Sam Pitroda is all that the Chinese are talking about. And chinks in India’s policy

Chinese discourse recognises that India’s political parties have varying approaches to China, with the Congress seen as more favourable toward Beijing.

File photo of Sam Pitroda | Commons

China’s strategic community and media view India’s domestic debate on Beijing as a sign of internal divisions and political exploitation of the China issue. 

Entrepreneur Sam Pitroda, chairman of the Indian Overseas Congress, recently urged the Indian government not to regard China as an enemy. His comments sparked a strong backlash from the BJP and drew attention in China. 

A Chinese commentator described Pitroda’s statement as “heartfelt,” while BJP spokesperson Sudhanshu Trivedi was likened to an “enraged lion” for his response.

Pitroda’s comments seen as Congress policy

While India’s broader stance on China differs from Beijing’s perspective, Chinese discourse acknowledges that India’s political parties have varying approaches to China, with the Congress seen as more favourable toward Beijing. A Chinese commentator noted that Pitroda, as head of Congress’ overseas unit, subtly accused Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the BJP of damaging India-China relations, attempting to sway public opinion against the Modi government.

Zhang Jiadong, director of the Center for South Asian Studies at Fudan University, described Pitroda’s remarks as rational, perceiving an emerging sentiment in India advocating for engagement with China despite public distrust. Zhang suggested that the debate surrounding Pitroda’s comments highlights a critical reality: India may need to reassess its China policy. He warned that embracing hostility toward Beijing could not only strain bilateral ties but also harm New Delhi’s own interests. However, Zhang also noted that Pitroda’s views do not reflect India’s mainstream stance and that the country’s strategic positioning toward China remains largely unchanged.

Xie Chao, an associate professor at Fudan University’s Institute of International Studies, pointed to internal contradictions within the Modi government. He observed that while Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman supports easing restrictions on Chinese investment, Commerce and Industry Minister Piyush Goyal advocates for stricter controls. According to Xie, the controversy surrounding Pitroda’s remarks further reveals internal disagreements within the BJP and between India’s two main parties, suggesting a fractured China policy.

Wu Xuelan, a current affairs commentator, identified three factors shaping India’s divided voices on China. First, ongoing political struggles push parties to adopt contrasting stances on China to secure votes. Second, the implementation of the US ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy’ provides India with opportunities to maximise its strategic and economic interests. Third, India’s recent developmental challenges have led to a pivot toward Western countries, which has yet to deliver the expected economic benefits. Against this backdrop, Wu argued that Pitroda’s remarks signal a push for cooperation with China, reflecting the belief that strengthening economic ties with its neighbour is essential for India to realise its full potential and become a ‘respected global power.’ Wu emphasised that the focus of bilateral relations should be on win-win cooperation, not confrontation and conflict.

Weakened bargaining position with the US

For a long time, China’s strategic community has believed that India seeks US support to counter Beijing. Long Xingchun, director of the Center for Indian Studies at China West Normal University, argued that this approach reflects a lack of confidence in India’s own strength and a reliance on external support.

Mao Keji from Tsinghua University contended that US President Donald Trump’s potential shift away from the Indo-Pacific Strategy and reduced focus on countering Beijing has weakened New Delhi’s bargaining power with Washington. 

As the US no longer views India as a counterweight to China, preferential treatment has diminished. Modi’s continued alignment with the US is seen by some in China as a sign of India’s eroding strategic autonomy, leaving New Delhi with fewer options. As pressure mounts, some Indian policymakers are reassessing their stance on China — not out of goodwill, but to regain leverage with Washington.

A Chinese commentator observed that even as the US actively courts India, differing views on China persist within the country. Pitroda’s statement, they argued, reflects a broader internal debate on India-China relations. Despite Modi’s push for ‘Make in India’ to reduce economic dependence on China, results have been mixed, and India remains heavily reliant on Chinese supply chains across key industries. Another commentator noted that the US often overlooks India’s diverse opinions on China, warning that Trump’s position on tariffs could ultimately force India to choose between Washington and Beijing.

‘India should cooperate’

Despite ongoing tensions, a small but optimistic perspective in China suggests that high-level engagements across political, military, and national security spheres signal cautious signs of détente. Amid global conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, the gradual improvement in India-China relations stands as a rare example of successful diplomacy.

Liu Hong, deputy director of the Center for China and Globalization, highlights that from China’s perspective, India is a rapidly growing consumer goods market with significant potential for foreign investment. However, he notes that a lack of mutual trust currently limits opportunities for deeper cooperation.

Much of the Chinese discourse portrays India’s current position as self-defeating, with a broader consensus that India should prioritise issues beyond its dispute with China. Some argue that Trump’s presidency could push India closer to Beijing, with a weakened India more likely to seek a resolution to border tensions.

However, India’s China policy is often overanalysed through the lens of US politics. It is important to remember that differences between the two countries are not driven by Washington but by longstanding issues and China’s weaponisation of the border dispute. The occupant of the White House does not change the fundamental realities of India-China relations or India’s outlook on China. Relations are more likely to improve when Beijing and its strategic community stop viewing India solely through the prism of great power rivalry and begin addressing India’s long-term concerns.

In the meantime, China could choose to capitalise on Pitroda’s comments, which align with its own views—if that’s the intention. Yet, this is the essence of democracy: diverse voices on critical issues. The truth remains clear: the path to lasting peace lies in resolving the border dispute and China taking genuine steps to support India’s rise. After all, that’s what friends do—something China hopes India will recognise, even as Beijing continues to block, coerce, and complicate the idea of ‘friendship’. While Chinese analysts ask, “Is China a friend or foe to India?” the answer depends entirely on China and its actions.

Sana Hashmi is a fellow at Taiwan-Asia Exchange Foundation. She tweets @sanahashmi1. Views are personal.

(Edited by Aamaan Alam Khan)