Insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir reared its ugly head yet again on 20 April 2023 with the ambush of an Army vehicle near the Line of Control in Mendhar tehsil of Poonch district, resulting in the death of five Rashtriya Rifles soldiers. No group has so far claimed responsibility. Many questions about the incident remain unanswered, and the truth may never be publicly known. But that should not prevent concerted efforts to situate the incident in the context of the dynamics that have emerged since the August 2019 revocation of J&K’s special status and its bifurcation into two Union territories.
The method of inflicting violence and the proximity of the incident site to the LoC, juxtaposed with the type of weapons used, indicate that the attack was carried out by trained and well-armed militants. The initial narrative that the petrol tank of the vehicle carrying the six soldiers caught fire due to bullets hitting it is misleading because it is unlikely to have trapped and burnt to death all of them except one. The vehicle has two different, though contiguous, compartments consisting of the driver/co-driver and the personnel/goods carrying sections. Prima facie, it seems that a heavier weapon like a rocket-propelled launcher or a similar firearm was used, and it could have been sourced only from Pakistan. The Pakistani hand in the incident seems unmistakable, and that should bring no surprise.
Keeping it ‘low-boil’
The districts of Poonch and Rajouri, because of their terrain and demographic profile, have traditionally harboured a definitive degree of support for militancy engineered by Pakistan. Infiltration through these border districts is easier, as there are many villages ahead of the fence. For Pakistan, using these two districts to tie down troops south of the Pir Panjal is probably useful to decrease the presence of troops in the Kashmir Valley, which is the space where terrorism is expected to pay them maximum political dividends.
Since 2019, violence in the Kashmir Valley and Jammu has remained at a sub-critical level and special care seems to have been taken so as to not impact economic activities and to provide some relief to the populace that remains politically shocked and subdued by the revocation of the erstwhile state’s special status. Among the Kashmiris, there is deep anger against the Centre. In all likelihood, Pakistan may harness it. But, probably because of Pakistan’s own domestic travails, the current design seems to fit the technique of keeping violence at the ‘low boil’ level — sporadic and limited in intensity so as not to provoke an immediate Indian reaction.
The effectiveness of the low-boil technique is enhanced by the possibility that even a small-scale terrorist attack at a well-chosen target can be sufficiently magnified to project a growing gulf between the Kashmiris and the Centre.
India will be presiding over the G20 Working Group meeting in Srinagar on 22-24 May. Even a limited strike on a tourist-related target would be an embarrassment. Such news can reach a global audience and project India’s Kashmir approach in poor light. Hosting the meeting peacefully has dividends in strengthening India’s image regarding J&K. Only time will tell whether it was worth the risk.
Although the Jammu-Kashmir divide was always present in varying degrees, the rift has widened since 2019. Worse, it has acquired a deep religious tinge that is also tied to the national trajectory of the Hindu majoritarian impulse. The delimitation of parliamentary and assembly seats promulgated in 2022 is another issue that Kashmiris see as a reflection of the Narendra Modi government’s bias toward the Hindu majority regions of Jammu. This rift could provide fertile soil to Pakistan for reigniting the insurgency in J&K whenever it considers appropriate.
What is noticeable in the official Indian reaction to the Poonch incident is the downplaying of the Pakistani hand and no wielding of the usual slogans like ‘Muh tod jawaab’. There seems to be a calculated attempt to not let the incident mar whatever possibility remains to improve relations with Pakistan. As both nations are in election mode, such a possibility may be remote, but preventing incidents that make a difficult situation worse would appear to be the preference.
Or the reason may well be to show the world that in the year of the much-hyped G20 presidency, that it is a mature leader in the comity of nations.
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Winning Jammu, alienating Kashmiris
The dynamics of domestic politics in J&K are driven by the Centre’s hardline policy aimed to weaken what has been officially described as the machinations of the three families that have reigned over the region for 70 years. The policy claims to have succeeded in terms of economic development and controlling levels of violence. Exploiting the divide in the political opposition and installing a Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government in J&K whenever assembly elections are held seems to be the political strategy. The resignation of Ghulam Nabi Azad from the Congress could also help the BJP.
The people of Kashmir may prefer to buy their peace and partake in restoring normality that would allow them to get on with their lives. However, even a small minority abetted by Pakistan may prefer violence and exact revenge for the revocation of the special status and bifurcation of the state. It would require the support of such Kashmiris with varying degrees of sympathy for perpetrators of violence, making it difficult for the security forces to obtain intelligence, which is key to effectively deal with insurgency issues.
The Centre has maintained that statehood would be restored at the ‘appropriate time’. Such a time would probably arrive after, if, and when the assembly elections are held and a BJP-led government comes to power. There is a likelihood of the parliamentary and assembly elections being held simultaneously. In principle, it is the decision of the Election Commission, but there is no need to guess that the poll body would act as unofficially directed by the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA).
The BJP government has probably won over the majority of the people of the Jammu region while alienating the Kashmiris. Such a political reality muddies the waters to enable the domestic and external inimical forces to drain India’s meagre resources, especially in terms of security. It would be prudent for the political leadership to deal with J&K in the larger frame of the ongoing military confrontation with China and the global geopolitical churn. They need to be reminded of the moral of the ‘Blind Men and an Elephant’ story.
Right now, it is the MHA that is driving the J&K agenda. Instead, the strategy should be broad-based and driven by the highest rungs of the executive powers that are far better placed to evolve approaches based on an integrated perspective. India’s national strategy evolution is seemingly stymied by a narrow vision that is more tactical than strategic in its dealings with Pakistan. A review of the existing approach is warranted despite the domestic political forces that are likely to be in play, as India remains in election mode. The larger question is whether we can transcend the narrow domestic political considerations while crafting our foreign policy toward Pakistan. The vision of the much-bandied-about ‘Vasudeva Kutumbakham’, based on rising above narrow self-interests and privileging larger global and national interests, provides the way forward.
Lt Gen (Dr) Prakash Menon (retd) is Director, Strategic Studies Programme, Takshashila Institution; former military adviser, National Security Council Secretariat. He tweets @prakashmenon51. Views are personal.
(Edited by Humra Laeeq)