and tactical significance of Chushul, it may make an exception once the redevelopment begins.

Historical context

China’s 1959 Claim Line, which generally coincides with the LAC in the Chushul sector, is only 10-20 km from the international boundary. This boundary is based on the 1842 Dogra Empire-Tibet treaty. This treaty, though signed at Leh after the invading Tibetan forces were defeated at Chushul by the Dogra empire forces, is also known as the Treaty of Chushul.  

One hundred and nine years later in August 1951, it was at Chushul that the Indian Army had its first brush with the People‘s Liberation Army when a Kazakh-Cossack Cavalry Brigade of the National Revolutionary Army of Chiang Kai-shek pursued by the PLA sought asylum in India. Until then, there was no military deployment in Eastern Ladakh and troops had to be rushed forward post-haste. The Kazakhs were given asylum and one infantry company was permanently deployed at Chushul. This encounter led to the development of the Chushul ALG, which was  inaugurated on 29 August 1952, when Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and other VIPs landed at the airfield to make history.

The ALG was not used much and went into disuse due to limited deployment of troops as the border remained dormant. Clashes with China at Kongka La and Longju in 1959 led to the border being handed over to the Army. This led to the revival of the Chushul ALG beginning 1960. Thereafter, it was used for logistics and movement of troops and weapons. After the first phase of the 1962 War began on 20 October, Chushul ALG was extensively used and the IAF made history by transporting by air six AMX-13 tanks and 12 25-Pounder guns at 14,230 feet, apart from moving troops and logistics. The ALG remained operational until 16 November, two days before the second phase of the war began on the night of 18-19 November.

Thereafter, the ALG became defunct for the second time and has not been revived since then keeping in view the perceived sensitivity of China. 


Also read: Theaterisation reform is stuck on ranks and roles — India’s military needs clarity


Tactical significance

As I have often said, China’s 1959 Claim Line is a marvel of terrain evaluation and cartography. Unless preemptively altered militarily, it confers overwhelming tactical advantages to the PLA. Entire Daulat Beg Oldie and Chang Chenmo sectors can be cut off and attacked in isolation. However, in the Chushul sector, India has a relative tactical advantage. 

The LAC in this sector runs along the crest of the Kailash Range, except in the area of Black Top which is north of Gurung Hill and gives the PLA a foothold on the Kailash Range. It can be used to attack the area north of the Spanggur Gap. The failure to secure Black Top in 1962 before the hostilities began and when it was not held by the PLA led to the collapse of the Chushul defences. South of the Kailash Range, the Indian Army dominates the entire area between Spanggur Gap up to the international boundary. 

In a conflict situation, a preemptive offensive or even a riposte that secures or captures Black Top and eastern slopes of the Kailash Range will lead to the restoration of the international boundary, posing a threat to Rudok — thus negating any gains of the PLA in vulnerable sectors. 

This was the reason why China was keen to disengage in this sector in 2020 after India secured the crest of the Kailash Range in end August. In my view, the standalone agreement for disengagement with the creation of buffer zones in February 2021 was an error of judgement. India lost its only leverage and it took another three years and eight months before disengagement took place in other sectors albeit with buffer zones mostly in areas that were under our control until April 2020.

While the restored Chushul ALG would be useful only in the pre-hostilities period, its real impact lies in the psychological realm.


Also read: The real impact of reviving Chushul airfield is psychological


Potential for tourism

Imagine an ecologically friendly five-star, centrally heated hotel on the western edge of the Chushul bowl or on the Pangong Tso between Chushul and Lukung, and throngs of tourists landing by aircraft or helicopters at the airfield after due acclimatisation at Leh. 

I have for long advocated opening up our northern borders for tourism. The best solution to meet the aspirations of the people of Ladakh is eco-friendly tourism. Open up the border areas and give impetus to the almost forgotten Vibrant Village Programme. And stop this ridiculous practice of inner line permits for Indian citizens. In the era of satellites and drones, what are we trying to hide?

The government must be complimented for the bold decision to reactivate the Chushul ALG. I recommend that it should be upgraded to a military-cum-commercial airfield along with other allied infrastructure to promote tourism. I look forward to Prime Minister Narendra Modi emulating Prime Minister Nehru, who landed at Chushul on 29 August 1952, in the near future.

Lt Gen H S Panag PVSM, AVSM (R) served in the Indian Army for 40 years. He was GOC in C Northern Command and Central Command. Post retirement, he was Member of Armed Forces Tribunal. Views are personal. 

(Edited by Aamaan Alam Khan)

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