Manipur has been in a state of anarchy for three-and-a-half months due to the ongoing ethnic conflict between the heavily armed Meitei and the Kuki-Zo communities. The state is virtually partitioned between Meiteis of the Imphal Valley and Kuki-Zo of the hills. The state government is absent both due to vested complicity in favour of Meiteis and lack of any policy to restore normality.
During the debate on the no-confidence motion in Parliament, Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Home Minister Amit Shah failed to mention a concrete policy or plan to reinstate peace in the beleaguered state. Apart from blaming past governments and reiterating confidence in the ineffectual and partisan Chief Minister N Biren Singh, their statements were hinged on hope and appeal. “I appeal to both communities in Manipur with folded hands to renounce violence. Please come to the talks table with the Government of India and let us find a way to restore Manipur to the path of progress and prosperity,” said Shah.
Manipur has the highest police-to-population ratio of 1,388 to 1,00,000. In addition, as per the Home Minister, “36000 central forces have been sent” to the state. 125 companies of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), Border Security Force (BSF), Sashastra Seema Bal (SSB) and the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) are operating in Manipur. There are 22 battalions of Assam Rifles, which also operate along the Myanmar border, and the 57 Mountain Division with three brigades, both operating under 3 Corps. The force level is more than adequate to control the situation, maintain peace and disarm the population. However, due to a lack of will, policy, central coordination, clarity on roles and rules of engagement, and a partisan state police, this large force is beset with passivity and inaction and is being employed merely to maintain a fragile status quo.
As per past experience, the most pragmatic approach is to redeclare the entire state as a disturbed area, impose the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA), create a unified command authority and give the lead role to the armed forces. However, for political reasons, this approach is unlikely to be adopted. There is no clarity even on the application of Article 355, and for all purposes, it is the CM, with a known majoritarian bias, who is controlling this large force – including elements of the Army deployed ‘in aid of civil power’ for maintenance of law and order.
In the above circumstances, I analyse the challenges the Army faces and how these can be overcome.
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An unusual situation
The three predominant stakeholders in Manipur – Meiteis, Kuki-Zo and Nagas – have given up secessionist insurgencies. The current conflict is ethnic in nature, for a share of state benefits and autonomy. It does not qualify as an insurgency questioning India’s sovereignty with an identifiable enemy. However, it does qualify as an internal insurrection as the communities are challenging the government’s authority by indulging in armed/unarmed violence against each other and not surrendering looted arms. Due to political reasons and the absence of secessionism, the central government has not declared Manipur as a disturbed area, reimposed the AFSPA in totality and given the Army a lead role with a clearly defined mission.
The central government is treating Manipur as a law and order problem, and the state has requisitioned the Army ‘in aid of civil power’ to maintain law and order. In the past, this role primarily dealt with the dispersal of unlawful assemblies on orders of a magistrate and in exceptional circumstances without such orders using minimum force for effect. The procedure is covered under Sections 129 to 132 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The procedure is time proven and has effectively dealt with communal and other riots.
The situation in Manipur is unique, particularly in the Meitei-dominated areas. The mobs here are composed of two elements, the armed and the unarmed, with the unarmed group being primarily led by women. The former focuses on arson and killings, while the latter keeps security forces at bay. Similar mobs have also interfered with the movement and operations of the Army, the most notable one being when a mob led by Meitei women forced the release of 12 terrorists on 24 June. It is unclear how the state government is managing to provide magistrates for 160 – 170 Army columns even if we discount their ethnic bias. In all incidents so far, the magistrate seems to be missing.
Campaign to discredit Assam Rifles
There is ample evidence of the partisan police ignoring or abetting the mob activity. There have been provocative altercations between the police and the Army, and a concerted political and public campaign has been launched to discredit the Assam Rifles. As a first, the state police has lodged an FIR against the Assam Rifles for interfering with its operations. Rather than rein in the police, there are reports that the Assam Rifles were removed from the checkpoint in the buffer zone. The Army was forced to publicly defend its conduct.
Under the facade of a ‘humane approach’, there has been a marked reluctance on part of the Army in dealing with mobs using minimum force. The Army’s rules of engagement regarding the dispersal of unlawful assembly have no other method specified than using minimum force for effect and operations using military tactics if required. So far, there is no report of the Army having used minimum force to disperse any mobs that have interfered with its operations.
There have been many instances of the Army using police methods for negotiating and reasoning with mobs, which are strictly forbidden as per its ‘rules of engagement’. There are serious repercussions of this approach. The credibility of the Army as the instrument of last resort that brings about finality to mob violence is at stake. The Army is well versed in dealing with women-led mobs in Jammu and Kashmir and Manipur. It is prudent to let the police handle them and stick to rules of engagement and minimum force as a last resort. The current battle of nerves being played will lead to a catastrophic incident if soldiers open indiscriminate fire in panic.
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The way forward
The situation has stabilised more due to the ethnic cleansing of Kuki-Zo people from the Imphal Valley and Meiteis from the hills and less due to law enforcement. With the absolutist position of both communities, an acceptable political solution seems unlikely in the near future. There is an urgent need to reestablish the writ of the State. For this, the prerequisites are to disarm the population and maintain the separation of the two communities. If negotiations fail and arms are not surrendered, both communities may resort to guerrilla warfare in each other’s territory and, as a worse case, revive secessionist insurgencies.
Since the central government is unlikely to declare Manipur as a disturbed area, invoke the AFSPA and give a lead role to the Army, it is necessary to review the mission and role of the Army in the prevailing situation. In the present circumstances, it would be detrimental to the Army’s credibility and morale to continue operating in aid of civil power for the maintenance of law and order. It must be derequisitioned forthwith. Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) and Manipur Police must be made responsible for upholding law and order and disarming the population in the Imphal Valley. All looted/handed-over weapons must be accounted for. This will also test the writ of the CM over his own community.
The Army should be responsible for manning an equidistant buffer zone between the valley and the hills. It should also be responsible for operations in the hills where it continues to be covered by AFSPA, as the 19 police stations from which it has been removed are mostly in the Imphal Valley. It should conduct operations to disarm the population and maintain the sanctity of the camps established for former insurgents under the Suspension of Operations agreement. The police and CAPFs must deal with mobs. If forced to confront them, the Army must not deviate from its sacrosanct rules of engagement – use of minimum force for effect – by resorting to police methods.
It is pertinent to mention that even when AFSPA is invoked, the Army continues to operate under the civil government through the Unified Command Authority and cannot operate independently. The contrary impression created in the past was because the Unified Command Authority headed by the Governor/CM literally gave the Army a ‘free hand’ in secessionist insurgencies. However, in disturbed areas with the cover of AFSPA, the mission of the Army gets clearly defined and its tactical operations cannot be interfered with. I have refrained from discussing the ambiguous provision of Martial Law under Article 34 as it is a taboo in a democracy. Declaration of a disturbed area and invocation of AFSPA serves the same purpose under the directions of civil government through the Unified Command Authority.
It is incumbent upon the central government to ensure that the military does not lose its credibility as the instrument of last resort for maintaining law and order in aid of civil power. It must not be reduced to the status of a glorified police force that the political government can manipulate. The military hierarchy must straighten its spine and give clear advice to the government to reset its mission in Manipur.
This article has been updated to reflect latest reports.
Lt Gen H S Panag PVSM, AVSM (R) served in the Indian Army for 40 years. He was GOC in C Northern Command and Central Command. Post retirement, he was Member of Armed Forces Tribunal. Views are personal.
(Edited by Zoya Bhatti)