Indian armed forces need functional integration, not geographic theaterisation scheme

Five years after establishing the CDS, India's geographic theaterisation model remains stalled because it's built on outdated warfare concepts.

Chief of Army Staff General Upendra Dwivedi, Air Chief Marshal AP Singh, and Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Dinesh Kumar Tripathi | Photo: Praveen Jain | ThePrint

The Department of Military Affairs and the office of the Chief of Defence Staff were established by the central government in February 2020. One of the key tasks assigned to DMA/CDS was the creation of joint/ theatre commands. More than five years later, however, we have seen little progress on this front.

Understandably, building consensus has proven difficult. Until recently, the discussion was largely confined to ministries, Service Headquarters, and a select group of defence and strategic affairs experts. But since Operation Sindoor, public interest in the functioning of the Indian Armed Forces has surged. This warrants a better understanding of the proposed theaterisation model, and the challenges that have stalled its implementation.

It is time to examine the validity of the theaterisation concept in light of fundamental shifts in modern warfare, and to chart a more pragmatic path forward.

The problem statement

Theaterisation, as currently envisaged, involves reorganising the Indian Army, Navy, and Air Force into Integrated Theatre Commands (ITCs), primarily defined by geographic areas of responsibility. The declared aims are to enhance joint operations, optimise resource utilisation, and streamline command structures.

However, consensus among the Services on the appropriate model and organisational structures has not been achieved. At the heart of the issue is the definition of the problem itself.

We are seeking a physical integration of forces that operate in fundamentally distinct domains—air, land, sea—with divergent operational needs and substantially different organisational cultures. The proposed ‘one size fits all’ model of theaterisation is built on an outdated conceptual framework that does not reflect the demands of contemporary warfare. With its focus on geographic restructuring rather than functional alignment, the model is actually a solution in search of a problem.

What is needed instead is functional integration—one that focuses on outcomes rather than structures. Each domain should be empowered to bring its most effective capabilities to a given operational challenge.

The model may have worked for countries with expeditionary ambitions, such as the United States, or for nations like China, where the CCP retains direct control over armed forces through dual-command systems involving political commissars as co-commanders in theatre commands. But such models do not suit the non-expeditionary ambitions and apolitical military in India.

The dated concept of theaterisation

Theaterisation, as discussed within Indian defence circles, focuses on consolidating the existing 17 Service-specific commands—seven each for the Army and Air Force, and three for the Navy—into a smaller number of geographically defined ITCs. These commands would theoretically integrate all three Services under a single commander to improve operational efficiency and reduce bureaucratic redundancies.

However, this approach assumes that geographic proximity and centralised command are the primary drivers of military effectiveness. In the context of contemporary warfare, this assumption is increasingly questionable. Modern conflict environments demand super-specialisation and domain-specific expertise, rather than rigid geographic structures.

Recent conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, as well as India’s own experiences during Op Sindoor, demonstrate that warfare has evolved beyond traditional geographic constraints. The Russia-Ukraine war highlighted the importance of decentralised, agile-operations. Ukrainian forces have effectively employed real-time intelligence, satellite based internet, drones, and long-range precision strikes to counter a much larger adversary. Their drone attacks on Russia’s strategic bomber fleet, deep within Russian territory, are a clear illustration of this shift.

Similarly, Israel’s operations in Gaza have underscored the role of non-contact warfare. Precision-guided munitions, precise intelligence, and cyber operations played a central role. In India’s context, CDS Gen Anil Chauhan, while referring to Operation Sindoor, commented that future wars are likely to be non-contact in nature.

These data points suggest that the battlefield is being shaped by long-range fires, precision stand-off-weapons, near real-time intelligence, space-based capabilities, unmanned systems, and strategic communications. The physical or geographic proximity of assets and commanders has very little role. Agility in decision-making is more important than integration of decision-making.

The proposed ITCs appear more focused on optimising military bureaucracy by aligning commands geographically—for example, a Western Command for Pakistan, a Northern Command for China, and a Maritime Command for the Indian Ocean Region. While this may streamline administrative processes, it does not necessarily address the core requirement of modern warfare. The focus must shift from territorial segregation to functional synergy.

Fundamental changes in modern warfare

To understand why the current theaterisation model may be misaligned with contemporary needs, it is essential to examine four fundamental changes reshaping warfare:

• Shift to long-range, non-contact warfare
  Modern conflicts increasingly favour long-range, non-contact operations, particularly in the initial phases of a war. Precision-guided munitions, ballistic/cruise missiles, drones and long-range artillery have reduced the reliance on traditional close-combat operations. For instance, in the Russia-Ukraine war, both sides are employing long-range strikes to target critical infrastructure, military capabilities and C2 nodes, often without direct troop engagement. In a short war- waged for limited political objectives, as we experienced recently or the opening phase of a longer conflict, India would need rapid, precise, and non-contact operations to disrupt enemy capabilities early. This would require integration of capabilities in terms of space, cyber, intel and joint fires from a plethora of weapon systems being held by our forces. Functional integration that integrates efforts should be preferred over co-located command structures.
• Democratisation of airpower
  The proliferation of low-cost drones and autonomous systems has democratised airpower, making it accessible at a fraction of cost when compared to manned platforms. The Russia-Ukraine war saw extensive use of commercial drones for reconnaissance, targeting, and even direct attacks. Similarly, in Gaza, both Israel and Hamas employed drones to gain tactical advantages. Our own experience in the last few weeks have led us to realise the critical importance of unmanned systems. For India, this realisation necessitates a military structure that can rapidly integrate unmanned systems across air, land, and sea domains. Rather than subsuming these capabilities under geographically defined commands, a dedicated functional command for unmanned systems would better harness this transformative technology.
• Increased battlefield transparency
  The proliferation of satellites, sensors, and open-source intelligence has made battlefields more transparent than ever before. Commercial satellite imagery, as seen in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and even during the recent India-Pakistan conflict, allowed civilians and analysts to track troop movements and assess battle damage in near real-time. This transparency complicates traditional force concealment and necessitates robust counter-intelligence and electronic warfare capabilities. India’s military must adapt to an environment where hiding force dispositions is nearly impossible, requiring agile decision-making and rapid redeployment capabilities- something that a geography bound command structure would find hard to implement.
• Information as a domain of warfare
  Information has emerged as a critical domain of warfare, with communication serving as a weapon. The ubiquity of mobile phones and social media platforms means that war-related information—force movements, battle outcomes, and even propaganda—spreads rapidly. In Ukraine, President Zelenskyy’s effective use of social media shaped global perceptions and rallied international support. Conversely, Russia’s attempts to control the narrative through disinformation highlighted the power of information warfare. For India, the deficiencies observed in messaging strategies, in relation to recent operations, were pointed out by many observers. This underscores the need for integrated communication strategies that align military operations with public messaging. Commanders must engage not only with their forces but also with the civilian population to counter enemy propaganda and maintain public morale. Once again, a functional convergence of strategic communication, at national level would serve better than theatre level briefings.

Trimming the fat—an inescapable requirement

The existing command structure in the armed forces is top-heavy and excessively unwieldy. There is an urgent need to trim the fat and eliminate excessive bureaucracy.

We have 17 Service specific (geography based) Commands and two tri-Service commands. Among the tri-Service commands, the Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC, HQ at Port Blair) is based on geography, while the Strategic Forces Command (SFC, HQ at Delhi) is based on functionality. Given below is the list of existing commands:

Indian Army Commands

• Northern Command (Udhampur, Jammu & Kashmir)
• Western Command (Chandimandir, Chandigarh)
• Eastern Command (Kolkata, West Bengal)
• Central Command (Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh)
• Southern Command (Pune, Maharashtra)
• South-Western Command (Jaipur, Rajasthan)
• Army Training Command (Shimla, Himachal Pradesh)

Indian Air Force Commands

• Western Air Command (Delhi)
• Eastern Air Command (Shillong, Meghalaya)
• Central Air Command (Prayagraj, Uttar Pradesh)
• Southern Air Command (Thiruvananthapuram, Kerala)
• South-Western Air Command (Gandhinagar, Gujarat)
• Maintenance Command (Nagpur, Maharashtra)
• Training Command (Bengaluru, Karnataka)

Indian Navy Commands

• Western Naval Command (Mumbai, Maharashtra)
• Eastern Naval Command (Visakhapatnam, Andhra Pradesh)
• Southern Naval Command (Kochi, Kerala)

Notably, no two command headquarters are located in the same place, reflecting the lack of will on the part of government and organisational inertia on part of the Services, in achieving physical integration of armed forces. In years gone by, communications over long distances were unreliable and often not secure. Also, moving forces from one place to another, and coordinating efforts with other Services took considerable time, necessitating the need to institute regional service HQs.

These problems don’t exist now. These command structures have outlived their utility and must be abolished swiftly, replaced with more responsive and integrated command structures. There would also be a need to trim the fat at the top. For example, an Air Force that has less than 30 operational fighter squadrons has more than 30 three-star officers. Similar predicament exists for other Services. We can certainly manage with much less brass.

The way forward: Functional integration and agility

To address the challenges of modern warfare, India’s armed forces must prioritise functional integration and agility over rigid geographic restructuring.

Geographic Commands

• Reduce the number of geographic commands to three: a Western Command for Pakistan, a Northern Command for China, and a Maritime Command for the Indian Ocean Region.
• The Indian Army’s resources should be divided into two geographic theatres: West (Pakistan) and North (China), reflecting operational requirements and terrain specialisation.
• The Navy should maintain one command (Maritime) and two fleets — Eastern and Western. The responsibility of island territories (Andaman and Nicobar, Lakshadweep) must be taken over by Maritime command.
• The IAF should remain a single, unified entity covering the entire country due to its rapid deployment capabilities and nationwide operational flexibility. However, it could be subdivided into two functional commands — Air Defence Command and Strike Command. Air Defence assets of other Services must be aligned with IAF’s AD command.

Functional Commands

We should lay greater emphasis on functional integration over physical integration. Following tri-Service functional commands should be raised:

• Logistics Command: To streamline supply chains, maintenance, and resource allocation across services.
• Training Command: To standardise joint training and doctrine development.
• Space Command: To manage satellite operations, space-based surveillance, and counter-space capabilities. To improve synergy with ISRO.
• Unmanned Systems Command: To integrate drones and autonomous systems across air, land, and sea domains.
• Cyberspace Command: To coordinate offensive and defensive operations in cyberspace.
• Strategic Forces Command: Existing SFC architecture should continue
• Design and Development Command: To ensure greater integration of armed forces in research, design and development of military hardware being manufactured/ procured locally as well as globally.

These functional commands would foster synergy, reduce costs, and ensure that domain-specific expertise is leveraged effectively.

The service HQs should continue to exist and merge at functional level with MoD to form integrated HQs. Service Chiefs would continue to form part of the chief of staff committee and along with CDS advise the government. Service HQs would execute service-specific sustenance functions like raise, train and maintain.

Going beyond the military

For integration to deliver optimum results, the integration efforts must expand beyond services to include MoD, DPSUs, ISRO, AEC, and other enterprises engaged in defence-related activities. In that regard, it is suggested that a Joint Secretary level officer from the MoD and MEA should be appointed to assist the theatre commander.

Based on the role-specification of functional commands, these external officers could also come from ISRO, DPSU, AEC, Ministry of Finance and so on. These postings would align military operations with national policy, enhance diplomatic coordination, and streamline defence production and procurement.

Group Captain Ajay Ahlawat is a retired IAF fighter pilot. He tweets @Ahlawat2012. Views are personal.

(Edited by Prashant)