A year after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, there are lessons from both countries’ experience that apply more broadly. Though context and conditions are very different, these lessons apply to India too.
Most basic is the need for greater self-sufficiency in military equipment. Though the US and its European allies have provided enormous military and diplomatic support to Ukraine, it has fallen short of what Kyiv would have really hoped for. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is still pleading for greater and speedier assistance. Even though there is considerable common interest between Ukraine and the West in ensuring that the Russian invasion is defeated, there are also significant differences. The West is concerned about potential escalation and this has meant considerable caution in the level of support they are willing to provide to Kyiv. There have been long debates about the kind of equipment to be supplied, including long-range artillery, battle tanks, and now combat jets.
The military equipment dependency
Western concerns about escalation are probably exaggerated, but there is a larger point here. A country that depends on foreign military supplies will always be at the mercy of others even if they share many common interests.
Equally, military support that comes late is not enough. In Ukraine’s case, it wanted military support earlier, as well as NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) membership. This reinforces a lesson India should have learned from its experience in the 1962 war with China. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru did ask for US military support but the war was over before any help could come. The ’62 war was a short one. But even in a long war, this holds true. You’ll likely have to take what’s available and offered rather than what you want.
To make matters worse, Ukraine has been saddled with small quantities of equipment from disparate suppliers. And this has led to logistics becoming a nightmare when you have to service and repair small numbers of different pieces of equipment. For example, one of the reasons why the German-built Leopard-2 tanks might be better for Ukraine than the US Abrams is that the Leopards are available with many more countries in the region. Many of Ukraine’s friends in central Europe can supply not only the tanks themselves but also spare parts. Having one model reduces logistical problems.
India already faces a problem sourcing military equipment from multiple countries. Whether they would all be willing to supply replacements and spares in a war remains to be seen, especially in a conflict with China. Many have deep economic ties with Beijing and may worry about the threat of nuclear escalation. Russia, in particular, has become more of ‘a junior partner’ in their ‘no limits partnership’, something that is unlikely to change in the near future. Beijing might not look kindly on Moscow, supplying India with military equipment during a war.
Though indigenisation of military equipment has been years long goal in India, it is unlikely that India can break free from this chain for at least another decade. The difference vis a vis China is stark: China manufactures most of its own military equipment now and they are mostly also technologically advanced. These differences may be particularly telling if a war lasts more than a few weeks.
This raises another issue: war duration.
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The ‘long’ and ‘short’ of a war
Indian plans appear to be focused on a short, swift war, lasting a couple of weeks. This was probably understandable as far as dealing with Pakistan was concerned because the adversary could not conduct a longer war either. But China is different. Though one aspect of the Sino-Indian conflict is territorial, this does not guarantee a short war. Beijing can drag the war precisely because it can afford to and because India cannot. A longer war, one that lasts more than a few weeks, will severely test India because it depends much more on import of critical items. Even in the Kargil war, which was not even a full-scale war, India’s war wastage reserves proved inadequate, as the Indian Army Chief General V.P. Malik pointed out. It is unclear if the situation is significantly better today but India had to scramble for supplies even after the Uri attack in 2016. War reserves for fifteen days of intense fighting, or even thirty days, may not be sufficient. Given India’s situation, it is not clear how this problem can be rectified because all talk of strategic autonomy has not yet translated into reducing India’s overwhelming dependence on Russian arms.
Another key lesson, especially from the Russian side, is the dangers of autocratic rule. Autocratic dispensations are often admired for their centralised decision-making and seemingly clear purpose and direction, unruffled by the noise, confusion and openness of liberal democracies. This was always a myth. But the last couple of years have demonstrated how much of a myth this is. Not only the Russian invasion but China’s foolish strategic behavior also illustrates the incompetence of autocracies and their tendency to reinforce mistakes rather than find correctives. Democracies are hardly immune to mistakes, but they appear to be better in dealing with them because mistakes are more difficult to paper in a political system that respects the legitimacy of domestic political and policy opposition.
Finally, the response — of both European powers and the Global South — to the Russian invasion suggest the limits of fair-weather friends. Understandably, as India did, many looked to their material interest rather than even the hoariest slogans such as the inviolability of territorial sovereignty. This will be no different if India and China ever come to blows. Glad-handing with Europe and the global South will neither deter China nor help India when the chips are down. Their interests lie in the economic benefits that the China trade provides and they will fear China’s anger. Their interests are not directly affected by the fortunes of a China-India war. So they will stand on the side-lines, urge compromise and talk about the dangers of nuclear escalation. Indian interests lie with those in the Indo-Pacific and elsewhere who fear China and whose interests parallel India’s.
The author is a professor of International Politics at Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi. He tweets @RRajagopalanJNU. Views are personal.
(Edited by Anurag Chaubey)