Across Chinese online discourse, US President Donald Trump’s sharply contrasting tariff policies toward India and Pakistan have sparked widespread debate. India, long seen by Washington as a key strategic partner, faces tough tariffs, while Pakistan is swiftly emerging as America’s preferred partner in the Indian subcontinent. As one Weibo post put it, “Trump’s policy disguised favouritism towards Pakistan at India’s expense.”
Another user lamented, “There is no way to take China and Russia; Trump channels his anger on India.” An Observer reporter, Liu Zhenghui, described Trump as “a wake-up call for India.”
Yet much of the discussion focuses on the US’ recalibrated stance toward Pakistan, which enjoys the lowest tariff rate in the Indian subcontinent at 19 per cent; a deal seen as preferential.
A divide-and-rule strategy
Chinese commentary largely agrees that Beijing has weathered Washington’s tariff storms with resilience, with exports continuing to grow despite pressure. This resilience reinforces confidence in China’s competitive edge while other countries adjust their approaches.
One analyst noted that India’s 25 per cent tariff, paired with 25 per cent secondary tariff over purchasing Russian oil, signals a clear shift from Washington’s earlier view of India as a friendly partner to a strategic adversary. Conversely, Pakistan’s comparatively low tariff is viewed as a calculated move to deepen the longstanding India–Pakistan rivalry, part of a broader US strategy aimed at isolating non-aligned states and intensifying regional divisions.
Another Chinese commentator expanded on this, suggesting the US seeks to fracture BRICS, isolate China, and maintain dollar dominance. The escalating India-Pakistan conflict exacerbates US doubts about India’s reliability, driving Washington closer to Pakistan and fueling tensions favourable to American interests. This tariff conflict thus pits outdated protectionism against China’s push for multilateralism and the internationalisation of the Chinese yuan.
Chinese analysts interpret Trump’s courting of Pakistan, especially regarding Chinese-led projects like the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and Gwadar Port, as Cold War-style tactics aimed at containing China by exploiting regional rivalries. The US’ offers of tariff cuts on textiles, mineral technology transfers, and F-16 parts sales to Pakistan are perceived as indirect pressure on China’s western borders. The ultimate goal, they argue, is to counterbalance India’s regional influence and disrupt China’s economic integration in the Indian subcontinent.
Chinese commentators mostly view this strategy as flawed, highlighting the strong mutual trust and interests underpinning China-Pakistan relations, and urging the US to abandon its approach in favour of cooperative, win-win partnerships that promote global peace and development.
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Fragile alliances and transactional ties
Less discussed but equally important is the view that recent US-Pakistan developments represent a “backstab” by a longtime friend, exposing the transactional and fragile nature of alliances in Asia. These shifts are interpreted as temporary compromises driven by urgent economic and political pressures rather than long-term strategic realignments.
Chinese discourse advises Beijing to consolidate existing partnerships, deepen multilateral cooperation, and explore new global markets. As one observer noted: while Pakistan’s moves may appear strategic, all parties are ultimately securing their own interests — the US gaining new oil sources beyond the Middle East; Pakistan obtaining technology, capital, and tariff relief; and China preserving long-term benefits from CPEC. For Pakistan, it is a precarious balancing act — a survival tactic amid competing powers. The key question remains: how will Pakistan, now prioritising development over symbolism, navigate this complex relationship?
A telling Weibo comment reflected this ambivalence: “After discovering the oil field, Pakistan repeatedly rejected its iron-clad brother but actively invited US companies to develop it. Pakistan seems ready to ‘step on two boats.’”
Global Times correspondents Cheng Shijie and Ding Yazhi, nevertheless, warned that the US trade policy remains unpredictable, urging Pakistan to remain cautious of the risks posed by Washington’s sudden shifts in trade and political priorities.
Trump’s chessboard
Chinese analysts interpret Trump’s actions as a ruthless reshuffling of the subcontinent chessboard, winning over military strongman — Field Marshal Asim Munir — and humiliating Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who aspires to global leadership.
They suggest that Trump’s disappointment with India’s military performance in the India-Pakistan conflict, combined with his now-favourable view of Pakistan’s leadership, led him to question India’s role in containing China. His meeting with Field Marshal Asim Munir at the White House was seen as reviving the “India-Pakistan hyphen” that Modi had sought to erase.
Liu Zongyi, senior research fellow at the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, highlights a sharp shift in India’s trade strategy. He explains that India initially sought 5-10 per cent tariff cuts to boost manufacturing and leverage the US Indo-Pacific strategy, but was rebuffed due to US economic constraints. Encouraged by progress in China-US talks, India adopted a tougher stance. However, the May 2025 India-Pakistan conflict, along with military setbacks and unacknowledged US mediation, damaged India’s image and strained ties. Frustrated, Trump ended trade talks and doubled tariffs on Indian goods.
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Signs of realignment
A Weibo post noted, “India-China relations have improved this year, not directly because of US tariffs but due to regional military tensions. Still, the tariffs have prompted India to reconsider its geopolitical stance. Without such pressure, India might have overestimated its ability to balance relations with Russia, Iran, and the West while expecting exceptional treatment as a democratic state with English as an official language.”
Lin Minwang, Deputy Director of Fudan University’s Centre for South Asian Studies, sees India’s recent outreach to China as a strategic response to US pressure, with New Delhi cautiously warming ties with Beijing and Moscow while engaging more actively with the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) to signal alternative options. Lin notes Modi’s gradual distancing from a ‘one-sided’ US policy, and although the depth of this potential realignment remains uncertain, he regards it as a significant strategic signal.
Chinese views on this complex issue vary — from interpreting US moves as a classic divide-and-rule tactic exploiting China-Pakistan ties to seeing it as a humiliation for India. Yet many agree in China that this moment offers an opening for normalising ties between China and India.
Sana Hashmi is a fellow at the Taiwan-Asia Exchange Foundation. She tweets @sanahashmi1. Views are personal.
(Edited by Aamaan Alam Khan)