IS Khorasan Province declares ‘war’ against Baloch groups, activists. What it means for Af-Pak

ISKP sees Baloch separatists as secular, nationalists & pro-democracy—traits it calls ‘un-Islamic’. One analyst says Pakistan can ‘technically use IS against BLA’.

Screengrab from ISKP clip | X: @realZalmayMK

New Delhi: The Islamic State – Khorasan Province (ISKP) has publicly confirmed the presence of its operational bases in Pakistan’s restive Balochistan province, and has formally declared war against Baloch separatist groups and activists. It has labelled Baloch and Pashtun activists like Mahrang Baloch and Manzoor Pashteen as “traitors”.

Released 25 May, through ISKP’s Al-Azaim Media, a 36-minute Pashto-language video titled “The Mastung incident and the conspiracy of the infidels”, claims Baloch separatists launched a deadly assault on ISKP camps in Balochistan’s Mastung district earlier this year, killing 30 ISKP fighters. In response, ISKP has vowed to carry out retaliatory attacks not only against separatist groups like the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) but also against those the ISKP perceives as BLA’s ideological and logistical backers.

The ISKP, or just the IS-K, further accused Baloch separatist groups like the BLA of forging ties with the Afghan Taliban, branding both movements as their ideological adversaries. The terror group’s declaration brackets Baloch separatists with the Taliban.

The video also confirms that the ISKP has established bases in Balochistan—a direct admission by the terror group that has often operated through shadow networks across the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.

This comes amid the ISKP’s attempts to reposition itself following the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan in 2021, which forced the terror group to allegedly retreat from areas it controlled in Afghanistan, and adapt.

Also, an ISKP booklet released last week denounced ethno-nationalist movements, explicitly targeting the Baloch Yakjehti Committee (BYC) and its leader Mahrang Baloch, as well as the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM) and its leader Manzoor Pashteen.

The booklet, both in Pashto and Farsi, urged supporters to attack events organised by the BYC, the separatist group that has become a focal point for civil rights activism in Balochistan, organising rallies and vigils for victims of enforced disappearances.

ISKP’s messaging through video and text has triggered widespread alarm among rights activists in Balochistan and Sindh regions of Pakistan.

Afrasiab Khattak, a former Pakistani senator and prominent Pashtun nationalist leader, took to social media to demand the Pakistani government explain ISKP’s expanding footprint.

In a tweet on 1 June, Khattak drew parallels between ISKP’s rise and the emergence of al-Qaeda in the region two decades ago, warning of long-term consequences if the terror group is allowed to grow unchecked.

There should be some explanation by the concerned quarters about the growing footprint of IS in Pakistan. Foreign terrorists are arrested here on intel provided by other countries. IS announces its plan to fight d BLA. It reminds one of d presence of Al Qaeda here 2 decades ago.

— Afrasiab Khattak (@a_siab) June 1, 2025

Former US special representative to Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzad too echoed similar concerns in a post on X on 26 May, saying ISKP’s actions suggest a troubling alignment with elements of the Pakistani State. Khalilzad had in an earlier post on X on 26 April said ISKP was active in Balochistan, contrary to Islamabad’s claims.

Pakistan’s Defense Minister has characterized his country's past support for terrorist and extremist groups as having been a mistake.  So, is #Pakistan no longer harboring terrorist and extremist groups?

Sadly, there are credible reports pointing to the existence of significant…

— Zalmay Khalilzad (@realZalmayMK) April 26, 2025

A significant part of the latest ISKP video is devoted to religious messaging, portraying Baloch separatists as secular, nationalists and pro-democracy—traits the terror group sees as ‘un-Islamic’. The video features senior ISKP religious figure Abu Abdur Rahman, who uses these arguments to justify the terror group’s decision to take on Baloch groups.

Remains of a bus attacked by Baloch separatists in Noshki in March | Reuters/ANI

Just two days after the video was released, the Islamic State Pakistan Province (ISPP)—a separate but related branch of ISIS—published a 117-page booklet in Urdu, echoing criticism of Baloch separatists. It also compared them to the Pashtun Tahaffuz Movement (PTM), a rights group that the ISKP has repeatedly attacked in its literature.

Reports that the ISKP set up new camps and safe havens in Balochistan have been circulating since the Taliban returned to power in 2021. After losing ground in Afghanistan, the ISKP is believed to have shifted operations to Mastung and surrounding areas, using the region to train recruits and plan attacks, according to reports.

These claims first surfaced in September 2023 via Al-Mirsad, a pro-Taliban media outlet. Taliban officials, including spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid, later confirmed these claims.

The new ISKP video notes that the ISKP and Baloch separatists had coexisted in Mastung for over a decade without conflict, prompting questions about why the terror group is only now declaring war against them based on ideological differences.

Kabir Taneja, senior Observer Research Foundation (ORF) fellow, told ThePrint, “There could be a variety of factors, but such fragmentation has usually more to do with overlapping interests of localised warlords and militant leaders than centrality of ideology.”

Abdullah Abbas Baloch, executive director of Human Rights Council of Balochistan, told ThePrint, “The recent statement from ISKP is not isolated—it’s a continuation of Pakistan’s systematic campaign to defame, dehumanize, and delegitimize the Baloch rights movement and its leadership.”

“This overlap is no coincidence—it reinforces the idea that ISKP is acting in alignment with, or at least to the benefit of, the Pakistani state’s objectives,” he added. “It serves two purposes: first, to crush the peaceful movement in Balochistan; and second, to deflect blame from the state by outsourcing repression to extremist groups. In doing so, Pakistan avoids direct accountability while continuing its repressive policies.”

“Historically, Pakistan has used non-state actors—particularly religious extremist groups—to advance strategic interests while simultaneously portraying itself as their victim. This dual approach has enabled it to win sympathy from the international community and secure funding under the guise of counterterrorism,” he said.

ISKP footprint in Balochistan 

Since its emergence in 2015, Islamic State – Khorasan Province (ISKP) has carried out a slew of attacks in Afghanistan, and a number of attacks in Pakistan.

In recent years, however, both ISKP and the Islamic State’s core leadership have expanded operations into Iran, carrying out multiple attacks. While its activity in Central Asia—specifically in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan—has so far been limited to smaller-scale incidents, the terror group continues to incite violence in Pakistan and surrounding regions, according to a 2025 report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).

In Balochistan, ISKP’s operations are largely confined to the belt stretching from the outskirts of Quetta to Mastung, Kalat, and parts of Khuzdar. These areas are dominated by Baloch communities. The ISKP has carried out 33 attacks in Balochistan since 2016.

“Shrines and churches have remained among its primary targets. IS-K has attacked shrines and churches eight times, while among human targets, political figures, especially politicians affiliated with the JUI, are at the top of its hit list. Security forces and polio health workers follow close behind,” Pakistani security analyst Amir Rana wrote in a piece for Dawn earlier this week.

What the falling-out means

Many fear these ISKP’s declaration of war could trigger a wave of violence in Balochistan—one that brings Islamist militants and Baloch separatists into an open conflict.

BLA has expanded its reach across the province, while ISKP remains largely restricted to central Balochistan. Still, the Islamist group’s ability to destabilise the separatist movement—and possibly redirect security attention—poses a significant threat in the region.

Rana wrote in the article, “This development will heighten the threat level for nationalist and rights movements in Balochistan and KP, while also triggering potential clashes between Islamist militants and nationalist insurgents.”

ORF’s Taneja said ISIS announcing a separate group for Balochistan shows how smaller entities or ‘wilayats‘ are born for specifically political and ideological reasons.

The Baloch struggle is for sovereignty and statehood, not Islam per se, and ISIS sees that as a problem and not something it can support, he added. “While, yes Pakistan can use the IS against the Baloch technically, the fact that the ISKP also actively targets Pakistani military along with TTP and many others make it a very dangerous proposition. But of course, dangerous propositions and self-harm have not deterred Pakistan in the past.”

This is an updated version of the report

(Edited by Ajeet Tiwari)