I first met Rajagopala Chidambaram in May 1972 at BARC, where he was heading the Neutron Physics Division. I had just finished my B.Sc Honours in Physics at Delhi University and registered for my M.Sc. As a national science scholar, I was expected to do two months of summer school and had picked BARC out of the options. That Dr Chidambaram was my supervisor was pure chance but it marked the beginning of a lasting relationship. In 1973, I was back at BARC and this time too he was my supervisor, but not by chance. As I learnt later, some of the work in the division on ‘high-pressure physics’ and ‘equations of state’ was key to the Smiling Buddha test the following year on 18 May.
In 1976, I told him about joining the Indian Foreign Service and received a warm congratulatory letter. I returned to Delhi in 1992, having done stints in Geneva working on multilateral disarmament negotiations (the primary focus during the 1980s was Chemical Weapons) followed by Islamabad where tracking Pakistan’s clandestine nuclear weapons programme was a subject of special interest.
In Delhi, I took over the newly created Disarmament & International Security Affairs division where my responsibilities included the International Atomic Energy Agency, negotiations in Geneva and New York, dual-use technology export controls and bilateral talks with France, UK and the US. The Cold War had ended, Soviet Union had broken up, India had exchanged ambassadors with Israel, a Look East policy was around the corner, and economic liberalisation was underway; in short, India’s world was changing.
Dr Chidambaram was heading BARC and in 1993, took over as Atomic Energy Commission chief. We had begun to meet during his regular trips to Delhi and would often end up for lunch, at Dasaprakash at the Ambassador Hotel. At times, Dr Abdul Kalam, who was then heading DRDO would also join us. Conversations revolved around the missile development programme (Prithvi and Agni were first tested in 1993 and 1994 respectively), upgrading the indigenous Pressurised Heavy Water Reactor and coping with the expanded and tightened export controls by the Nuclear Suppliers Group and Missile Technology Control Regime. Similar concerns were being voiced separately by U R Rao, then heading ISRO.
At the initiative of the Ministry of External Affairs, an Eminent Persons Group, consisting of serving and former senior members of the scientific departments, was set up to assess these developments and devise approaches to cope with these restrictions, with the author serving as the member secretary. Interaction with India’s Department of Atomic Energy intensified with the commencement of negotiations in 1994 on a nuclear test ban treaty in Geneva.
Also read: Rajagopala Chidambaram: Physicist who played key role in India’s bid to secure nuclear state tag
‘One of us’
Two key developments took place in 1995. In May, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was extended indefinitely and unconditionally. India had never joined the NPT, labelling it as a discriminatory treaty, and now it was clear that India would always be outside it. In August 1995, the US put forward ‘a zero-yield’ definition of a test ban in Geneva that would make it impossible for India to retain a viable ‘nuclear option’ unless it upgraded its capabilities by undertaking additional tests. As Dr Chidambaram put it, a ‘nuclear option’ cannot be open-ended, just as a ‘marriage option’ cannot last indefinitely.
Prime Minister PV Narasimha Rao designated Naresh Chandra, former Cabinet Secretary and then Governor (Gujarat) to put together a small group to examine options. The members were Dr Chidambaram, Dr Kalam, K Santhanam (DRDO) and the author. Rao gave the green light for a limited number of tests. Regular meetings were held to assess nuclear preparations and monitor international sentiment even as India played an active role in Geneva, Vienna and New York where high-level meetings were being held to commemorate 50 years of the establishment of the United Nations. However, less than a fortnight before the scheduled date, the tests were called off.
Events moved rapidly thereafter. India tried, unsuccessfully, to tighten the language in the test ban negotiations. Even as India went for elections in 1996, it was clear to Dr Chidambaram that India needed time and could not go along with the Geneva negotiations. Accordingly, in June, India withdrew from the negotiations, causing much consternation in Geneva and Vienna. Dr Chidambaram was a relieved man. We continued our meetings in Delhi and Mumbai to exchange views on emerging nuclear initiatives such as a fissile-material-cutoff-treaty. In Mumbai, our dinner venue would be Khyber in the Fort area.
The story about Operation Shakti and the tests on 11 and 13 May 1998 is well documented. Simultaneously, nuclear diplomacy with the US, France and other countries intensified. Our interactions too became more frequent; it was imperative for MEA and DAE to be on the same page as to how India’s position regarding the doctrinal aspects of the credible minimum deterrent, a nuclear triad, no-first-use and assured retaliatory capability, were presented and perceived. In short, we had to ensure a growing acceptance of India as a responsible nuclear power. Though not directly involved, he played a significant role in the negotiations leading to the India-US civil nuclear cooperation agreement. He instinctively understood that as a nuclear weapon state, there would need to be a separation between the civilian and the military nuclear fuel cycles and that India must maintain an exemplary non-proliferation record.
At the end of 2000, I left to take over as Ambassador for Disarmament in Geneva and in 2001, Dr Chidambaram took over as Principal Scientific Adviser. We continued our meetings, though gradually less frequent. His tenure as PrScAdv was marked by many successes, among them the high-speed National Knowledge Network, the National Supercomputing Mission and Rural Technology Action groups.
it was serendipity that I met him in 1972. And decades later, after some difficult negotiations, he told me, “I trusted your instinct because, after all, you are one of us.” That ‘trust’ gave me the good fortune to walk beside him on India’s nuclear journey. Thank you, Dr Chidambaram.
(Edited by Theres Sudeep)