Since Russia invaded Ukraine, the European Union (EU) has been reshaping itself from a largely geo-economic bloc to a more strategic and securitised actor. Its response—from sanctions of unprecedented scale to joint defence initiatives—could fill volumes. Yet, the real story is not the catalogue of actions, but the mindset shift underway in Brussels: a recognition that Europe must move beyond its economic comfort zone if it is to remain relevant in a harsher world.
This reorientation is unfolding along two tracks. Internally, the EU is enhancing military, industrial, and logistical capacity—both to sustain Ukraine and to reinforce its own readiness. Externally, it is redefining itself with global partners, signalling that it wishes to be seen as a serious security actor, not just a trading bloc.
India illustrates this outward push. In September, the EU’s Political and Security Committee (PSC) held wide-ranging consultations in New Delhi, building on the February’s landmark visit by the full College of Commissioners, led by Ursula von der Leyen. The mission included the bloc’s first-ever Commissioner for Security and Defence, Andrius Kubilius, who underlined how the war has altered Europe’s very identity. More recently, PSC chair Delphine Pronk echoed that theme during the PSC’s maiden trip to India.
The joint statements issued may appear cautious, but the symbolism is powerful: EU-India ties are entering a new phase where strategy, security, and defence join trade and technology on the agenda.
Relevance of the PSC
At the centre of this shift sits the PSC, which oversees both the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). It monitors global developments, recommends strategic approaches to the Council, and directs the work of the Military Committee, the Politico-Military Group, and the Committee for Civilian Crisis Management. Comprising ambassadors from all member states and chaired by the European External Action Service, the PSC ensures that Europe’s crisis responses have both political control and strategic direction.
Put simply, the PSC is where the CFSP and CSDP take shape. It designs coherent EU-wide responses to crises and steers their implementation. However, it is important to recall that the CFSP was conceived in the relatively calm post-Cold War era, designed for stability rather than war. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has shattered that assumption. The EU, thrust into uncharted territory, has had to redefine what security means—and that evolution is increasingly visible in the debates of the European Parliament and beyond.
EU not in India’s strategic imagination
From New Delhi’s vantage point, the EU’s strategic identity remains unclear—largely because it is still evolving. Even before the Ukraine war, Europe’s maritime role was more developed than its other defence instruments, as seen in operations like Atalanta, where India has been a partner. That cooperation grew naturally from a shared vision of the Indo-Pacific as a theatre of great-power contestation, where multipolarity must be upheld.
Yet India has long regarded the EU’s broader security role with scepticism. The reason is straightforward: while New Delhi enjoys comprehensive bilateral defence ties with key European states—France most prominently, but also the UK, Germany, Sweden, Spain, Poland, and others—the EU as a bloc has lacked hard power and streamlined decision-making. With 27 members, it is hard to move quickly. This mismatch explains why India’s engagement with Brussels has remained low compared to its thriving bilateral partnerships.
The Ukraine war is changing this dynamic. It has forced member states to raise defence spending and modernise their militaries, while simultaneously compelling the EU itself to step into a more direct security role—supplying Ukraine with arms and ammunition, training soldiers, and coordinating support. Though its pace lags behind national governments, the EU is unmistakably evolving into a security actor.
For India, this shift opens doors. Europe’s defence modernisation creates demand for exports, particularly in dual-use systems and secondary equipment. Already exporting to France, Italy, Spain, and Poland, India could expand its role in Europe’s reconfigured supply chains. If South Korea and Israel can contribute significantly to European modernisation, there is no reason India cannot. With its push to co-develop and co-produce defence systems, New Delhi is well placed—so long as safeguards ensure its products do not directly feed the Ukraine war.
But exports are only one part of the puzzle. The larger question is how India and Europe can frame their cooperation in a way that is both durable and strategic.
Five factors to watch
Beyond PESCO
The PSC’s recent visit to India was notable not just for its symbolism but for its substance. Conversations extended beyond maritime threats into defence industry cooperation. Yet the EU’s existing framework, Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), is poorly suited for partners outside the transatlantic theatre. Burdened with heavy legal and human rights clauses, PESCO is too rigid to accommodate India’s preferences. What Brussels needs is a more flexible, resilient framework that allows India to plug into Europe’s evolving defence industrial strategy—especially in common procurement schemes that benefit both buyers and sellers. Without this flexibility, the partnership risks being stifled by bureaucracy.
Shifting transatlantic balance
Another driver is the shifting balance across the Atlantic. The Trump administration’s erratic approach—criticising India over Russian oil, pressuring Europe on defence spending—laid bare divergences within “the West.” NATO remains indispensable, but Europe is quietly reducing reliance on Washington. States are favouring domestic suppliers, like Dassault, over US platforms, like the F-35. This unprecedented militarisation since World War II creates an opening. India may not be a supplier of advanced jets, but it can co-produce drones, systems, and secondary equipment with Europe—or even in triangular arrangements with Israel. To seize this moment, however, the EU must move beyond PESCO-styled constraints.
A missing defence attaché
Momentum aside, one glaring gap persists: India has yet to appoint a defence attaché in Brussels. The EU did so in New Delhi two years ago, but the absence of reciprocity hampers follow-through. Complex defence conversations cannot be sustained through occasional visits alone. A permanent Indian defence presence in Brussels would provide continuity, signal intent, and ensure routine coordination—a small but vital step.
Caucasus dynamics and India’s stakes
The rapidly shifting Caucasus is another factor. India has become Armenia’s principal defence supplier, but the US and Turkey-backed normalisation with Azerbaijan complicates matters. Trump’s proposals for a corridor along Armenia’s border with Iran could disrupt India’s supply routes. Meanwhile, Armenia’s recent outreach to Pakistan, coordinated by China, adds fresh uncertainty. These shifts could constrain India’s role in Yerevan unless it embeds its presence in a wider framework. Here, partnership with the EU offers a way to remain relevant and contribute to regional stability.
Twin enablers: trade and bilaterals
Finally, two structural drivers will underpin EU-India defence cooperation. First, trade: years after negotiation, only seven of 23 chapters of the India-EU FTA have been agreed upon. A comprehensive deal by 2025 looks unlikely, but even a sectoral agreement would be a major advance with Europe, India’s second-largest trading partner. Second, bilaterals: the stronger India’s ties with France, Germany, and other key states, the more they will reinforce engagement at the EU level. In practice, EU-India defence cooperation will remain secondary to bilateral ties—but that is no weakness. Compartmentalisation allows both sides to deepen convergences even as differences over Russia persist.
To conclude, the PSC’s visit to New Delhi should not be mistaken for an end goal. It is a marker of Europe’s evolving search for a security identity, a process that is far from complete. For India, the challenge and opportunity lie in calibrating engagement carefully—leveraging Europe’s transformation without being drawn into its immediate conflicts. Done right, this could expand India’s defence footprint, embed its role in Europe’s industrial ecosystem, and anchor its presence in the world’s largest economic bloc, now with a GDP surpassing China’s.
The EU’s strategic personality remains unfinished, but its direction is clear. For New Delhi, the task is to seize the moment.
Swasti Rao is a Consulting Editor (International and Strategic Affairs) at ThePrint. She tweets @swasrao. Views are personal.
(Edited by Saptak Datta)