Bhadralok and the myth of casteless West Bengal politics

Mamata Banerjee tried to mitigate the impact of Muslim marginalisation but it was resisted by the BJP, resulting in the communalisation of political discourse.

A BJP rally in West Bengal | Representational image | Photo: ANI

The ongoing assembly election in West Bengal has been witnessing an unprecedented role of the ‘caste’, which will have a direct impact on the outcome of the polls. It is an interesting development since it was declared that unlike the north Indian states, caste did not have a significant role in the politics of West Bengal. It was argued that as a modern liberal state, West Bengal had risen above caste politics. But now, caste is back on the centre stage of political as well as academic debate.

I analyse how the caste question was back-seated in the politics of West Bengal and how it became salient in recent elections.

The caste conundrum of West Bengal can be explained by understanding the construction of ‘Bhadralok’ and deconstructing its political narratives. I list seven ways through which the myth of casteless politics was created in West Bengal but now stands exposed.

Partition and elimination of Muslim elites

The politics and public sphere of the state has been upper caste dominated, which is an outcome of the Partition of India and East Pakistan. The Partition was supported by the Indian National Congress, the Hindu Mahasabha, and the Communist Party of India; but it was opposed by the Bengal Scheduled Castes Federation, the All Bengal Depressed Classes Association and the Bengal Muslim League. Why did the upper caste dominated parties and organisations support Partition? The question is important because the same upper caste elites had carried out an unprecedented mobilisation for annulment of the partition of Bengal in 1905. The real reason behind this change in stance was the introduction of limited representative governments through the Indian Councils Act 1909 and the Government of India Act 1919.

The upper caste leadership of Bengal quickly realised that they could not form a government because of their lower numerical strength, whereas Muslims and Dalits could. This demographic disadvantage had led to a fear among the upper castes of having to live permanently under the rule of Muslim leadership, which prompted them to support the Partition. However, the Partition resulted in the migration of Muslim elites — the main political competitor of the upper caste or the Bhadraloks — to East Pakistan. This also became one of the reasons for the marginalisation of Muslims in West Bengal. Mamata Banerjee tried to mitigate the impact of this marginalisation but it has been resisted by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), resulting in the communalisation of political discourse in the state.

Transfer of subaltern castes inhabited areas to East Pakistan

Colonial Bengal saw the emergence of strong anti-Brahmanical movements in the form of Matua Mahasangh (1860), Bangiya Jana Sangh (1922), Bengal Depressed Classes Association (1926) and Bengal Scheduled Castes Federation (1943). The cumulative outcome of socio-political mobilisation of these organisations meant electoral gains in Bengal assembly. During Partition, overruling the reservation of subaltern castes, the districts dominated by them such as Khulna, Bakarganj, and Barishal were transferred to East Pakistan. This broke the political power of the subaltern castes.

The letters of Governor General Lord Mountbatten to the British government, accessed by this author, reveal that the transfer of land was done to retain Kolkata. However, when the subaltern castes migrated from East Pakistan to West Bengal, they were sent to Dandakaranya and Andaman and Nicobar Islands, whereas upper castes were allowed to settle in Kolkata. When some of them tried to settle down in the Marichjhapi island in the Sunderbans, they were massacred by the West Bengal Police in 1979, under the Left Front government. The Marichjhapi massacre suggests that the political hegemony of Bhadralok in West Bengal is not through consent but through coercion.

Non-recognition of anti-caste reformers

Bengal is credited for initiating the Indian renaissance, in which the contribution of Raja Ram Mohan Roy, Ishwar Chandra Vidyasagar, Shri Aurobindo and Rabindranath Tagore have been well acknowledged. However, the contribution of anti-caste leaders such as Harichand Thakur, Guruchand Thakur, Manindranath Mandal and Jogendra Nath Mandal is barely mentioned.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi in his election rallies has started mentioning these names to mobilise subaltern caste voters.

Non-cooperation with Mandal Commission

The Communist regime of West Bengal remained dismissive about the caste question. As a result, when Jyoti Basu first became the chief minister in 1977, he did not include any Scheduled Caste minister in his council. However, ‘Kanti Biswas was later inducted when he and other SC members convinced the Communist Party of India (M) to include SCs in the cabinet’. Basu, in his reply to the Mandal Commission, had said that there were only two castes in West Bengal — the rich and the poor. This non-cooperation with the Mandal Commission resulted in the implementation of only seven per cent quota for the OBCs.

Exclusion of Hindu subaltern castes from OBC reservation

The claims of West Bengal elites were exposed with the release of reports of Sachar Committee and Rangnath Misra Committee. The former found that Muslims were a marginalised community in the public institution and denied educational opportunities. In 2010, the Left Front government decided to expand the OBC quota by adding 10 per cent reservation for the most backward. But out of 56, 49 communities included in the ‘most backward’ list were Muslim castes. Four Muslim castes were already included in the list of 52 castes who were given seven per cent quota. The Mamata Banerjee government has further expanded the OBC list in the state. Now, 177 communities are in the OBC list of West Bengal, out of which 99 are Muslim. Due to this expansion, the Trinamool Congress often claims that 97 percent Muslims of West Bengal have been given the OBC quota.

The inclusion of Muslims disproportionately in the OBC quota has come at the cost of exclusion of Hindu backward castes such as Mahisyas and Telis. These caste groups have been demanding for their inclusion in the OBC category, and the BJP has echoed with them.  The party has already been able to make inroads in the Mahisyas dominated districts of Midnapore, Howrah, Hooghly, Nadia and 24 Parganas in the previous assembly election.

Exclusion of subaltern castes from urbanisation

Kolkata — the social, economic and political power centre of the state — was a trade off with East Pakistan, by giving large regions dominated by the subaltern castes, particularly the Namashudras. But in post-colonial India, the subaltern castes could not settle in the West Bengal capital. According to a  research, “around 60 per cent of Kolkata’s localities do not have a single Dalit resident”.

Urbanisation creates inequality in any society, and hence, this exclusion would have reproduced social and economic inequality in West Bengal society.

Extension of upper caste domination in rural Bengal

The data on urban settlement reveals the truth about the domination of the upper castes in the Bhadralok of Kolkata. This domination continues in public spaces, government institutions and party organisations.

Both the CPM and TMC have made attempts to expand their organisation to rural Bengal. However, instead of bringing inclusion of the subaltern castes, their expansion has resulted in extension of the upper castes network of the Bhadralok. The ongoing election can also be seen as an assertion of the subaltern castes against the Bhadralok.

Arvind Kumar (@arvind_kumar__), PhD at the Department of Politics & IR, Royal Holloway, University of London. Views are personal. 

Edited by Anurag Chaubey