Last week, India and China reached a patrolling agreement at the Line of Actual Control, effectively ending over four years of stalemate and escalating tensions. This development set the stage for the first one-on-one meeting between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping in five years.
While the Indian media and strategic community approach this potential thaw with caution, opinions within Chinese internet and strategic circles vary. Many Chinese internet users view India’s announcement of the patrolling agreement, later confirmed by China, as an unprecedented initiative and a positive step toward improving bilateral relations. On Weibo, hashtags such as “Indian Foreign Minister says he hopes India-China relations return to pre-2020 state” and “India-China will complete military disengagement” were circulated widely.
Economic drivers at the core
Some commentators suggest that this recent détente appears strategically timed, given that the agreement was announced on the eve of the Kazan BRICS summit. They interpret it as a signal of Modi’s intent to explore deeper cooperation with China by expressing goodwill to normalise bilateral ties. On Chinese media and social media platforms, there is a growing consensus that India’s China policy has qualitatively shifted, primarily due to its perceived economic slowdown and the pressing need for cooperation with China. Many observers argued that because China is India’s top trading partner, New Delhi is economically inseparable from Beijing despite past border tensions. India has had to recognise that Chinese capital and technology are essential for sustaining rapid development. From 2014 to September 2024, China amassed a cumulative trade surplus of approximately $685.33 billion with India, averaging an annual surplus of around $63.63 billion.
Recent discussions among Chinese internet users and analysts suggest that the thaw in India-China relations may be linked to India’s escalating tensions with Canada and a growing perception of the West as unreliable. Commentators noted that India appears to be reevaluating the effectiveness of its partnerships with the US and other Western countries. Chinese analysts assert that under Modi, especially since the start of his third term, there has been a noticeable shift in India’s China strategy towards a more pragmatic and independent stance that contrasts with Western positions. Consequently, as India perceives the US as an unreliable partner, they suggest that a policy shift seems inevitable, driven by a deeper understanding of the US’ ‘true intentions’ and a desire to navigate its options carefully without being trapped, while still engaging with Western partners.
Also read: China can back out of LAC agreement. India shouldn’t be lulled into a false sense of security
Lingering mutual distrust
‘Future de-escalation will, however, depend on reciprocal actions from China’—this remark by India’s External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar that has drawn scrutiny within the Chinese strategic community. Long Xingchun from Sichuan International Studies University argued that blaming China alone for the border issue or implying that China seeks concessions from India is misguided. Improving relations, he argued, requires mutual effort, sincerity, and restraint to prevent new issues, emphasising cooperation as a shared responsibility. Lin Minwang, deputy director at the Center for South Asian Studies at Fudan University, observed that Jaishankar’s remarks reflect a persistent lack of mutual trust between the two countries. He suggested that Jaishankar’s stance may also be a response to domestic political pressure despite the agreements reached.
Moreover, a commentator remarked that the recent agreement is merely a technical one aimed at stabilising the situation and should not be seen as China making any concessions regarding sovereignty. The confrontations over the past four years have demonstrated China’s military strength, leading India to recognise Beijing’s ability to control actions—whether advancing or retreating—at will. The latest developments are portrayed as a win for China, with some voices suggesting that India has finally ‘woken up’ to reality. In Chinese discourse, there is a strong emphasis on the notion that Beijing is not making any concessions to New Delhi and that the latter has recognised it does not wish to be manipulated by the US anymore.
Also read: India-China LAC ‘solution plan’ will follow Beijing’s timetable. That’s a different calendar
China’s flawed interpretation of India
Chinese narrative is framing India as the lesser or weaker power in this thaw. A Weibo post even shared a video depicting the disengagement where only Indian troops are withdrawing from the border areas. Although India has long demonstrated a willingness to resolve differences with China—keeping military and diplomatic communication channels open—these developments appear to have worked in China’s favour, especially given its alignment with Russia and partial isolation from the West. The optics of the BRICS summit in Kazan—when Modi stood alongside Xi and Russian President Vladimir Putin—were effective in reinforcing China’s narrative and projecting India as neutral or leaning toward an anti-Western stance.
Much of the Chinese discourse on the India-China thaw interprets it through a US-China rivalry lens or as an inevitable move for India to seek economic cooperation with China. However, these perspectives overlook India’s actual approach and interests. India’s stance reflects its commitment to strategic autonomy; it has consistently avoided overt coalitions directed at any third country and has even viewed China as an important component of its Indo-Pacific policy.
While the recent agreement is a step toward reducing tensions, China must address deeper, structural issues for lasting peace. The truce will remain fragile unless the differences are managed effectively. Importantly, India is not abandoning its like-minded partnerships with the West, which extend far beyond the US-China dynamic. India’s approach of multi-alignment, strategic autonomy, and issue-based coalitions remains intact and continue to shape its China policy.
India remains cautious, particularly in light of historical precedents involving recurring patterns of confidence-building measures, violations of agreements by China, and standoffs. For China, it is crucial to recognise that India’s perception of China’s approach to the LAC has evolved; any further border incursions are likely to provoke a firmer policy response, jeopardising this fragile peace. While New Delhi has accepted Beijing’s olive branch for now, the onus now falls on China to uphold stability in the relationship.
Sana Hashmi is fellow at the Taiwan Asia Exchange Foundation. She tweets @sanahashmi1. Views are personal.
(Edited by Theres Sudeep)