Indian Army vehicles driving through the snow in Ladakh (representational image) | Photo: AFP via Getty Images via Bloomberg
Indian Army vehicles driving through the snow in Ladakh | Representational image | Photo: AFP via Getty Images via Bloomberg
Text Size:

The eighth round of Corps Commander-level talks between India and China were held on 6 November at Chushul. After the talks, both sides gave perfunctory diplomatic statements of having had candid discussions on disengagement and to carry the process forward as per the consensus reached between the leaders of the two countries. Prior to this development, it was presumed that status quo would continue indefinitely.

Since India secured the dominating heights on the Kailash Range on the night of 29/30 August, during the sixth and seventh round of military talks, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) had been persistent that disengagement must begin with our withdrawal from the Kailash Range because India has ‘altered the status quo’. Beijing remained ambiguous with respect to disengagement in the Depsang Plains and north of Pangong Tso, claiming that it has merely secured its own territory up to the 1959 Claim Line.

But India rightly said that it has never recognised the 1959 Claim Line and that it is China that has unilaterally altered the status of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and violated the 1993 agreement. On the Kailash Range, India has only moved up to the LAC to preempt the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) planning to alter the status quo. India further insisted on an all-encompassing status quo ante agreement.


Also read: Why Russia really stopped its S-400 supply to China


In new ‘agreement’, China eyeing Kailash Range

In a surprise development on 11 November, the media was agog with speculative reports citing “reliable sources”— read government/military unofficial briefings — that an ‘agreement’ had been reached for disengagement along the Kailash range and north of Pangong Tso during the eighth round of talks.

It seems that it is a quid pro quo agreement for the PLA to withdraw east of Finger 8 (north of Pangong Tso) and us withdrawing from the Kailash Range. North of Pangong Tso, we would withdraw to Dhan Singh Thapa post, west of Finger 3. Between Finger 3 and Finger 8, there would be a buffer zone where no deployment or patrolling would take place. Along the Kailash Range, the PLA would vacate Black Top and other positions on the Kailash range with us doing the same. It is presumed that the entire Kailash Range would be a buffer zone. The disengagement would be carried out in three phases and could begin as early as Diwali.

However, there is no mention of any disengagement in the Depsang Plains. The sources hinted that it was a pre-Modi era problem. While this is not the case, in my view, we seem to have agreed to a huge buffer zone on our side of the LAC where we will not deploy (we never did) or patrol.

It is pertinent to mention that all buffer zones which are likely to be created are on our side of the LAC, denying us the right to patrol, deploy or develop infrastructure, which we had up to April 2020. Given the yawning differential between the military capabilities in China’s favour, this kind of an agreement was inevitable. In fact, I have been advocating the same up to end August. Once we seized the Kailash Range, the situation had changed and we should have insisted on status quo ante April 2020.


Also read: Trump firing Esper, Mattis, Bolton and Tillerson has meant a reboot for India too


Kailash Range and 1959 Claim Line

Kailash Range is one area where the alignment of the 1959 Claim Line offers a major strategic advantage to India, and for the first time since 1962, we are holding it in strength. This, negates the strategic advantage the PLA had gained due to its preemptive operations in the Depsang Plains, Hot Springs-Gogra and north of Pangong Tso.

Even in 1962, both sides fought for the control of the Kailash Range. By 27 October, China had reached its 1959 Claim Line in all sectors. However, it did not want to give us the advantage of holding on to the Kailash Range. The 1959 Claim Line passes over the crest of the Kailash Range, except in the area of Black Top that is to its east. China could still claim that it had not violated its Claim Line. On 24 October 1962, Radio Peking announced that in eastern Ladakh, Chushul was the next objective.

In 1962, the Army psychologically collapsed and abandoned the Kailash Range and Chushul Sector when, militarily, there was no need to do so. I analyse the circumstances of our withdrawal from the Kailash Range and Chushul in 1962 and why we must not withdraw from it now.


Also read: High-tech drones could have neutralised Chinese intrusions at LAC but India didn’t have them


Indian Army shows resolve

Until 24 October 1962, 114 Infantry Brigade was responsible for the defence of Ladakh. Beginning 20 October 1962, in 48 hours, DBO, Galwan, Hot Springs and Sirijap Sectors had collapsed and troops had been withdrawn. Chushul Sector was held by the 1/8 Gorkha Rifles; 5 Jat was holding Lukung and Phobrang at the northern end of Pangong Tso. By 28 October, 7 J&K Militia in the Indus River Sector had also withdrawn to Dungti. There was a lull in the battle from 28 October to 17 November.

The Indian Army showed great resolve in rushing troops by air and road to Ladakh. HQ 3 Infantry Division was raised on 26 October at Leh.

114 Infantry Brigade with two additional battalions — 13 Kumaon and 1 Jat —was ordered to defend Chushul and Lukung-Phobrang Sector. 70 Infantry Brigade was deployed for the defence of Indus Valley Sector and 163 Infantry Brigade for Leh itself. An ad hoc formation was across the Khardung La to defend the Saser La approach.

However, there was a strategic flaw in planning. The focus was on defence of Leh, 280 km behind the frontline (by existing road), resulting in paucity of resources for defence of Chushul. Until now, our appreciation was that in Eastern Ladakh, the PLA will not cross the 1959 Claim Line, which, in hindsight, was correct. However, when Radio Peking, on 24 October, 1962, gave the next objective as Chushul, it was assumed that the 1959 Claim Line would be crossed and Leh would be the logical strategic objective. The actual objective of the Chinese was the Kailash Range and that is where they halted.

The PLA did not have the resources or logistics to conduct any further operations. It had committed only one division in Ladakh which was stretched from Karakoram to Demchok. In fact, the PLA had to regroup to attack the Demchok area on 27 October 1962. For Phase 2, it had to regroup again to barely muster one regiment for operations in the Chushul Sector. Hence, the PLA was capable of only limited operations along the frontline. Moreover, the winter was setting in and after November, operations were severely restricted. No attempt was made for detailed air or ground reconnaissance to ascertain the strength of the PLA.

The flawed planning of HQ Western Command/15 Corps/3 Infantry Division was to a great extent responsible for the subsequent events. The focus became to defend Leh and led to a 200 km withdrawal to the rear without the Chinese firing a shot after 20 November.


Also read: The dangerous cat-and-mouse game before 1962 War has lesson for counter-attack in 2020


Defence of Chushul

The reinforced 114 Brigade with four battalions was deployed for defence of Chushul and Lukung as follows:

  • 13 Kumaon was holding Maggar Hill and Paw Hill with a company each, and one company with an additional section was at Rezang La. Battalion HQ and one company was located in the area of Track Junction, South of the airfield. One company minus one platoon of 5 Jat was holding Tsaka La, the pass between Chushul Valley and Indus Valley.
  • 1/8 Gorkha Rifles had one reinforced company at Gurung Hill, one company to the north of Point 5167, one company was defending the Spanggur Gap and the Battalion HQ with one company was located on the airfield.
  • 1 Jat had one company minus one platoon in area Jetty to cater to an amphibious attack, two companies with one additional platoon at Thakung Heights and Battalion HQ with one company at Gompa Hill near Chushul village.
  • 5 Jat was deployed at Lukung with one company less a platoon at Tsaka La under 13 Kumaon.
  • One battery of 13 Field Regiment within 25 Pounder guns was supporting the brigade. The battery had to be split due to limited range and one troop each was deployed south of Gurung Hill and Maggar Hill.
  • Two troops of AMX-13 tanks had been flown in on 26 October and were located at the base of Gurung Hill to deny the Spanggur Gap approach to enemy tanks and support Gurung Hill.
  • The brigade was supported by one company of engineers and approaches from Spanggur Gap had been mined.

    Annotated Google Earth image showing approximate location of landmarks

The PLA attacked the Kailash Range in the early hours of 18 November. Gurung Hill and Rezang La were attacked simultaneously with a reinforced battalion each. Rezang La fell by 2200 hours on 18 November. Fighting at Gurung Hill continued up to 19 November afternoon and only the higher heights were captured by the Chinese. The lower heights close to Spanggur Gap were still in our hands.

Inexplicably, after the loss of Rezang La and partial loss of Gurung Hill, held by only two companies, withdrawal was ordered. All other posts on the Kailash Range and in the valley held by 10 infantry companies were withdrawn to the heights west of Chushul Bowl on the night of 19-20 November, even before they were contacted by the enemy. If that was not enough, the entire brigade withdrew from Chushul on 21 November.


Also read: China has taken LAC clock back to 1959. India not in a position to take back Aksai Chin


Analysis of the debacle

114 Infantry Brigade had sufficient troops for the defence of Chushul. However, its tactical deployment was flawed. The brigade made no attempt to capture Black Top, which was the most dominating feature on the Kailash Range, north of Spanggur Gap. In the initial stages, it was not held in strength by the PLA and could have easily been captured. As a result, the Chinese were able to dominate Gurung Hill and attacked it from higher ground. Similarly, south of the Spanggur Gap, Mukhpari, the most dominating feature located between Rezang La and Muggar Hill, was not held. There was a 10-km gap between the two posts. Rezang La was, thus, completely isolated. The PLA was able to outflank it from the north and south to attack from the rear. To compound the problem, it was out of the radio communication range and telephone lines were cut at the onset of the battle.

There was limited fire support — only one artillery battery was available. Due to limited range, Rezang La had no artillery support. Higher commanders are to blame for this situation. Our aircraft were landing at Chushul till 15 November. On 26 October, six tanks had been landed. If there was will, a minimum of two artillery regiments could have been made available by road or air.

The brigade did not have any idea about the strength of the PLA. No patrols were sent beyond Kailash Range and no air photo reconnaissance was carried out. Had this been done, the commanders would have known that the PLA had only two battalions available for the attack. After the attack on Gurung Hill and Mugger Hill, the PLA had run out of steam. With winter setting in, it was not capable of progressing the attack further.

The brigade was passive in defence and did not launch any spoiling attacks or counter-attacks. There were sufficient troops available. Three companies deployed in the valley were available as reserves. 1 Jat had not even come under artillery fire, and leaving one company behind at Thakung Heights, could have been used for counter-attack.

The Brigade Commander is squarely to be blamed for withdrawal from the Kailash Range. The Army Commander, Corps Commander and the Divisional Commander are responsible for abandoning Chushul.  The PLA did not even have the capacity for progressing operations at Chushul let alone advancing 200 km to Leh.


Also read: Modi’s message to China at virtual SCO summit — respect territorial integrity


We must not withdraw from Kailash Range

The Kailash Range gives us the same strategic advantage in Spanggur Tso-Rudok area as the PLA has in the DBO Sector. We must develop the required infrastructure to man it permanently. In event of an escalation, we must capture Black Top and the lower heights of the Kailash Range to the east. In case we have not already done so, we must also secure it in the Indus Valley.

We shamefully abandoned the Kailash Range in 1962. Today we must not pull back from it merely to declare a political victory. More so, when we gain very little in return. What more can the Chinese want? All likely buffer zones will be on our side of the LAC where we cannot patrol, deploy or develop infrastructure. China will achieve its political aim – to secure the 1959 Claim Line and prevent development of border infrastructure. And, above all, it would make us vacate the strategic Kailash Range. Mark my words, the PLA knew of the importance of the Kailash Range in 1962 and it does so now. We must not repeat the folly to give up the Kailash Range because the PLA will make sure that we never get it back.

Lt Gen H S Panag PVSM, AVSM (R) served in the Indian Army for 40 years. He was GOC in C Northern Command and Central Command. Post retirement, he was Member of Armed Forces Tribunal. Views are personal.

Subscribe to our channels on YouTube & Telegram

Why news media is in crisis & How you can fix it

India needs free, fair, non-hyphenated and questioning journalism even more as it faces multiple crises.

But the news media is in a crisis of its own. There have been brutal layoffs and pay-cuts. The best of journalism is shrinking, yielding to crude prime-time spectacle.

ThePrint has the finest young reporters, columnists and editors working for it. Sustaining journalism of this quality needs smart and thinking people like you to pay for it. Whether you live in India or overseas, you can do it here.

Support Our Journalism

VIEW COMMENTS

39 COMMENTS

  1. The fact is many in India just want China to infiltrate inside the borders and that includes many eminent media houses too.

    • Exactly just for the sake of opposing the government and getting frustrated at their own Lutyens and South Delhi lobby not getting their hold at power like those earlier days….Good thing you pointed because these intellectual idiots seem to forget 1962 war failure which was the real reason for the LAC conflict reaching the level it has now

    • Indeed, you are right : Modiji did allow infiltration when he was entertaining Xi, and he kept quiet then. PLA infiltrated in Galwan and he kept quiet, which is suscpicious. We need to change this Hindu chowkidar, have a Sikh or Muslim chowkidar.

      • And the Sikh or Moollah Chowkidar will destroy Indian military and sell Ladakh to Chinese and J&K to Pakistan. Problem solved. Modi did a remarkable job in building up the entire military in six years beyond imagination.

  2. We must not withdraw from our side…. Buffet zone must be same in each country’s territory….. Smugglers can be trusted, but can’t trusted China…..

  3. I agree that pull back from the Kailash Range without ensuring PLA pull back from Galwan and Depsang is a failure of making use our position of relative advantage.

    But we also need to understand our limitations for understand the horizon of long haul conflict of attrition. Because we are not prepared nor build capabilities for that kind of conflict we resort to ad hoc responses or indulge in appeasement.

    Border posts in the Himalayas are at about 13-15000 feet requires troops acclimatization before deploying soldiers at those heights. Are we organized for regular turn over of troops as Oxygen is less, and temperature in the next four winter months could touches minus 40 Celsius. Food, water and nutritional food stocks are not yet adequate for troops being cut off from re-supply for long periods by nature.

    The asymmetry in logistics and firepower is high and both strategic logistics and roads connecting posts have patchy connections for artillery support for conduct of sustained operations.

    In 1962 our strategic intelligence was poor. In 2020 we need a large numbers of drones for tactical intelligence. Comparitive abilities to inflict precision strikes by missiles on nodes and artillery are asymmetrical.

    Our commanders and troops have done well to stonewall the PLA for last 7 months with much lesser resources. It has given us new found confidence to build up. Swift operations in last week August on Kailash Range has stiffened the spine of political decision-makers, that if need be, the army can do it. Our soldiers and officers have demonstrated robust courage and buried the ghosts of 1962.

    It is for the political and apex level military leaders to now reorient to prepare and build up capacities of the Northern front to outfight and outlast the PLA in Tibet and Sinkiang
    through conflicts of attrition and value targeting.

    But with winter and altitude ranged equally against any human being, is it sensible to deplete your strength and morale to pulmonary odema, chillblaines and frostbite?

    What have we understood of PLA limitations in past 8 months?

    We think of our operational moves in terms of holding or taking features of tactical advantage by Battalions or companies on the chessboard. The Chinese think strategically from playing Wei Chi war games for centuries.

    One, change our political mindset of the past 45 years. Our security priority is and will remain threats from the North. Enough of political misleading of threats has been done, primarily for electoral purposes by Pakistan bashing. Enough of Chinese appeasement, instead prepare to compete.

    Two, do we need to react to PLA surprising us with their Spring intrusions by reacting with bravado of our troops holding ground in Winter?

    Three, Shouldn’t we think in the long term horizons? Prepare our Northern front strategically to build resilient defence capacities in the mountains to inflict attrition and prohibtive losses with geo-political partnerships. Plan strategically and implement advantages tactically.

  4. I agree that pull back from the Kailash Range without ensuring concurrent PLA pull back from Galwan and Depsang is a failure of making use our position of relative advantage.

    But we also need to understand our limitations for understand the horizon of long haul conflict of attrition. Because we are not prepared nor build capabolities fot that kind of conflict we resort to ad hoc responses or practice appeasement.

    Border posts in the Himalayas are at about 12-13-15000 feet requires troops acclimatization before deploying soldiers at those heights. Are we organized for regular turn over of troops as Oxygen is less, and temperature in the next four winter months could touches minus 40 Celsius. Food, water and nutritional food stocks are not yet adequate for troops being cut off from re-supply for long periods by nature.

    The asymmetry in logistics and firepower is high and both strategic logistics and roads connecting posts have patchy connections for artillery support for conduct of sustained operations.

    In 1962 our strategic intelligence was poor. In 2020 we need a large numbers of drones for tactical intelligence. Comparitive abilities to inflict precision strikes by missiles on nodes and artillery are asymmetrical.

    Our commanders and troops have done well to stonewall the PLA for last 7 months with much lesser resources. It has given us new found confidence to build up. Swift operations in last week August on Kailash Range has stiffened the spine of political decision-makers, that if need be, the army can do it. Our soldiers and officers have demonstrated robust courage and buried the ghosts of 1962.

    It is for the political and apex level military leaders to now reorient to prepare and build up capacities of the Northern front to outfight and outlast the PLA in Tibet and Sinkiang
    through conflicts of attrition and value targeting.

    But with winter and altitude ranged equally against any human being, is it sensible to deplete your strength and morale to pulmonary odema, chillblaines and frostbite?

    What have we understood of PLA limitations in past 8 months?

    We think of our operational moves in terms of holding or taking features of tactical advantage on the chessboard. The Chinese think from playing Wei Chi war games for centuries.

    One, change our political mindset of the past 45 years. Our security priority is and will remain threats from the North. Enough of political misleading of threats has been done, primarily for electoral purposes by Pakistan bashing. Enough of Chinese appeasement, instead prepare to compete.

    Two, do we need to react to PLA surprising us with their Spring intrusions by reacting with bravado of our troops holding ground in Winter?

    Three, Shouldn’t we think in the long term horizons? Prepare our Northern front strategically to build resilient defence capacities in the mountains to inflict attrition and prohibtive losses with geo-political partnerships. Plan strategically and implement advantages tactically.

  5. China likes only Pappu so make him ambassador to china he will help us by telling in advance what china is going to do

    • Pappu was the chai wallah who used to touch Xi’e feet and who said the acronym STREANH (meaning STRENGTH) symbolised Indo-China relations. After he got a beating, he went quiet. He knows who is the boss.

  6. To occupy Kailash never belong to India, is India ready to pay much higher price than Glacier & 1962 punishment? This 6mths will be acid test for India logistic to see how many soldiers can survive without PLA firing single shot.

    India has paid very high price is wasting much resources and lifes for its Chanakya expansionism invading every neighbors lands in 4 directions. What have India gain from them economically & strategically in last 73yrs?

    Nada, nil. Only wars, disputes, violence(AFSPA in Kashmir & NEastern states like Assam & Nagaland) & terror(LTTE in Sri Lanka & Pakistan Balochistan). Wasting 25% budget on military and weapons import to occupy these lands not belong to India.

    Worst are these inhabitable bare lands in Ladakh & South Tibet with harsh winter that has no economical value to occupy.

    India will unlikely be let off the hook this time like Doklam, for its abolishing of art370, illegal annexed of Ladakh with new map including Arsai Chin, QUAD to threaten China sea lanes, US alliance BECA, etc. to unilateral changing status quo threatening neighbors security.

    India should know in hindsight, there is always a price to pay in all aggressions and change of status quo. It may too much a cost if China decided to disintegrate India for the good of Asia century.

    • Please don’t go around telling silly things. China cannot disintegrate India, however hard they try. That is just wishful thinking. If it was possible, why have they not done it in all these years? At the max, Chinese PLA may be able to get some area in Ladakh, nothing more. That too will be with lot of man and material cost on the PLA side too. It won’t be an easy walkover. Also, just to remind you – around 35 PLA troops also died in Galwan. It is just that the Chinese government is not letting the news out.

      • ‘…around 35 PLA troops also died in Galwan. It is just that the Chinese government is not letting the news out.’

        Did you read that in a RSS pamphlet ? Modi’s body language showed a man who had just got a beating. The Hindu chest thumping was gone.

    • I agree, India is wasting its time and money on military hardware, instead of diplomatic solutions. India is seized by Hindu delusions of being a super power, without any foundation for it.

  7. I am unable to understand why India is even theconsidering disengagement from the areas which have been retrieved by the Indian army/STF showing indomitable courage/gallantry and sacrifice….The tragedy of Galvan valley cannot and will not be forgotten……China can not be trusted. They’ve always shown scant regards for the WORLD ORDER and broken n number of agreements over the years
    ! So there is no way that India can justify any retreat from its position of strength because of some agreement with the expansionist CHINA . China does not have the credentials to be part of any such agreement. Moreover, till the other day we were crying hoarse that China has built up enormous infrastructure on their side of the LAC……Roads
    ….bridges…….airports…..tunnels etc. It will be foolish of India to ignore that while negotiating disengagements
    If any, with China. Has China stopped working on the CPEC ?

    I cannot recall any army without the name of the country ……PLA ? Any specific reason….God only knows

    .

  8. I am not familiar with the minute details, but suffice to say India’s long term plan regarding Tibet should be creeping towards securing the whole of the Upper Indus Basin along the hydrological (and topographical) ridge-line and leave the Tarim Basin (except on the K2-Broad Peak-Karakoram-Khunjerab ridge region) to the Chinese. This will also mean securing the Mansarovar/Rakkhash Tal region.

    On the Eastern sector too securing the Upper Brahmaputra in a creeping manner is similarly important. The basic issue is creep up, and hold but plan the progress in a manner so as to easily defend what is acquired. Once the high grounds are progressively captured the Chinese will be easy to fend off. They have absolutely zero rights to Upper Indus/Brahmaputra. Holding these will hydrologically and topographically secure India, fragment/disconnect the Pakistan-China land corridor and eventually pave the way forward to push back the Chinese in South Tibet (hydrologically part of India proper).

  9. The Chinese have been stung by the robust response by India and the global opprobrium that US has led.

    They have decided to cool the temperature till US position is clear, Covid anger is dealt with and their digital warfare machinery is fully operational.

    The current soothing noises are just that.

    Their long term aim is clear and we must do all we can to foil that completely and beyond further problem.

    So all the best to the strategists planning and executing Indian moves, both in the forces as well as the government.

  10. Well and timely said.china never calms .It will continue to be more and more militarily in the said area .It has become soft towards negotiation because 1- severe cold with snow is she’s,2- Tibetan defence persons came to public which may bring more trouble to china in Tibet,3-India took over strategic areas 4-pak problem is affecting china now, 5-international community is angered with china on a lot of matters,6-china is strategically weak now .7-

  11. The Indian Government must take Opinions of former experienced Generals esp with Ladakh area and take suitable action. Our advantage on Kailash range should never be compromised. China will play dirty. We have been beaten many times. Come what we must be able to pressure China more often than vice versa
    Hope the Top functionaries take suitable steps where our advantage is never lost.

    • Modi gave up the land without a fight and said nothing happened. Nehru at least fought. But Hindus think Modi is the chowkidar.

  12. Our objectives should also be to take back Aksai Chin by showing historical Dogra map to China, and POK by pushing out Pakistan। Mere endless talks, meetings, negotiations won’t impress much।

  13. Strategically what Gen Panag says about the Kailash range may be true and valid. But at present China holds most of the aces and it will take 5-10 years for us to attain military position from where we can talk from a position of strength India can instead hold out for a comprehensive disengagement and withdrawal from both sides , with China moving back from the Pangong N Bank and Depsang . On our part some compromises may have to be made since China has caught us out in a weaker position. Patience over a period of 5-10 years will benefit us more than any precipitate action.

  14. I request the Government of India and the Indian Army not to fall prey to the rogue PLA on Kailash mountain range,we should never give this area back,as for Hindus this is very very sacred. You remember Govt of China issuing stapled visas for devotees to visit Kailaash Manasarovar parikrama. Pl be ruthless with these inhumans and give them the taste of their own medicine. All 130 crore people of India are solidly behind you.
    Jai Bharat Maata,Vande Mataram

  15. I agree with Lt Gen H S Panag. We have a bunch of idiots working in the MEA and the PMO (whims) who want to role over to please the Chinese. If we withdraw now, we can kiss all strategic advantages goodbye. Next thing you know the Chinese will be sitting on the outskirts of Leh.

  16. Gen. Panag is absolute right. Under no circumstances, we should vacate Kailash range. Due to setting in of winter, China playing dirty game. We must teach them a good lesson now or never.

  17. Hopefully, the occupation of Kailash range on 29th night has given the negotiating edge to the Indian side. Until then, India was at the receiving end of the Chinese aggression.

    Indira Gandhi lost in 1973 negotiation with Bhutto, whatever the army had gained for her in 1971 war. Since, we have perinnial problem with Pakistan, not only regarding Kashmir, but also low intensity war through terrorists. I hope our leaders are wiser now and heed wiser cousel. As the writer advises, India should permanent infrastructure on Kailash heights and hold on to it permanently.

  18. If true, then it makes no sense to disengage from a position of strength and that too when someone can say with reasonable confidence that China will cheat again in a couple of years. Wont we look like fools then? Cannot understand why governments of India give so called peace a higher priority then self security.

  19. We should not vacate the Kailash Range. Buffer zone should be on both sides, not only on our side. Anyhow the China has never respected any buffer zone. She creates buffer zone and then violate it, creating another LAC. Starts negotiations and another buffer zone in our territory. Stick to the position, and negotiate hard.

  20. We now have to maintain five divisions in Ladakh permanently.
    Although the positions on the Kailash range we occupy would delay the enemy it will not stop him.
    With mass drone attacks India will have no presence in the air, to combat this new warfare, not to mention the inevitable mass rocket attacks. Our roads, armour, mountain positions, logistical lines will be destroyed, nothing will be allowed to move.
    This enemy is not to be stopped until we close the economic gap with China.
    Wellington still teaches our officers WW2 tactics.
    One thousand troops eliminating three terrorists in an encounter, is NOT war experience, preventing infiltration across the LOC is not war experience.
    The course in Wellington hardly has any logistical cadre officers attending, a most important aspect of mountain warfare
    The instructors there are overconfident opinionated unimaginative, they consider themselves better than the US army and China but with less toys. Bent on fighting the next war through last war British and American manuals.
    The students had to stick to the rigid outdated WW2 doctrine and were not allowed to use their own imagination.
    That is why we do not have more Gen Panag’s
    Because our generals are mediocre, lacking in imagination , timid not bold. A perfect reflection of the students at Wellington.
    We are scraping the barrel to get bright officers, at a time when technology becomes warfare, we need the brightest.
    Our WW2 army will be obliterated just as the Armenian army.
    Pakistan learns from Turkey about drone warfare every day. They will change their WW2 army before us.
    Quetta is getting it, Wellington is not.

    • We are lucky that both are world war 2 Armies.
      Should be interesting when war breaks out, it will be a period drama and should be filmed.
      However there are a large number of Pakistani students attending the military colleges of the USA , Turkey and China which should moderate the archaic teaching In Quetta.
      The rampant corruption of the Pakistani army will be its death knell.

  21. On national security matters no one should play politics.
    Trust that we all agree to that.
    Best Regards,
    Ram

  22. General is stating the obvious about importance of Kailash Range as well as about buffer zones to be created (which in his usual clever way he says that they are on Indian side! He forgets that as per our official map, China is already much inside our territory since 1962!!) but the issue is- Do we continue in this face to face situation or we arrive at some solution to reduce the tension? This is both a military and a political question to be decided by the government.

    At this stage, government cannot be seen to be frittering away our gains, after ultimate sacrifices by 20 of brave soldiers. We will have to wait and watch what finally happens.

  23. India must maintain status quo as of now, till all the border dispute is resolved in black and white. Never trust China after temporary withdrawal they will reoccupy these areas after a couple of years.
    Resolve the dispute once for all and live happily ever after!

Comments are closed.