The National Security Advisor Ajit Doval has put forward the idea of integration among the Central Armed Police Forces. As per his suggestion, these forces can interchange roles like border guarding, internal security and law and order among other responsibilities. The rationale provided by the NSA is that the CAPF have similar training, equipment and command structure. “It is not only for saving money but it also brings about greater homogeneity (among CAPF),” Doval said.
The NSA qualified his statement by stating that he was proposing not as the NSA but as a former police officer. The basic premise for his recommendation is that “we have huge (CAPF) force altogether. They have also got the same type of intermingling duties at many places. Whether it is procurement, communications, training standardization”. He further compared this to the jointness being experimented through Theatre Commands by the defence forces, which needs thorough analysis.
Any comparison with jointness among the three Services is misplaced, to say the least. The Theatre Command is aimed at synergising the efforts of defence forces to win a war against the enemy. This necessitates that the strategy, command structure and resources of defence forces be combined during peacetime through Theatre Commands for better and effective utilisation of scarce resources. It implies that command channels will be integrated and orders will emanate from a single person after a joint assessment of the situation by elements of different forces under the theatre commander.
On the other hand, the CAPF can’t interchange roles as the NSA seems to imply. That’s because these forces are in spatially segregated areas of operation. For example, the Border Guarding Forces have totally different areas of deployment in accordance with the “One Border-One Force” specialisation recommended by the Group of Ministers (GoM) set up after the Kargil war. So, the BSF guarding India-Bangladesh and India-Pakistan borders faces an entirely different operational environment than the Sashastra Seema Bal (SSB) deployed along India’s borders with Nepal and Bhutan and Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP), which guards India-Tibet border.
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Against the ethos
The borders with Bhutan and Nepal are open with free movement of people and goods. They cannot be fenced or reinforced with any obstacle as it will hinder free movement and thus adversely impact relations with these countries. The emphasis on training for personnel of SSB, therefore, has to be more on developing soft skills and developing intelligence to detect and prevent contraband from crossing over the border. They also have to focus on developing intelligence about militants and intelligence operatives of a third country exploiting these open borders. Such a force cannot easily adapt to the operational environment prevailing on the western border with Pakistan where the security infrastructure and methodology is militaristic in nature.
Forces unfamiliar with frequent trans-border firing incidents, along with militants and drug smugglers trying to infiltrate without hesitating to open fire, will be out of its depth in guarding these borders. Their lack of experience operating along obstacle systems will further complicate matters. Such forces will even find it difficult to operate on India’s eastern border with Bangladesh as the trans-border cattle smugglers and other criminals are often violent. Similarly, BSF and ITBP will struggle if they are deployed in areas unfamiliar. In fact, even a BSF unit when being transferred from the western border to the eastern border needs to undergo reorientation training as the operational environment differs widely.
It is worth noting that each force develops their own ethos and operational philosophy according to the role defined and the area of operation. Their training and equipment are also aligned to fulfill this role. Even though the role of border guarding is the same, the operational area is different, and the training differs widely from each other. Any meddling with the established systems is likely to affect their efficiency and thus degrade national security.
The only shared training aspect among them is physical/toughness training (PT) and range firing practices. Perhaps, the jointness can be achieved by sharing the infrastructure for these activities. In fact, it’s already in practice at operational levels, where the local commanders cooperate extensively with each other.
Even before the recommendations of GoM after the Kargil episode, the aspect of specialisation was implicit in the deliberations of the study group set up in 1965 after the India-Pakistan war. The group, having found the state armed forces incapable of assisting the war efforts of defence forces, recommended raising of specialised and centrally controlled border guarding force, which is constituted and equipped similarly to an Infantry Battalion.
Border forces and difference in duties
Considering the need for specialisation in border guarding roles, it will be catastrophic to assign units of the CAPF earmarked for Internal and Industrial Security, such as the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and Central Industrial Security Force (CISF). The training, equipment and operational philosophy of these forces are entirely different from those of border security forces. The CRPF, for example, does not have a wartime role and therefore lacks training for it. It will not be able to stand up to even minor skirmishes in case of any eventuality. The training curriculum of the CRPF also does not have any inputs on border management, which is a specialised domain in itself. Thus, the force if deployed on the border will be ill-prepared to carry out border domination, leading to grave compromise with national security.
Additionally, the operational level organisation of a CRPF battalion is different from that of Border Guarding Forces (BGF). Unlike BGF, the units of CRPF do not have a “Support Company” equipped with 81mm mortars and Medium Machine Guns (MMGs), which are necessary for border security for this role. Moreover, while the CRPF employs “lathis” for assisting the civil administration to control law and order, border guarding forces are neither authorised nor are they trained to use them. Even when called upon for internal security or election duties, they carry and use only their firearms.
The case of the CISF is unique because they do not even have a fixed organisational structure. The strength of their units varies depending upon the requirement of the size and complexity of securing a particular industry. They are also not equipped with medium weapons like mortars and MMGs. Their training is focused on imparting soft skills, along with aspects of access control and inputs on handling technical gadgets for screening and detecting explosives and other contraband. They would be even more ill-prepared if deployed for border guarding duties.
An important function of BGF is the extension of diplomacy at the local levels through interaction with the counterpart forces and other agencies. They also need to integrate closely with the defence forces to assist them in war efforts. This will be difficult to achieve if the forces are rotated frequently as they would neither be familiar with the area nor trained to execute the wartime duties.
The equipment, resources and training required for each force are guided by their specific role and tasks, which vary significantly. The only similarity in duties exists when these forces are deployed for internal security operations. However, even in such situations, they operate best when deployed separately in specific areas. Jointness in these circumstances is achieved through systems like unified command, as seen in Jammu & Kashmir and Maoist-affected areas in central India. Some amount of integration is feasible in terms of procurement of clothing, equipment, and small arms for all these forces.
While the economy of efforts in managing security threats to the country, whether from across the border or from within, is important, the issues involved are not as simple as the NSA’s statement suggests. Doval’s statement goes against the grain of specialisation emphasised by the GoM. Not only this, the GOM recommended further specialisation in the domain of border guarding/management by recommending “One Border-One Force”, resulting in the deployment of different BGFs for different borders, including earmarking of Assam Rifles to guard the India-Myanmar border.
Different aspects of the issue need detailed analysis and it will be perilous if the NSA’s recommendation is taken at face value and implemented in a hurry.
Sanjiv Krishan Sood is the BSF Additional Director General (Retd). He tweets @sood_2. Views are personal.
(Edited by Ratan Priya)