When China Eastern Airlines restarted its Shanghai–Delhi service recently, much of the Chinese commentary presented the resumption of direct flights between India and China as evidence of warming ties, another step toward the gradual “return to normal.”
A Weibo user named Sun Yuliang wrote, “The skies once again connect Beijing and New Delhi. The planes flying over the Himalayas carry not only luggage and passengers, but also subtle signals concerning the relationship between China and India.”
Notwithstanding this optimistic rhetoric, the dominant Chinese narrative emphasises the limits of recovery, with particular focus on deep-seated contradictions, structural challenges, and a persistent lack of trust that continue to define India-China relations.
A gradual, cautious normalisation
The reopening of air links may ease tensions temporarily, but it does little to bridge enduring strategic and political divides. For many Chinese observers, the relationship remains precarious and gestures of goodwill are pragmatic adjustments rather than transformative breakthroughs.
Chinese discourse frames “normalisation” as a slow, layered process, combining diplomatic signals with functional measures. As per a commentary by the South Asian Research Newsletter, the reinstatement of Kailash Mansarovar Yatra for Indian pilgrims, the resumption of tourist visa for the Chinese, the reopening of border trade markets, and the partial lifting of restrictions on goods such as fertilisers, rare earths, and shield machines by China are examples of resolved issues. The restoration of flights fits into this carefully sequenced, incremental approach.
Yet the underlying challenges remain unresolved: military de-escalation, border control reform, cross-border river data sharing, India’s hesitancy to liberalise Chinese investment, and the long-delayed delimitation of the border. Persistent tensions, an asymmetrical trade balance, and rising nationalist sentiment continue to fuel mistrust. Crisis management mechanisms remain largely reactive, leaving relations vulnerable to sudden flare-ups.
Within this discourse, analysts emphasise China has opted for “functional cooperation” as a stabilising mechanism. By contrast, India’s China policy is often interpreted in China through the lens of domestic politics. The rise of Hindu nationalism, commentators argue, reinforces a posture aimed at ‘hyping up the China threat’ and ‘justifying containment of China.’
Chinese commentators consistently portray India, not China, as the driver of rapprochement. New Delhi’s outreach is framed as a pragmatic, reluctant choice shaped by multiple pressures. A widely circulated Weibo post summarised four key drivers:
- Economic urgency: India’s slowing economy and declining foreign investment create an urgent need for Chinese capital and technology.
- Strategic recalibration: Reliance on the United States has exposed vulnerabilities, revealing the limits of geopolitical speculation.
- Dependence on China: Chinese supplies, particularly rare earths, which account for nearly 80 percent of India’s needs, are essential to India’s industrial chain. Disengagement would be costly and disruptive.
- Pragmatic foresight: Cooperation with China must be approached with strategic clarity and initiative.
A Baijiahao commentary argued that India’s vulnerabilities in military and new energy sectors have prompted careful recalibration, combining selective engagement with cautious distancing. At the same time, a Zhihu post seemingly drew parallels between Beijing and New Delhi being driven by internal weaknesses and external pressures, noting how China too is constrained by its strategic priorities in the South China Sea and the contestation with the US that highlight its inability to resolve border disputes.
Also read: In China, Ashley Tellis’ arrest is proof that US-India trust was always fragile
Trust deficit and strategic play
Chinese commentators and state-owned media portray recent developments as cautiously positive yet overshadowed by long-standing mistrust. Arunachal Pradesh, referred to in Beijing as “South Tibet”, is now depicted as the most sensitive flashpoint. A Chinese commentator threatened that, unlike Taiwan, the threshold for escalation with India is lower, making conflict likelier if provocations persist. From this perspective, the commentator suggested that given Beijing’s limited patience, China will eventually enforce its territorial expectations vis-à-vis Arunachal Pradesh.
Along the Line of Actual Control, Chinese discourse interprets India’s infrastructure projects as deliberate, long-term strategic signalling rather than temporary adjustments. Posts on Chinese social media frame these developments as evidence that India is preparing for a sustained border presence.
Positive developments between Beijing and New Delhi are depicted as a careful strategic play. A commentator noted that each side closely monitors troop deployments, infrastructure expansion, and political signalling, and that terms like “risk management” (China) and “confidence-building measures” (India) conceal mutual suspicion: India is wary of covert Chinese troop movements, while China watches for sudden Indian advances.
In this narrative, the resumption of flights between Shanghai and Delhi is largely symbolic, a tactical gesture rather than an indicator of genuine lasting trust. Chinese commentary stresses that while functional cooperation continues, underlying tensions, border disputes, infrastructure buildups, and strategic mistrust, remain central to any prospects of full normalisation in India-China relations.
Sana Hashmi is a fellow at the Taiwan-Asia Exchange Foundation. She tweets @sanahashmi1. Views are personal.
(Edited by Prashant)