All elections have two sides to them: one is purely statistical, the other is about meaning. Let us combine the two and assess what has just happened to the United States of America.
Statistically, the midterm elections have been a “shellacking”, a term popularised by Barack Obama when, after winning the presidency in 2008, he lost the 2010 midterms. Though the President is not on the ballot, everyone knows that the midterms are a referendum on the presidency.
The 2026 shellacking is bigger than it was in 2010. Democrats lost across the board then, but they were able to maintain a slim majority in the Senate. President Donald Trump has lost both Houses of Congress. The legislature has completely moved out of his control. When the last results for the House of Representatives come in, the Democrats could well end up holding the largest number of seats there since 1990.
Let us now turn to the meanings, concentrating on those that have the largest implications.
Gerrymandering can be defeated
First, the US has a history of battles over how to fix the electoral map in such a way that the incumbent is privileged and the battlefield becomes tilted. Called gerrymandering or redistricting, such moves in many states are allowed once every decade. The US practice has also spread to Hungary and, most recently, India. President Trump sought mid-decade redistricting in several states, but most of all in Texas, the second-largest US state and the largest under Republican control. He managed to get five favourable districts through the state legislature. He could win only one. This is also true of some other states, which engineered redistricting.
The lesson is that attempts to tilt the electoral playing field can indeed be overcome if opposition parties mobilise support. Victories by huge margins can successfully counter gerrymandering. Some months back, Hungary sent the same message. Gerrymandered districts/constituencies can be won. That is the task of politics. Politics can alter the meaning of the maxim that demography is destiny.
The return of legislative accountability
Second, relying on elections alone, democracies run the risk of becoming a vehicle of brute executive force. The constraints on Trump, if any, had so far come from the judiciary, especially from the lower federal courts. Legislative restraints were missing—primarily because both Houses were Republican-ruled.
Now, the old precept of American politics—“divided we govern”—makes a return. Deals with the US Congress will have to be made. The US President does have the power to veto bills passed by the legislature, preventing their passage into law. In practical terms, however, the veto power simply can’t be exercised with respect to every bill that comes to the President’s desk. In some form or the other, the notion of legislative accountability will be back in business.
The 19th-century political philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche created the concept of the “Superman” (Übermensch), driven by the “will to power”. The concept has been used for Trump (as well as for Modi, Orban and Erdogan). These elections have created conditions to tame the Superman. Serious executive-legislature battles lie ahead.
Identity politics meets bread-and-butter issues
Third, the mantle of identity politics has been quite seriously dented. White majoritarianism was the driving force of Trump’s politics, with marked secondary assistance from Hispanics, the largest minority group along with Black Americans. The Hispanics have returned to the Democratic Party in large numbers. Indeed, all important voting demographics show a return, some less, others more. Assuming the exit polls are reliable, the biggest demographic shift is among Hispanics, young voters under 30, both White and non-White, and lower-income voters. If one looks at the urban-rural division, even rural and small-town counties, where Trump’s base was strongest, moved leftward—partly, if not wholly.
Do identities matter more than interests? Political analysis has always wrestled with this question. No answers apply to all times and places. Answers are always contingent. The identity politics mastered by Trump floundered on the rock of bread-and-butter issues. How expensive are oil and diesel (important in an automobile-driven society)? How affordable is healthcare (more significant in the US, with a privatised health system, than in Europe, which has public healthcare)? Can young couples buy a home, a long-standing American tradition (thus, interest rates matter)? Will jobs be available (thus, AI is a threat)? The Iran War or tariffs were unacceptable if they led to higher prices of essential goods.
Trump’s arc of identity politics showed its sharpest lurch in Michigan, where he called a Muslim Democratic candidate—of Egyptian-American ancestry, committed to his Islamic faith and a Rhodes Scholar physician—a “jihadist” and a “terrorist”, who should be forced to go through a metal detector before he is allowed to enter Capitol Hill. Abdul El-Syed has handsomely won and will be the first Muslim US senator ever. The idea of a metal detector screening did not scare the voters away.
The erosion of Republican strongholds
Fourth, the idea of “ruby red”, or a deeply institutionalised Republican state which will never go Democratic, lies gravely mauled, at least for now. Kansas has elected its first Democratic senator after nearly a century—94 years, to be precise; Texas, its first since 1988; South Carolina, its first since 1998; and North Carolina, its first since 2008. Add to this list two more Democratic victories in ruby-red states: Iowa, red for a long time, and Ohio, which has been so of late. Finally, Susan Collins, a Republican senator for three decades, lost Maine.
Texas, the second-most populous state after California, is perhaps the most transformed. Not only does it have its first Democratic senator in 38 years, with James Talarico defeating Ken Paxton, but the gubernatorial race also delivered a massive surprise. Republican Greg Abbott, its most powerful governor, lost to a Hispanic woman, Gina Hinojosa, who rose from below and fought against Abbott’s devotion to Trump. A primary campaign target for both Hinojosa and Talarico was Elon Musk, who poured in anywhere between $150 million and $200 million, making Texas the most expensive race. Money could not buy enough voter love.
A more representative America
Finally, no account of American elections is complete without a glance at how the Black American community fared. Among other things, Black candidates have now won five races for state governor. The list includes Keisha Lance Bottoms, who becomes the first Black woman elected governor of a US state, after winning Georgia.
The political theorist Hannah Pitkin is famous for her concept of “descriptive representation”, by which she meant the extent to which elected institutions represent the population in terms of some key demographic characteristics. In India, this term has always meant caste, religion and language and, of late, gender. In the US, it has meant race, ethnicity and gender. After these elections, America’s elected power structure would look more like America for the next two years than in the last two. We don’t know whether that will continue beyond 2028. But for now, that is what it is. And this kind of inclusion is perhaps the greatest triumph of the 2026 US midterm elections.
Ashutosh Varshney is Sol Goldman Professor of International Studies and the Social Sciences and Professor of Political Science at Brown University. Views are personal.
(Edited By Prashant Dixit)