Given the near-certainty that India plans to purchase 114 foreign fighter jets, it is imperative to question the rationale, approach, and timeline of any possible procurement. What capabilities does the Indian Air Force require? What price is India willing to pay? Most importantly, if the IAF’s needs haven’t changed substantially since the last fighter competition, is another tender necessary, or are we simply delaying a critical decision?
The IAF down-selected the Dassault Rafale and the Eurofighter Typhoon in the 2008 Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) competition for 126 aircraft following a thorough evaluation, ultimately opting for the Rafale. Yet, due to various issues and delays during negotiations, the tender couldn’t be completed, leading instead to a government-to-government (G2G) purchase of 36 Rafales in 2015 and the subsequent withdrawal of the tender that included manufacturing 108 jets in India. Re-opening a competition now — and considering the same set of options — seems redundant and likely to reignite the diplomatic and political pressures associated with such a high-stakes procurement.
If India were to choose a different fighter, it would imply the Rafale selection and acquisition was flawed, undermining both the credibility of the nation’s defence evaluation and the decision-making process. It will also reopen the controversy over the decision to buy it. Ironically, one reason the government wants another tender may be to avoid such controversies; however, this process could create exactly what it seeks to prevent. The government should avoid such an outcome by streamlining its options and aligning closely with IAF’s operational priorities and the amount it is willing to spend.
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Defeating the purpose
The current contenders present a mismatched mix of single- and twin-engine fighters, spanning medium- and heavy-weight categories. Including options like the American F-21 and Swedish Gripen—both single-engine jets—seems off-track if the IAF’s goal is exclusively twin-engine, medium fighters. There are other considerations as well. Why spend time and resources assessing the Russian MiG-35 when India already operates the MiG-29, or the Su-35, given the IAF’s substantial fleet of Su-30MKIs? The IAF is generally averse to acquiring additional Russian fighters, as they lack the technological sophistication of Western models and come with high maintenance demands and lower operational availability. Similarly, the American F/A-18 and F-15EX, both heavy fighters, are unlikely choices for the IAF, despite India’s growing stock of US-origin platforms and strengthening ties with Washington.
The Rafale remains the most pragmatic option. It is already in service with the IAF with training and logistics infrastructure in place along with operational experience. India has also invested €1.7 billion in developing India-specific enhancements. If the government is prepared to invest around $20 billion in a larger Rafale fleet, a G2G agreement with France would not only maintain operational consistency but also deepen India’s strategic relationship with a trusted ally. Choosing any other fighter, especially heavier models, would not only be expensive but also complicate logistics and maintenance due to the need to integrate a new platform. Additionally, opting for American fighters could draw criticism of yielding to their pressure, which will certainly be there. The US was very disappointed at losing out in the MMRCA competition.
Pragmatic alternatives
If budget constraints and Rafale’s price tag are a concern, the Swedish Gripen offers a compelling, cost-effective alternative. The single-engine fighter has solid operational capability, includes an advanced electronic warfare suite that provides a degree of stealth, and is compatible with the Meteor missiles that are already in India’s arsenal. It is powered by the GE-F414 engine that is going to power India’s own LCA MkII and AMCA, and to be manufactured in India under ToT by GE, thereby providing synergies. Sweden is also open to technology transfer. However, it lacks the geopolitical weight that usually accompanies large defence deals. Here lies a critical question: Can India separate defence acquisitions from political gains? If the answer is yes, the Gripen may offer a solution that balances capability and cost.
The other single engine option, the Lockheed Martin F-21, is unlikely to find favour, as it is considered an old aircraft and its earlier variant, the F-16, is in service with Pakistan.
The timeline and supply chain reality
A key reason for a foreign acquisition is to address the fighter shortfall in the IAF, now reduced to 31 squadrons from its sanctioned 42. This number is set to decline further with the impending retirement of the remaining MiG-21s and the Jaguar fleets. However, some of the jets in contention come with significant backlogs and supply chain hurdles. If these cause delays in delivery timelines, the purpose of procuring foreign fighters to fill immediate gaps will be defeated. There’s little value in buying foreign jets if they can’t be inducted faster than India’s own production rate for the LCA Tejas.
Time to empower private players
Another critical aspect is determining who will lead the manufacturing effort within India should the 114-jet acquisition proceed. In the initial Rafale negotiations, a significant roadblock arose over workshare with Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), largely due to Dassault’s reluctance to guarantee HAL-manufactured fighters, thereby questioning its competence. If India aims to foster a competitive domestic aerospace industry, this is the moment to empower private enterprises, giving the lead to a competent enterprise or a group of them. Engaging capable private players could not only expedite timelines but also establish a parallel capability that promotes efficiency, innovation, and industry competitiveness.
The bottom line
If India has $20 billion available for this acquisition, the government should either advance with a Rafale G2G arrangement or consider a more economical option like the Gripen. Another tender will only prolong decision-making, intensify diplomatic pressures, and likely trigger renewed political scrutiny.
Instead of repeating this process and risking a reputation for indecisiveness, India should make a pragmatic choice. Focus on what the IAF truly needs, bring private industry into the fold meaningfully, and evaluate cost, delivery timelines, and long-term strategy. Defence procurement should be a focused, forward-looking decision — not a spectacle.
It’s time to end this prolonged debate. Whether by expanding the Rafale fleet or choosing a capable, yet less expensive alternative like the Gripen, India must equip the IAF with the resources it needs without further delay.
The author is an adjunct scholar at the Takshashila Institution. He tweets @YusufDFI. Views are personal.
(Edited by Humra Laeeq)