A recent post by a learned colleague on social media listed 15 tactical essentials that any army must follow to survive on a battlefield that’s shaped by a quantum leap in military technology. These lessons have emerged from the Russia-Ukraine and Israel-Gaza/Hamas/Iran wars, where new-age weapons and combat support systems have been successfully employed.
I will discuss these essentials, related to the fundamentals of tactics—firepower, protection, and mobility—that armies have employed since time immemorial to capture or defend ground, or, at the macro level, territory. Despite all technological advancements, capturing or defending ground still has to be done physically. However, the impact of military technology and the relative dominance of these three fundamentals have dictated tactics over time.
Transparent battlefields & lethality of PGMs
Modern surveillance and reconnaissance tools—such as satellites, drones, aircraft, radars, and electronic/cyber interception—have made the battlefield transparent. These technologies can pinpoint all static and moving targets, which can then be targeted with near 100 per cent hit probability by air- or ground-based precision-guided munitions (PGMs) and drones.
The limiting factors are resources and cost, and the lethality of kinetic munitions, which is related on the degree of protection the target has. However, this limitation can be partially circumvented by using cheap drone swarms and deep-penetration munitions.
On the defensive side, we see a return of the famed trenches of World War I and even of tunnel defences. Electronic and cyber jamming to neutralise command and control systems, fire control means, and guided missiles/munitions, further compound the threat to both the defender and the attacker.
In such an environment, firepower and protection—and thereby the defender—have a distinct advantage over mobility. The attacker is forced to manoeuvre in the open to capture territory. Unless 70-80 per cent of defences and fire support means are destroyed (compared to the neutralisation to close in, needed in the past), a physical assault becomes prohibitive in terms of casualties to men and equipment. This is the reason why there has been no large-scale capture of territory in Ukraine or Gaza through the combined arms manoeuvres that dominated the battlefield during and after World War II.
However, the advantage is relative, as both the attacker and the defender can employ countermeasures against intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance means. Protective bubbles can be created against electronic warfare (EW), cyber warfare (CW), drones, and air/ground kinetic attacks, as Ukraine did during the Kursk offensive. The limiting factors remain cost and resources.
In a nutshell, the tactical battlefield has undergone a radical change. The days of combined arms manoeuvres, with large division and corps-size formations, are over. All battles will be fought by agile combined-arms brigades and smaller units, with organisations tailored for exploiting new technology.
Expensive vs cheap weapon systems
The focus of most modern armies so far has been on employing sophisticated weapon systems with all-encompassing technology. Notable examples include tanks, infantry combat vehicles, artillery guns, air defence systems, attack and utility helicopters, aircraft of all hues, as well as aircraft carriers, ships, and submarines. These systems have become extremely costly and are a drain on the nation’s resources. Even rich nations have limitations with respect to the above, as is evident from the Ukraine war.
Historically, powerful and wealthy nations had a monopoly over high-end military technology. Meanwhile, weaker nations and non-state actors had to resort to prolonged struggles exploiting fourth-generation warfare tactics, which resulted in either the exhaustion of the stronger power or the annihilation of the weaker side. Since military technology has always had dual-use applications, its civilian-commercial version had to be kept simple, cheap, and ready to use. It is this technology that is now powering mass-produced, cheap, and effective weapon systems.
The new weapon systems on the block are a combination of human-operated artificial intelligence and robotic systems like drones, which are cheap, expendable, and can be mass-produced. What has saved the day for Ukraine are not the expensive drone systems but mass-produced FPV drones, which are hundreds of times cheaper and can be operated by a frontline soldier. Note the phenomenal achievements of Ukrainian FPV pilot Tymofiy Orel, who, from January to May 2024, eliminated 434 enemies, wounded 346, and destroyed 42 tanks, 44 BMPs, 10 MT-LBs (multi-purpose armoured vehicles), and 28 BTRs (APCs). Even their long-range drones are much cheaper. Not only have these drones removed the Russian naval fleet from western Black Sea but have also targeted Moscow, 1,700 km away.
Currently, with defensive operations on the rise, we are seeing millions of dollars’ worth of advanced weapon systems being destroyed by drones that are only a fraction of their cost. Imagine, a $500 drone destroying a tank costing $10 million or $2,000 drone requiring a $2 million missile to counter it. Over the next two decades or so, we are likely to see a mix of both expensive and sophisticated systems and cheaper artificial intelligence/robotic systems. In the long run, the latter are bound to prevail.
How to fight on the techno-battlefield?
At all levels of command, from the section to corps, battlefield transparency has to be ensured. Any army that fails to do so will be fighting an unequal battle. Apart from satellites and electronic/cyber warfare, the most cost-effective method is deploying a mass of cheap tactical drones, which can be loaded with an array of visual and electronic packages.
The side that can field more PGMs will have a distinct advantage. A judicious mix of fail-safe but costly air/drone/ground-based PGMs at relatively higher levels of command, alongside a mass of cheaper drone systems and intelligentised basic conventional munitions, will dominate the battlefield in the foreseeable future. Ukraine and Hamas have already demonstrated this model.
All existing communication and guided weapon systems emit a phenomenal amount of electronic/cyber signals, making them vulnerable to interference, interception, and deception by EW and CW. These signals also pinpoint the location of the emitter. Earlier, such sources were targeted with a heavy volume of unguided kinetic firepower. Now, within minutes, the source, depending on its degree of importance, will be targeted by ground, air, or drone-based PGMs. Take, for example, how Hezbollah’s leadership and command/control were destroyed by Israel in a span of 10 days. The implication is that not only must communications be secure, but active signal emissions have to be reduced to the minimum. Troops and weapon systems have to be agile to rapidly change their locations. This precludes the use of large formations.
The transparent battlefield and PGMs also necessitate physical protection for the forces. For permanent defences along borders, both fielded forces and logistics have to go underground. Tunnel defences offer a pragmatic solution. Apart from passive measures, exposed forces in defence, advance, or attack will require protective anti-drone/air defence, as well as electronic/cyber warfare bubbles.
It is pertinent to mention that all these issues are relative and depend on the capabilities of the adversary.
Also Read: Indian military has narrowed the gap with PLA in drone warfare, now it needs a clear concept
Reform or perish
The Ukraine-Russia and Israel-Gaza/Lebanon/Iran wars have provided a live demonstration of the role played by a combination of existing state-of-the-art and emerging military technologies. Ukraine has stalemated a superior adversary through a combination of expensive, state-of-the-art and largely imported weapon systems, and the innovative use of emerging technologies, particularly mass-produced, cheap drones used in various roles. Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran have also made innovative use of new technologies, but Israel has gained the upper hand by overwhelming them with mass deployment of superior technologies.
I have no doubt that the Indian armed forces have studied and learned lessons from the Ukraine-Russia and Israel-Hamas/Hezbollah/Iran/Houthi wars. However, the transformation blueprint is not in the public domain. At present, the Indian armed forces are organised, structured, and equipped to fight wars using technologies that peaked three decades ago. The focus has been on budgeting and inducting technologies that modern armies adopted a decade ago. Progress has been limited due to a shrinking defence budget.
In the last four years, a parallel focus has also been given to emerging technologies. But my assessment is that the Indian military is adopting emerging technologies for incremental change and not transformation—which is the need of the hour.
I must reiterate the urgent need to formalise a national security strategy and a national defence policy to pave the way for the transformation of the armed forces. The government must give formal guidance for this transformation, provide the necessary budget, and monitor progress. China began its transformation in 2015 and is on track to complete it by 2035. Sadly, we have made little to no progress in the last decade even as China has increased the military differential. The emergence of cheaper advanced military technologies has given India a unique opportunity to bridge the gap. Transformation in the next decade is now a compulsion for India.
Lt Gen H S Panag PVSM, AVSM (R) served in the Indian Army for 40 years. He was GOC in C Northern Command and Central Command. Post retirement, he was Member of Armed Forces Tribunal.
(Edited by Asavari Singh)