In the wake of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Russia, several American officials, both current and former, have publicly expressed displeasure at New Delhi’s continued dalliance with Moscow. In private, the comments of US officials were even harsher, especially because Modi’s visit coincided with the celebration of NATO’s 75th anniversary summit. This raises several questions about the state of India’s most important relationships and the choices that Indian security managers are making.
Despite US concerns, the state of the relationship is probably as good as it can be. Obviously, India gets to choose the kind of relationship it wants with the US and is plainly uncomfortable with the deeper security partnership that Washington appears to want. But the pace of the India-US relationship is clearly being dictated by New Delhi, as it almost always has been. However, this method hasn’t been without its downsides. In the 1950s, Jawaharlal Nehru was unwilling to fully commit to partnering with the US against China, with predictable consequences.
The current situation echoes that era, with the US seeking a deeper anti-China partnership and India demurring. Hopefully, the consequences this time will be different from those under Nehru. Neither being a 5,000-year-old civilisation nor a rising power precludes strategic foolishness. Nehru’s India, after all, was the same 5,000-year-old civilisation and a rising power, and his foreign policy towards China (among many others) was not exactly a grand success.
This pattern of relationship is not unusual. When it comes to relations between regional notables and great powers, it is often the former that sets the pace. This appears counterintuitive because we expect the stronger side to be more influential, but regional powers tend to be more obsessed with local issues and tend to usually get their way. Think of the US-Pakistan relations or Egyptian-Soviet ties, if you want non-Indian examples.
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A near-ideal scenario
The current state of relations with the US is perhaps near-ideal for India. New Delhi does not seek a deep security partnership such as a military alliance, where the military forces of both countries fight together if either partner is attacked. Indeed, the slow conversion of the Quad—the “Security Dialogue” part of the title seems no longer in fashion—into a mostly non-traditional security grouping reflects India’s reluctance.
What India appears to want is some level of diplomatic support, though even this is circumscribed because New Delhi prefers not to have other countries involved in its bilateral dispute with China. Obviously, if the border issue escalates to war or if China takes it to the UN Security Council or some such contingency, New Delhi will expect US support. However, it seems clear that India does not want its partners to make any loud pronouncements about Chinese actions on the border itself because such pronouncements may complicate its negotiations with Beijing. These negotiations aren’t making much progress, of course, but that is another story altogether.
India also wants military equipment, but New Delhi is not looking to the US for large-scale military supplies. What it appears to want are niche technologies for which there aren’t many other choices, such as the P-8Is or Apache helicopter gunships. This is why the increase in the dollar amount of US arms supplies to India is not a very good indicator; they are for specific pieces of high-technology items rather than large-scale military equipment like fighter planes or tanks.
Intelligence support is another area where India benefits from partnering with the US, which has helped New Delhi during crises at the LAC. This support is likely to continue because India still has gaps in its intelligence capabilities despite the growing sophistication of its space-based assets. The US is unlikely to scrimp on this assistance, as it benefits the US too by enhancing India’s military preparedness at the border, especially during crises.
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Striking a balance
As long as India seeks only a limited partnership, it is unlikely to be seriously damaged by troubles arising from its dalliance with Moscow or US unhappiness with some aspects of India’s domestic policies. Any friction is likely to remain limited and will not affect the narrow objectives of the partnership. Indeed, this might be one reason why the relationship has so far survived and prospered despite many turbulences because these do not fundamentally affect India’s modest ambitions for the partnership.
To the extent that there are frictions, they pertain to the management of expectations. In Washington, over the past year, there has been growing acceptance that an ambitious agenda for the partnership is probably unachievable, leading to a downward revision of expectations. This likely suits New Delhi, as it aligns the partnership more closely with India desires.
However, there are some downsides for India in such a limited partnership. For one, it reduces the strength of a central argument pushed by many supporters of a closer US-India partnership in Washington: that a stronger India is naturally in America’s interest. This argument has traditionally defended the partnership whenever the US and India disagreed. Without it, the relationship becomes more transactional, though this is not necessarily a bad thing as long as both sides understand the terms of the transaction.
In practical terms, this might mean that the US starts looking elsewhere for deep security partnerships to counter China in the Indo-Pacific. Not surprisingly, this has already been happening. With the Quad engaged in more trivial pursuits, the US and its other partners are developing hard security structures in the region, such as AUKUS, the deepening Australia-Japan defence arrangements, and others involving the Philippines. This leaves India out, though any effort to balance China in the region will also benefit India.
Another potential disadvantage is that the US may not be open to the kind of technology transfers that India desires. In a limited, transactional partnership, the incentive for the US to do more than what is absolutely necessary diminishes.
Of course, just as India benefits from any effort by the US and its partners to balance China in the region, the US also benefits from Indian efforts to counter China. In effect, even without any formal or deep US-India partnership, the US and others in the region will benefit from this dynamic because India has little choice but to do what it can to counter China.
Rajesh Rajagopalan is a professor of International Politics at Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi. He tweets @RRajagopalanJNU. Views are personal.
(Edited by Prashant)