New Delhi: As India’s second Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) retires later this month without the much-awaited theaterisation rolling out, neighbouring China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA), under tight control of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), tread the road to a joint theater command structure over a decade ago.
After his ascent to power in 2013, President Xi Jinping set out to reform the PLA, tighten his grip on it—especially its inner workings—and bring it in line with modern China’s evolving strategic vision.
Although Xi’s reign as President of the People’s Republic of China began only in 2013, he took charge of the CCP as general secretary in 2012. In line with the party’s norms, the CCP general secretary is also chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) and in charge of the PLA, the People’s Armed Police (PAP) and the Militia.
China’s white papers
Since 1998, China has released a white paper on its defence forces with regularity, with three particular editions—2010, 2013, and 2015—offering valuable insights into the thinking that informs the CMC, and, ultimately, the CCP.
China’s 2010 National Defence White Paper, titled ‘China’s National Defence in 2010’, defined national defence tasks as safeguarding sovereignty, territorial integrity (land, sea, air), maritime rights, and emerging domains like space, electromagnetic, and cyberspace.
The paper emphasised active defence, a no-first-use nuclear policy, and self-reliant strategies without arms races. A key theme was transitioning to “local wars under informed conditions,” prioritising information over sheer manpower. It promoted joint operations across Army, Navy, Air Force, and Second Artillery (later the Rocket Force), with integrated command systems and rapid-reaction capabilities. The paper also highlighted regional concerns like Taiwan, South China Sea, and neighborhood stability.
‘Informationised warfare’ is a modern conflict doctrine, patronised by China, that centres on leveraging information technology to gain victory. China aims to have a fully ‘informationised’ force by 2049.
China’s 2013 defence white paper, titled ‘The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces’ emphasised “new historic missions” for the military under Xi, including protecting overseas interests, disaster relief, and international peacekeeping, while upholding a defensive policy and no-first-use nuclear stance. The paper highlighted China’s peaceful rise amid a complex security environment, addressing maritime disputes, non-traditional threats like piracy, and global responsibilities. It also spoke (again) about advancing “informationised” warfare capabilities, joint operations, and diversified force employment.
The 2015 defence white paper, titled ‘China’s Military Strategy’, was the first white paper dedicated solely to military strategy rather than general national defence.
It detailed the PLA’s missions under Xi Jinping’s “new historic missions”, emphasising “active defence in a complex security environment” with threats like hegemony, maritime disputes, space/cyber vulnerabilities, and overseas interests’ protection.
It marked some key doctrinal shifts, note scholars, including marrying strategic defence with operational/tactical offence, the concept of pre-emptive strikes, and jointness and multi-domain operations. It also saw a new focus on non-war operations such as disaster relief, counter-terrorism, peacekeeping and strategic prepositioning.
This set the stage for the 2015 reforms.
The 2015 reforms
Under ‘Deepening National Defence and Military Reform’, a series of reforms were announced in November 2015, with the stated objective to “consolidate and improve the fundamental principles and systems of the party’s absolute ownership” over the PLA, and to essentially reinforce, with increased fervour, their symbiotic relationship.
The reforms were also a step towards consolidating Xi Jinping’s control over the military through reorganisation of the CMC. The other dimensions of the reforms, broadly, were: Moving towards jointness with theatre commands, upending ground forces’ dominance through demobilisation and establishing new forces for better integration and information.
Theaterisation
As a part of these reforms, in late 2015, the Xi Jinping-led establishment set out on an ambitious project: To become only the second country—after the United States of America—to institutionalise a theatre command structure of its armed forces.
In February 2016, the PLA officially abandoned its decades old policy of military regions. Under the military regions system, the country was divided into seven parts—Shenyang, Beijing, Jinan, Nanjing, Guangzhou, Chengdu and Lanzhou.
In its place came five theatre commands in charge of defending the territories of the North, South, East, West and Central regions of China. In the theatre command system, the commands of the various forces including the ground, naval and air forces are consolidated, representing more functional blocks of forces, serving China’s defence and operational needs more efficiently.
All non-nuclear operations within their respective geographic territories lie in the domain of the theatre commands. The Army, Navy, Air Force and Rocket Force work in tandem for operations, planning and rapid responses. So, while the theater commands handle operations and responses, the various service branches still retain control over management of the forces, including equipping and organising them.
The five theatre commands
Eastern Theatre Command: Headquartered in Nanjing, it primarily focuses on Taiwan, the East China Sea, and Japan. It is crucial in maintaining regional Chinese supremacy, especially given the recent tensions with Taiwan.
In fact, the goal of the reunification of Taiwan was a pivotal driver for theaterisation in China. Prior to 2016, the Nanjing Military Region handled Taiwan contingencies. The old system, however, as mentioned earlier, lacked a unified command over the various branches of the PLA, which would be critical in case of a multi-domain invasion.
The 2010 and 2015 white papers highlighted this gap, calling for “joint operation systems” and “informationised local wars”. The Eastern Theatre Command evolved to plug those very gaps.
Southern Theatre Command: Overseeing operations in the strategically critical South China Sea, this command is central to the Chinese assertion of the “Nine-Dash Line” claim that enables China to claim sovereignty over much of the waters of the South China Sea. It is headquartered in Guangzhou, and replaced the erstwhile Guangzhou Military Region.
Western Theatre Command: The most expansive of the five, it is responsible for peace and security in the volatile Xinjiang and Tibet regions, and along the border with India. Headquartered in Chengdu, Sichuan Province, it is responsible for a region marked by tough, high-altitude terrain with sparse infrastructure, making military operations and coordination challenging.
Northern Theatre Command: With its headquarters located in Shenyang, it serves as an important counter to potential risks that Russia and North Korea could pose. It also covers a region that is of high strategic value, housing rich reserves of both coal and petroleum, apart from being home to Daqing, China’s largest oil field.
Central Theatre Command: Headquartered in Beijing and directly linked to the CMC, it is responsible for protecting the capital city, apart from broadly overseeing logistics and operations. It is also responsible for the safety of key infrastructure and managing internal security threats. It is critical as it not only protects the Chinese capital, but also CCP leaders.
“Theaterisation addressed two needs: Aligning military power with economic might through jointness and informatisation for ‘system-of-systems’ conflicts, and fixing military regions’ wartime gaps in mobilisation and cross-service command,” Anushka Saxena, Research Analyst at Takshashila’s Geostrategy Programme, told ThePrint.
Sanjay Pulipaka, Chairperson of the Politeia Research Foundation, elaborated: “China’s theatre commands are structured to mirror its neighbourhood concerns, all oriented toward external threats—except the Central Theatre Command, which reports directly to the CMC.”
“Theaterisation enables deep regional specialisation—threat-specific procurement, tailored training, and personnel acclimatisation that fosters unique military thinking per theatre,” Pulipaka explained. It also boosts civil-military coordination, driving consolidated infrastructure like the Tiber High Speed Rail, he noted.
This requires neighbours like India to tailor their responses to each theatre’s unique posture, putting China in pole position regionally.
The military reforms, of which theaterisation was an integral part, should not be viewed in isolation, according to Pulipaka. “China’s theaterisation aligns its military with its economic rise, but unlike the US’ global commands, China’s remain territorially bound. This gives Washington the edge when it comes to the battle for global supremacy,” he noted.
Pulipaka also has a word of caution. “The Theatre Commands’ efficiency depends heavily on both military and political leadership. Recent CMC purges—removing over half its members —show their vulnerability to CCP-CMC dynamics,” he said.
Saxena, too, believes that “while theatre commands present solutions to the problems of integration and mobilisation, they also pose certain challenges.”
“Funding surges fueled corruption and led to budgets being skimmed from, ultimately compromising integration and jointness. Interservice rivalries, too, linger unevenly, and logistics remain a challenge even a decade on,” she noted.
Is Xi doing anything to rectify the problems? Saxena believes so. “Xi’s purges (an estimated 15,000 officials) and new guidelines hope to tackle corruption. On the other hand, drills, the unmanned aerial vehicles integration, and ‘all-domain battle links’ boost jointness, which is visible in Western Theatre Command’s improved border logistics and Central Theatre Command’s smart inventory,” Saxena highlighted.
(Edited by Viny Mishra)
Also read: What theaterisation could look like: Rotational CDS, three-star theatre commanders in initial years