The 16th annual BRICS summit was held in Kazan, Russia, from 22 to 24 October 2024. This was the first BRICS summit to include Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates as members following their accession to the organisation at the previous summit.
In the run-up to the event, there was much speculation about whether there would be a one-on-one meeting between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi on the sidelines of the Summit. On 21 October, there were a flurry of statements by the Ministry of External Affairs regarding an agreement on patrolling along the Line of Actual Control. The timing of the announcement did indeed suggest that it was to create a conducive atmosphere for a Xi-Modi meeting. After formal confirmation from both sides, the meeting was held on 23 October, the first such meeting in five years and more importantly, the first meeting post the 2020 crisis in Eastern Ladakh.
The stage was set when Vikram Misri, the Foreign Secretary, made the announcement regarding the restoration of patrolling rights in the Depsang Plains and the Demchok area. These two areas have been a bone of contention ever since the failed attempt by the Chinese to unilaterally change the status quo in the first half of 2020. That the two sticking points now seem to have been mutually settled is a welcome development and is indicative of our resolve.
Prime Minister Modi in an interview with Newsweek earlier this year had said that “…through positive and constructive engagement…we will be able to…restore and sustain peace and tranquility on our borders”. At the same time S Jaishankar, our Minister of External Affairs, had stated on numerous occasions that as long as the boundary issues remained unresolved it could not be business as usual. This was as clear a message as possible that while India was willing, and has been always open to resolving differences through discussions, it would not compromise on its core interests.
It is against this backdrop that a number of talks at the military level between the Corps Commanders and at the diplomatic level as part of the WMCC were held. Each of these was followed up by a routine communique that the meeting was held in a cordial atmosphere and that the two sides had agreed to work closely together. These bland releases gave an impression that not much was happening but as events have proved, that was not the case. What is important is that through these series of meetings, each side comes to appreciate each other’s concerns and over a period of time the points of divergence narrow down until a ‘win-win’ agreement is possible, for which the credit must rightly go to them.
Also read: Chinese aggression at LAC in 2020 was ‘not a bad thing’, says former Army chief Gen Naravane
Only the first step
The agreement on the restoration of patrolling rights is a welcome first step, but much work still needs to be done on dis-engagement, de-escalation and de-induction before normal border management protocols come into effect. The details of the arrangements on restoration of patrolling rights are yet to be made public, but would cover standard clauses such as strengths and periodicity and procedures to be followed to avoid confrontations. This would then facilitate the first step of dis-engagement from the friction points.
However, de-escalation would be contingent on the successful implementation of the new protocols that are put into effect. Similar protocols and Confidence Building Measures (CBM) existed even earlier, but it is the total disregard for protocols and violation of CBMs that led to the clashes not only in Eastern Ladakh but also in various other disputed areas all along the boundary with Tibet. It will therefore take considerable time to reach the level of trust required for any meaningful de-induction, which would be the third and last step.
Given the terrain differential which is in China’s favour, this de-induction would have to be on the basis of mutual and reciprocal security and not in absolute terms. Come what may, we should not get lulled into a false sense of security. Only when a formal agreement is negotiated covering the entire boundary with Tibet, can we lower our guard.
The Xi-Modi meet has further given political direction for the way forward. These include the resumption of the Special Representative (SR) level talks to oversee the boundary issues. The SR level mechanism, which was constituted in 2003, had done some yeoman work, which led to a landmark agreement—the ‘Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question’—in April 2005. The last SR-level talk between the designated representatives Wang Yi, the Chinese Foreign Minister and Ajit Doval, our National Security Advisor, was held in December 2019. The SR-level talks can build on this existing framework to find a mutually acceptable solution. Furthermore, the resumption of the SR-level talks would add an additional layer to the dialogue process and be a buffer to forestall any untoward incident.
During the summit, Prime Minister Modi reiterated the formulation that this is “not an era of war” and that dialogue and discussion at multiple levels was the key to rebuilding the relations between the two countries, which had reached a nadir following the Galwan clash. These dealings are not with a narrow security perspective but cover the whole range of mutually beneficial issues including the developmental challenges faced by both countries. On the whole, these developments augur well for our bilateral relations.
There have been summit-level meetings in the past too, which had generated similar expectations. Those hopes were repeatedly dashed to the ground on account of Chinese belligerence on the disputed boundary with Tibet and Beijing’s increasing presence in the Indian Ocean Region, which goes against the ‘three mutuals’ of respect, trust and sensitivity that are the cornerstone of our relations. The differences in the read-outs of the two countries over the current arrangement is also a cause of concern, as it is open to differing interpretations, particularly given the fact that the word ‘agreement’ is conspicuously absent in the Chinese version. Therefore, given the Chinese penchant for saying one thing and doing the exact opposite, we must approach these latest developments, however good they might seem, with abundant caution.
General Manoj Mukund Naravane PVSM AVSM SM VSM is a retired Indian Army General who served as the 28th Chief of the Army Staff. Views are personal.