Donald Trump is at it again. The man who claimed he could end the Ukraine war “in 24 hours” is about to once again try his hand at what has become the bloodiest conflict in Europe since WW2. Curiously, India is watching this with cautious optimism, and Prime Minister Modi has even spoken with President Zelenskyy on the phone.
At first glance, these two threads—Trump’s meeting with Putin in Alaska and India’s hopes—feel out of sync. But the riddle begins to unravel if you follow the breadcrumb trail of strategic ego, economic carrots, political grudges, and converging interests.
On Friday, Trump is set to meet Putin at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson in Anchorage, Alaska. This is no random coffee shop—during the Cold War, it was the “top cover for North America”, guarding against Soviet bombers. Today, it still houses F-22 Raptors, the stealthiest fighters in the world, that routinely intercept Russian jets sniffing around US airspace.
In anticipation of the Alaska meeting, European leaders are scrambling to have a phone call with Trump, cautioning him of all the things that could go wrong with hurried decisions.
The amount of international speculation the meeting has garnered is understandable. This is Trump and Putin’s first in-person encounter since Osaka 2019, and Trump’s first as the re-elected US president. The announcement was dropped—in classic Trump style—just before the 8 August deadline for putting fresh sanctions on Russia for failing to stop the war. Instead of pulling the sanctions trigger, Trump decided to invite Putin for a chat in the Arctic.
India’s déjà vu
If you’re in New Delhi, you’ve seen this movie before—and it wasn’t exactly a box office hit. Smug with Trump’s cosying up to Putin in the early weeks of taking office, India was ill-prepared for the US president’s re-pivot to Europe.
Trump’s latest swings on Russia policy have had collateral damage for India. Punitive tariffs have been slapped on Indian goods, a hard-negotiated trade deal stands iced, and a 25-year strategic partnership has been suddenly made to look inconsequential.
The not-so-secret spoiler here is also the Modi government‘s misreading of Donald Trump on events after Operation Sindoor. The cold shoulder toward Modi and punitive tariffs aren’t solely about India buying Russian oil. These US actions are more about Modi refusing to publicly acknowledge Trump for facilitating the “ceasefire” between India and Pakistan—something Trump has bragged about dozens of times while India has repeatedly and unnecessarily denied.
The US’ sudden reduction of a self-assured India to a strategic expendable has gone down bitterly in New Delhi. This time, though, it is keeping its powder dry. Any US-Russia dialogue is welcome and conducive to Indian interests, but the memory, impact, and shock of recent disappointments linger.
That said, pragmatism calls for keeping our cards open. The calculation is simple—if Trump warms up to Putin, India might get short-term relief (having the punitive tariffs lifted) and long-term diplomatic flexibility—engaging both Russia and the West without alienating either.
The catch? India has talked a big game about playing peacemaker and mediator, but hasn’t shown much appetite or capacity for actual, even limited, mediation. It has facilitated no prisoner swaps, no ceasefire preparatory talks—nothing on the level of what the Emiratis, Saudis, or Turks have done. The truth is, India’s leverage in ending the war is rather limited. More disappointingly, it has not even lived up to its widely respected ‘humanitarian actor’ reputation in the war.
Part of the problem is that India hasn’t capitalised on its 2023 “moment”—hosting the G-20 and basking in global attention. Instead of pushing hard for investment, reforming defence procurement, and capitalising on ‘China + 1’ diversification, India got distracted.
Now, with Trump and Putin set to meet again, India is reclaiming its mediator role. However, a little scrutiny will tell us that nothing decisive can be expected from Alaska.
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Roadblocks in Alaska
Even with Trump’s flair for theatrics, three big roadblocks remain:
1. Land swap paradox: Trump’s team has repeatedly mentioned land swap—the question is, how? Ukraine doesn’t hold Russian territory; Russia only partially holds some annexed Ukrainian regions. Putin wants all four annexed territories without more fighting, and Ukraine refuses to gift land that it is still defending. Does Trump mean to ask Russia to give its own land to Ukraine? Or does he mean to ask Russia to give back some of the land taken from Ukraine? Either seems a rather outlandish proposition.
The strategy, therefore, has a fundamental paradox to resolve.
2. Battlefield dynamics: The war in Ukraine began in 2014 with Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the gaining of de facto control over the Donbass region. In 2022, Moscow escalated to a full-scale invasion, seeking to seize more territory and formally declaring four Ukrainian regions—Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson—as part of Russia. Of these, Donetsk and Luhansk were part of the earlier occupied Donbass, while Zaporozhzhia and Kherson were new claims.
However, after 11 years of grinding conflict, Russia fully controls only Luhansk. Roughly a quarter each of Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia remains under Ukrainian control, with fierce fighting ongoing. Despite expectations of major breakthroughs, battlefield dynamics have stayed relatively static, and Russia’s summer offensive has underperformed.
Notably, following Trump’s announcement of planned talks with Putin in Alaska, Russian forces have intensified operations, attempting to seize as many villages as possible before potential negotiations. Yet Russian gains average at about 20 per cent of Ukrainian territory. Putin’s strategy hinges on presenting a simplified battlefield dynamic to Trump, which will not hold in reality.
3. Diffused power differential: Who holds the cards to end the Ukraine war? Trump may hold immense power, but the US cannot singlehandedly end the conflict. Russia, for all its reputed military might, has failed to secure victory on the battlefield, while Ukraine—despite its resilience and courage—remains unable to reclaim its lost territories through force alone. However, in its fourth year of war, Ukraine boasts one of the world’s most advanced drone warfare capabilities despite war fatigue and apparent fissures in Zelesnkyy’s popularity.
Then there is Europe. Unable to play a decisive role initially, Europe’s unprecedented transformation to ramp up its defence spending despite fragile solidarity and resilience to stay united behind Ukraine has been surprising. While the UK and France have maintained consistent strategic positions, Germany’s rearmament and Poland’s resurgence have been pivotal.
As Trump took office, Poland, as EU Council chair, championed security and defence as core priorities—driving a difficult but essential enabler toward military modernisation. Chancellor Merz’s constitutional changes, boosting Germany’s defence spending, complemented Poland’s leadership in steering structural reforms for a good six months within a traditionally geo-economic EU. They reshaped Europe’s strategic focus toward security preparedness, and in the process, accorded the EU undeniable agency as a bloc. Today, it is Europe that provides more support to Ukraine, not the US. Even the American weapons for Ukraine are purchased by Europe.
Therefore, Europe and Ukraine’s agencies are crucial. There is credible evidence to show that if the Alaska talks are steered bilaterally between the US and Russia, the diffused power differential among key stakeholders will foil the outcomes before they even start taking effect.
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The Trump carrot
Promising to give Ukraine some due, Trump is dangling eye-popping offers to Russia. The list includes mineral access in Russian-occupied Ukraine, lifting sanctions on the aviation sector, and even letting Russia develop Arctic resources in the Bering Strait—an area holding an estimated 13 per cent of the world’s oil. For a man who once almost convinced the world about taking Greenland militarily, this is counterintuitive. The US has carefully guarded its Arctic dominance for decades; handing any of that to Moscow would be a seismic policy shift—that is, if Trump means it.
If, against all odds, Alaska produces even a partial step toward peace, India could quietly position itself yet again for a role in Ukraine’s reconstruction—bridging American, European, Russian, and Ukrainian interests.
Is it a risk-averse approach? Yes. Is it aspirational? Also yes.
Where Trump is involved, anything is possible—from a headline-grabbing “deal” announced beamingly on Truth Social to a total flop, with fighting resuming. The most probable scenario, however, would be a ceasefire immediately and then steps toward discussing the quid pro quo on territories and guarantees.
India should keep hedging to avoid the fate of being collateral damage in someone else’s great-power drama. But as Alaska looms, one thing is clear: the real battlefield is as much about leverage, resilience, and perception as it is about territory and capabilities. On that front, the safest strategy for India is to translate its potential into leverage. And that is no easy feat.
Swasti Rao is a Consulting Editor (International and Strategic Affairs) at ThePrint. She tweets @swasrao. Views are personal.
(Edited by Prasanna Bachchhav)