Much of the attention on Japan’s new Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba is not directed at his political record, but on his foreign policy agenda. His stance on Japan’s relationship with the US, security policies, and his idea of an ‘Asian NATO’ have stoked curiosity both at home and abroad.
Ishiba’s election as leader of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) on 27 September surprised many, especially given the expectation that the late former PM Shinzo Abe’s protege Sanae Takaichi would prevail in their final face-off. Instead, Ishiba’s fifth attempt proved to be the lucky charm for him.
As he takes office, questions abound. Will he continue with the policies of his predecessor Fumio Kishida, or will he introduce fresh ideas, as he stated throughout his campaign?
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Expectations for US & South Korea ties
Ishiba’s image as an anti-status-quo politician was bolstered by his foreign policy positions, as iterated during his campaign, particularly regarding Japan’s alliance with the US.
In a paper written for Hudson Institute, a US-based think tank, Ishiba labelled Japan’s alliance with the US as an “asymmetric bilateral treaty” and signalled that he would like the relationship to be more equal. He argued that Japan must have its “own military strategy and become independent in terms of security until it is willing to share its strategy and tactics on equal terms with the US.”
Ishiba’s concerns regarding the alliance are focused on two issues—one is the US-Japan Security Treaty and the other is revising the US Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA).
However, Ishiba will probably address these issues appropriately when he gets settled into his prime ministership. For the time being, it seems he will continue to advance his predecessor Kishida’s legacy. This was evident in his first diplomatic conversation with US President Joe Biden, where he reaffirmed the importance of the alliance for him. In their conversation, Ishiba emphasised four points: strengthening the US-Japan alliance as his administration’s top priority, enhancing deterrence and alliance response capabilities, developing networks of like-minded countries—like the US-Japan-South Korea trilateral and the Australia-Japan-India-US Quad—and working closely together on issues such as China and North Korea.
Japan and South Korea ties are also expected to continue on a smooth course. After Ishiba became the PM, the South Korea government congratulated him, emphasising the need to continue efforts to establish a “more advanced and future-oriented cooperative partnership” in all areas, including “security, economy, and global agendas”.
In his book, published before the election, Ishiba appreciated South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol’s efforts and argued that Japan should use the opportunity to advance its ties with Seoul. In a conversation on 2 October, both leaders agreed to advance their relations and to jointly deter North Korea’s provocations. Besides, unlike Abe or Takaichi, he will be more considerate of South Korean sentiments regarding Japanese leaders visiting the controversial Yasukuni shrine, which also commemorates some convicted Japanese war criminals.
New foreign policy ideas
One of the most difficult tasks for Ishiba, apart from keeping together the divided LDP under his leadership, will be implementing his foreign policy ideas—if he chooses to pursue them.
A challenge he is expected to face is how much he will have to barter to stay in power in exchange for continuing Kishida’s foreign policy legacy. While Ishiba has hinted that he will continue Kishida’s foreign policy, this could constrain his ability to implement meaningful foreign policy ideas later. No major shifts are expected to happen in the US-Japan alliance framework before the US presidential elections. But if he attempts to change the course, it will be one of his most challenging tasks, as he will face much resistance from within his party.
Another interesting proposal made by Ishiba during his campaign is the creation of an ‘Asian NATO’, aimed at countering the nuclear alliance between North Korea, China, and Russia.
Although the idea of nuclearisation is gaining strength in Seoul, pitching this concept for China and not just North Korea would automatically create fissures in the current trilateral security cooperation. Even though South Korea is a US ally, Seoul remains cautious about anatgonising Beijing and prefers to stick to North Korea in terms of the bilateral and trilateral security cooperation agenda. Besides, the US is unlikely to entertain the idea of an Asian NATO for the forthcoming future.
Ishiba has even described partnerships with countries such as India, the Philippines, and Australia as “quasi-alliance relationships”, suggesting that there is potential to upgrade these ties and eventually develop them into an “Asian version of NATO”.
However, many of these ideas will likely change once Ishiba settles into his PM tenure due to the practical limitations of diplomacy and foreign policy.
To reiterate: Japan’s foreign policy is unlikely to change direction under Ishiba. He is expected to strengthen Tokyo’s security and defence ties with its strategic partners in the Indo-Pacific, particularly with the US and South Korea.
Ishiba has carefully chosen candidates to implement his defence and security policies. Both Gen Nakatani, the defence minister, and Takeshi Iwaya, the foreign minister, have extensive experience in government, particularly the defense ministry. However, the choice of Iwaya, a close friend of Kishida, suggests that foreign policy will largely continue on the same course as before.
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Reality checks for Ishiba’s foreign policy
PM Ishiba has called for a snap election on 27 October to get a “public mandate”, which will serve as the first test of his foreign policy ideas among the Japanese citizenry. Additionally, he will also get a reality check on some of his ideas when he interacts with his global counterparts in the upcoming ASEAN, APEC, and G20 summits in 2024.
From the standpoint of pragmatic and realistic foreign policy, several of Ishiba’s diplomatic initiatives and ideas are very risky. Rather than strengthening regional deterrence, they are likely complicate security for Japan, particularly in Northeast Asia.
The idea of an Asian NATO, for instance, will ring alarm bells in Beijing, Pyongyang, Moscow, and even Southeast Asian governments, which are highly suspicious of such rhetoric. If he continues to push this idea, it will likely sour Japan’s relations with Southeast Asia. Even India, one of Japan’s closest regional strategic partners, does not support this concept.
At a recent foreign policy gathering in the US, Indian External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar distanced himself from the idea of an Asian NATO.
“We have never been a treaty ally of any country. We don’t have that kind of strategic architecture in mind,” he said, adding that Ishiba’s views don’t reflect India’s way of thinking.
It seems that Japan’s new foreign minister Takeshi Iwaya has already taken note of the feedback on the Asian NATO proposal and has toned down the rhetoric. In a press conference, he said that the idea is worth exploring in “the future”, implying that now’s not the time. He added that dialogue with China is essential to ease regional tensions—a clear signal of the “pacifist-leaning” junior coalition partner Komeito party’s influence on Ishiba’s foreign policy.
Hence, it is expected that not much will change in Japan’s foreign policy in the forthcoming future. Even if there’s a push for it, Ishiba’s ideas would first have to be approved by his colleagues in the LDP and its partner Komeito. It’s worth recalling that Abe attempted his share of foreign policy reforms too, but was hindered by alliance compulsions. Also, by the U-turns Ishiba has made since becoming the PM, it seems likely that most of his foreign policy ideas will meet the same fate while he focuses on elections and domestic political reforms.
Abhishek Sharma is a Research Assistant with ORF’s Strategic Studies Programme. He posts on X @AVIRAL9. Views are personal.
(Edited by Asavari Singh)