All Trump wants is a good deal. Ukraine war shows he’ll even risk Europe for it

Trump’s unpredictability is a deliberate tool. He will continue using inflammatory rhetoric to keep European leaders on edge. This is precisely where Europe must tread carefully.

File photo of Volodymyr Zelenskyy with Donald Trump in New York, 27 September 2024 | ANI

February marked the beginning of the fourth year of the fateful war between Russia and Ukraine—an endurance few had predicted. Despite all strategic cacophony, Ukraine fights on, sustained largely by American military assistance, albeit with a growing sense of unease.

On 24 February, Kyiv bore a sombre mood. A crucial minerals deal, initially brokered in discussions between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Trump’s Ukraine envoy, Keith Kellogg, had collapsed. Senior officials in Ukraine called it “colonial”. A few hours later, in his characteristic social media bombast, US President Donald Trump lashed out at Zelenskyy, labelling him a dictator and lending credence to Russia’s invasion.

The US, once the self-proclaimed torchbearer of democracy and liberal values, now seemed to treat these ideals as mere inconveniences—relics of a bygone era, hindering America’s brute strategic interests.

Adding to the tensions, Washington unilaterally engaged in talks with Russia in Riyadh, conspicuously excluding both European allies and Ukraine itself. The move sent shockwaves through European capitals, where frustration and strategic bitterness were palpable.

Therefore, on the war’s third anniversary, Europe’s political elite, flanked by security experts, journalists, and military officials from all over the world, gathered in Kyiv. Two of the city’s safest five-star hotels—the InterContinental and the Grand Hyatt—became hubs of diplomatic manoeuvring, within earshot of St Sophia’s Cathedral, where prayer bells rang intermittently, punctuated by the wail of occasional air sirens.

Against this backdrop, a singular set of questions loomed: Where was the transatlantic alliance headed? What would become of Ukraine if American support waned? And most of all, what exactly did Trump’s vision of a ‘new American world’ entail?

By evening, Trump had delivered his final blow to the transatlantic alliance. During a United Nations General Assembly vote condemning Russia’s war in Ukraine, a stunned Europe watched as the US aligned with Moscow, rejecting the resolution. As if this diplomatic rupture were not enough, key influencers within Trump’s team openly lavished praise on Russia, extolling its virtues with an enthusiasm even the Kremlin had not anticipated.

As hurried opinion pieces flooded in, attempting to make sense of the unfolding chaos, Trump delivered yet another shocker in the wee hours of that very night. In a dramatic reversal, he suddenly declared to sign a ‘reworked’ minerals deal with Ukraine. Talking to the press once more, he triumphantly declared that Ukraine would now receive “$350 billion, lots of military equipment, and the right to fight on.”

Trump’s lust for deals

For all his theatrical proclamations, Trump has not been able to end the war in 24 hours. However, he made one thing clear—he was determined to strike a ‘deal’, regardless of European interests, Ukrainian sovereignty, or international law.

Now, a deal has emerged—one that, for Ukraine, may represent the most pragmatic outcome under the current circumstances.

For nearly a year, I have argued that the Trump administration would approach the Ukraine war with unfiltered transactionalism—his preferred lens for nearly all geopolitics. I maintained that he would continue military aid to Ukraine while employing a strategy of escalation to ultimately force de-escalation, seeking a sustainable equilibrium.

Why? Simply put, supporting Ukraine aligns with US commercial interests.

I also contended that no ceasefire would materialise without concrete security guarantees—something neither the US nor NATO has been willing to offer. As a result, a ceasefire remains elusive, and the war shows no signs of ending anytime soon.

And now, after a week of political grandstanding, Trump has, in effect, done exactly that.

By the time this piece is published, Zelenskyy will be in Washington to finalise the minerals agreement at the White House. Meanwhile, in Kyiv, his cabinet has already approved the revised terms.

What changed?

This episode reveals that Trump is well aware of the opinions within the Republicans—particularly the support and agency Zelenskyy enjoys among congressional Republicans in both the House and Senate. Not all Republicans are MAGA fanboys, and the reworked minerals deal reflects this. The exaggerated demands—such as Ukraine paying the US $500 billion and granting Washington full control over investments—have been removed from the final draft.

Despite Trump’s erratic stance on Europe, Russia, and Ukraine, he often seems to recognise the limits of his manoeuvring—how far he can push without completely breaking vital alliances.

At this juncture, it is worth noting that amid the air of uncertainty in Kyiv on the war’s third anniversary, two voices stood out for their seemingly excessive optimism. One was Boris Johnson, who repeatedly insisted that events would ultimately work in Ukraine’s favour. The other was Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal, whose confidence in the US bordered on delusion.

In hindsight, their optimism was proved right. The revised minerals deal offers Ukraine an opportunity to stabilise its position, establishes the US as a key investor and stakeholder under mutually agreed-upon terms, and ensures continued military support at a critical moment in the war.

However, perhaps the most surprising element lies in the 10th clause: “The Government of the United States of America supports Ukraine’s efforts to obtain the security guarantees needed to establish lasting peace.” Though vague, this statement contradicts much of the rhetoric Trump and his most ardent supporters have been peddling.

And then, in classic Trumpian fashion, another dramatic reversal followed. In less than a week, Trump went from branding Zelenskyy a “dictator” to hailing him as the “best president”, just as the Ukrainian leader is about to land in Washington.

This isn’t just strategic cacophony. It’s strategic bipolar disorder.

It must be noted that despite all the rhetoric, there is still no sign of a ‘deal’ between the US and Russia. In that sense, Ukraine holds a first-mover advantage on the ground—but should it celebrate?

Not quite.

The narrative the Trump administration is crafting to sell domestically, particularly in the lead-up to gubernatorial elections, is based on clear political markers. Trump can claim that he forced Europe to increase its defense spending—both for its own security and for Ukraine—while simultaneously securing a minerals deal that ensures the US maintains access to rare earth elements at a lower cost. These resources are critical to America’s dominance in global security, digital infrastructure, and economic leadership.

Meanwhile, of the approximately $110 billion spent on Ukraine so far, the majority has flowed back into the US defence sector, benefiting American contractors and manufacturers. This aligns seamlessly with Trump’s broader “America First” strategy.

However, Europe has cause for concern. Trump’s unpredictability remains a deliberate tool, and he will continue using inflammatory rhetoric to keep European leaders on edge. This uncertainty is precisely where Europe must tread carefully.

Europe’s Stunde Null

The architects of post-World War 2 Europe were determined to prevent the continent from ever igniting another war. However, they failed to account for a scenario in which Europe would need to defend itself. The European Union was built with the assumption that the US would serve as its primary security guarantor, a reliance that became the cornerstone of transatlanticism.

Now, with Trump openly expressing indifference toward Europe taking responsibility for its own wars, the continent is being forced to rethink its fundamentals. To his credit, Trump has compelled many European nations not only to meet but exceed NATO’s 2 per cent GDP defence spending requirement.

At the same time, his unpredictable stance has pushed Europe to seriously consider forming an independent security alliance. Whether such an initiative will materialise anytime soon remains uncertain. These discussions, however, are becoming increasingly frequent amid the uncertain geopolitical landscape.

Alongside the UK, discussions are underway to establish a European rearmament bank and a pan-European defence financing fund. These initiatives build upon the EU’s broader European defence programme, which recently introduced the first-ever European defense industrial strategy to revamp its own base and better support Ukraine.

While Europe may be late to the game, reclaiming its strategic autonomy is no longer optional. It is existential.

Swasti Rao is a consulting editor at ThePrint and a foreign policy expert. She tweets @swasrao. Views are personal.

(Edited by Prasanna Bachchhav)