The Bharatiya Janata Party-led Mahayuti alliance charted a sweeping victory, the scale and manner of which no election experts could have predicted. The Mahayuti, a conglomeration of BJP, Eknath Shinde’s Shiv Sena, and Ajit Pawar’s Nationalist Congress Party, managed to win 235 of the 288 seats in the state with a vote share of over 50 per cent. The alliance also managed an 81.6 per cent seat share, the highest ever that any alliance or party has recorded in the last 50 years. With this, the BJP repeated its 2014 electoral success for a third time and became the first party in 30 years to cross the 100-seat mark in Maharashtra—a feat last achieved by the Congress in 1990.
The margins with which the Mahayuti won came as a bit of a surprise, especially considering its poor performance in the recent Lok Sabha elections and the success of its opponent, the Maha Vikas Aghadi, in the state. What is also significant is that the Mahayuti recorded a thumping victory across various regions in Maharashtra – from the Konkan to Vidarbha, Marathwada to Western Maharashtra.
The backdrop of this election, moreover, was marked by an intense socio-economic and political churn. A prolonged drought and agrarian crisis amplified rural distress, while caste and identity-based unrest further polarised the electorate. Major party splits fractured long-standing allegiances, adding an air of unpredictability to the campaign.
While the earlier success of the MVA and relative setback to the BJP-led coalition was seen as an indication of the electorate demanding change, the results indicate something that many in the electoral fray failed to sense—an appealing and carefully structured narrative that cut across caste, class, and regional boundaries. In this article, we try to decode some of the things that may have helped the Mahayuti craft and use this narrative, as well as the future of Maharashtra’s political landscape.
Hindutva vs caste-based social engineering
The BJP has been aggressively using the Hindutva card at the national level, posturing it as a thread that would unify Hindus. The Uddhav Thackeray-led Shiv Sena, which saw one of the biggest vertical splits in its history, has been struggling to set its stance on Hindutva ever since it allied with the Congress and NCP, whose politics rest on the core principle of secularism.
Eknath Shinde, who engineered the Shiv Sena split, managed to capture this space in the state and positioned himself as the true heir of Bal Thackeray, who was known as the Hindu Hriday Samrat (king of Hindu hearts). He framed Uddhav’s Shiv Sena as having abandoned Hindutva by joining hands with Congress and NCP, which have been positioned as Hindu dweshte (Hindu haters) by the BJP’s political machinery. This allowed Shinde and other defecting MLAs to justify – and divert attention away from – their political ambition.
Over the last two years, and particularly in the months running up to the Vidhan Sabha elections, BJP and Shinde’s Shiv Sena carefully targeted the state’s Hindu vote bank. They urged Hindu voters to come together, irrespective of their caste and regional differences. This was done both online and offline. On social media, narratives of ‘batenge to katenge’, ‘ek hai to safe hai’, and ‘vote jihad’ were being repeatedly used. On the ground, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) supported BJP’s door-to-door campaigns.
The alliance also took support from Hindu religious groups and organisations, including temple trusts, kirtankars and priests. The extensive use of Hindutva symbols in its local-level campaigns helped polarise Hindu votes in its favour. At the same time, strategic efforts were made to ensure that Dalit and Muslim voters didn’t rally behind the MVA.
A grassroots political worker in Western Maharashtra told us how the youth in the remotest villages of the state, mostly disillusioned due to unemployment and agrarian distress, were used as a laboratory to manufacture the Hindutva narrative. The MVA, though, failed to gauge this silent undercurrent. The BJP silently worked on consolidating the Other Backward Classes (OBCs). It capitalised on the grassroots outreach of OBC activist Laxman Hake, particularly in northern and western Maharashtra. This strategy helped deflect attention from the Manoj Jarange Patil-led Maratha agitation, which had become a major reason for the Mahayuti’s loss in Marathwada during the Lok Sabha elections.
The MVA failed to counter Mahayuti on both accounts. It underestimated the ‘vote-jihad’/Hindutva narrative and Hake’s movement. Moreover, after its Lok Sabha success, MVA remained complacent about the possibility of OBC consolidation against it.
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Benevolent patronage
The Mahayuti used its powerful position in Maharashtra to create mass appeal as a benevolent group that would put money in the right hands. It doled out several freebies and welfare programmes such as the Majhi Ladki Bahin scheme, free pilgrimage for senior citizens, waivers on farm loans, free power for agricultural pumps, and cash in hand for unemployed youth, among others. They not only sanctioned gigantic budgets for these schemes (Rs 35,000 crore for Majhi Ladki Bahin, for instance) but also relaxed eligibility criteria to ensure that a large subsection of the electorate benefits from it.
The freebies were strategically rolled out around Diwali. Male Mahayuti leaders presented them as ‘Bhaubeej’ (Bhai Duj) presents for women voters, who have only been rising in number. This seems to have worked in its favour, as these women beneficiaries likely encouraged their entire families to elect a government that could continue such schemes.
We spoke to several female beneficiaries who have been registered under the Ladki Bahin scheme, which aims to financially empower women from impoverished backgrounds. While many of them saw it as a poll gimmick, they also found it helpful. There was also a fear that this financial aid would stop if the Mahayuti wasn’t elected, as hinted by leaders such as Ajit Pawar. This freebie strategy – without the promise of actual welfare-centred measures – was replicated by MVA, but slightly later in the season. MVA’s narrative did not catch on because it lacked what the Mahayuti had—strong political might and control over financial resources.
Hyperlocal campaigns, internal cohesion
BJP’s ground-level machinery, reinforced by the RSS cadre along with support from Shiv Sena and NCP cadres, built the Mahayuti’s narrative. While several local issues and difficult dynamics did exist between the leaders and workers of these three parties, the alliance managed to keep it under wraps and put up a united front. Moreover, quickly learning from the Lok Sabha elections, it consciously ensured the complete transfer of votes within the alliance at various levels. It also managed to effectively convince some of the rebels to take back their nominations, which the MVA failed at terribly.
The Mahayuti campaign focused on popularising two things: the alliance’s strong stance on Hindu unity, and the sops it offered. It was also hands-on to the extent that many local karyakartas enrolled a record number of beneficiaries for schemes such as the Pradhan Mantri Ujjwala Yojana, which offers LPG subsidies to low-income households.
Huge political rallies and sabhas were organised throughout the election season and big leaders of the BJP, including Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath, travelled to the remotest parts of the state to campaign for the alliance.
Those on the ground suggest that across the political spectrum, a lot of financial incentives were offered for people to participate in campaign rallies, celebrate festivals, and organise gatherings.
Candidates very evidently sponsored meals and breakfasts in housing societies during their campaign trails in Mumbai, for example. Moreover, despite its poor performance in the Lok Sabha elections, Ajit Pawar’s NCP managed to capture the loyalties of powerful actors within the sugar lobby and cooperative sector. The Mahayuti created a mass hysteria, and its ground strategy was extremely hyperlocal and well-tailored for each section of the electorate—something that the MVA couldn’t manage.
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Careful use of state machinery
It was evident that the ruling alliance left no stone unturned in influencing decisions in its favour. The Election Commission’s decision to allow Shinde and Pawar to take the official names and symbols of Shiv Sena and NCP, and the delay that followed in judicial proceedings challenging this move, are a strong indication of this. The MVA called this out and used the gaddar (traitor) rhetoric to shame those who had switched sides. However, it was unable to keep the momentum going as there are limitations when taking the moral high ground in Indian politics.
Despite the concerning nature of unfair means used in electoral politics, particularly over the last decade, public memory, as evident from the Maharashtra election results, is short-lived. The Mahayuti managed to create an impression that switching loyalties was a normal thing in politics, and what should matter to voters is that its partners are collectively committed to delivering their promises of development. The Opposition couldn’t do more than call them out, failing to strategise on the ground and revive the cadre and organisational network that could deliver its governance agenda.
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Relentless spectacle
The Mahayuti’s election campaign was not just fought on the ground; it was meticulously choreographed in the media, leveraging every platform to amplify the BJP’s tried and tested vikas narrative. A relentless barrage of communication through traditional and digital channels created a pervasive echo chamber that reinforced Mahayuti’s narrative and drowned out the Opposition’s voice. Full-page newspaper ads showcased glowing reports of the government’s achievements and future promises. The Mahayuti also skillfully utilised social media influencers to penetrate digital spaces where younger, urban, and semi-urban voters are most active. Paid collaborations disguised as organic content blurred the lines between propaganda and opinion.
The messaging was consistent across mediums and among alliance partners. This was unlike the MVA’s approach and reach, which was scarce due to lower resources spent and also differently tailored by the three allies.
The 2024 assembly elections were seen as a litmus test for all parties and leaders in Maharashtra following the political drama of the last five years. While the multiplier effect of various factors and strategies ensured bigger-than-expected results for Mahayuti, this historic win led by the BJP has underlined the limitations of morality in politics. It has also underlined the fragility of voter sentiments, which shift like a pendulum as per dominant narratives. But the story is far from being over. The coming days are likely to show us a tough battle and internal competition among winning allies to maximise their power stakes.
The BJP is likely to go all out to fulfil its dream of capturing the state solo, which may create a threat for the Pawar-Shinde duo. The crisis of existence deepens for Uddhav-led Shiv Sena and the Congress and Sharad Pawar-led NCP, as now the battle is for survival and not success. The political drama is far from being over.
Dr Sanjay Patil is a Mumbai-based researcher who specialises in Maharashtra politics and urban informality. His doctoral work looks at the journey of Shiv Sena between 1985 and 2022. Ravindra Swami is a Mumbai based PhD scholar, specialising in electoral politics and campaign strategies. Their X handles are @sanjaypp23 and @RavindraSwami07. Views are personal.
(Edited by Zoya Bhatti)