Military reforms in many countries are inspired by the US’s Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defence Reorganisation Act of 1986 (GNA). For some, the Act is a gold standard for military reforms.
General Anil Chauhan notes that amid shifting global conflicts, the new era of warfare requires tactical, operational, and strategic thinking across land, sea, air, cyber, space, and cognitive domains.
CISC Air Marshal Ashutosh Dixit says modern surveillance must allow military to detect, track & identify threats while still in staging areas, airfields or bases deep in enemy territory.
China’s rapid military modernisation is altering the regional power balance to the detriment of India’s security. India needs to pivot toward a multi-domain defence strategy.
DAC has paved way for procurement of this tech, which will enable tanks to track & hit targets with more precision. As of now, T-90 tanks are positioned manually to hit targets.
Decimation of Russian tanks suggests heavy armour is no longer enough to dominate the battlefield. The 2nd of a 3-part series on lessons for India’s military from the Ukraine war.
With a growing indigenous base of drone manufacturers and exporters, and incentives from government, industry sentiment is bullish. However, some concerns remain.
A report in The Indian Express suggests China may be employing hybrid warfare — using non-military measures to gain an edge over rivals — against India.
The minerals that Pakistan purports to offer to the US are either in quantities too small to matter, of a type that the US does not need, or would be much more easily sourced from other partners.
Open to public feedback until 26 November, the revised guidelines, among other changes, give CA firms more flexibility to advertise & promote their services.
Bihar is blessed with a land more fertile for revolutions than any in India. Why has it fallen so far behind then? Constant obsession with politics is at the root of its destruction.
AFAIK, even in Operation Sindoor, IAF had to face damages to its assets initially, because of artificially imposed restrictions by political executive ( Limited mandate to strike and destroy terrorist infrastructure was found to be limiting as PAF responded by an all out strike). Only when the political mandate unshackled the Indian armed forces that the indian fortune changed. So yes battlefield fluidity demands equal flexibility from political establishment.
What is expected is jointness of force. Airforce is hampered by reduction in force levels from sanctioned levels which itself was designed for 1.5 war fronts, not the 2.5 fronts which we face. Further distributing the IAF assets among theatres will result in diluting Air force till it no longer remains a force.
Same is true for our minimal Sea force levels. In the Andaman and Nicobar Command where the case for theaterization will help the indian navy achieve blue water navy capability of simultaneously defending entire IOR and the trade passing through it.
As a civilian it is clear to me that navy assets deployed over the himalyas was the clearest demonstration of jointness which India needs.
Nato must scale up by investing 4% in defence capabilities and we are a developing country, we make do with 2.6%. This paucity of resource is the gorilla in the room that needs addressing beyond theaterization.
Pak and china are not threats but challenges we must rise to and acquire force levels commensurate with increasing economic stature.
We must be atmanirbhar this vijaydashmi or else the demons of pak china america external hand and color revolutions will keep scaring us.
AFAIK, even in Operation Sindoor, IAF had to face damages to its assets initially, because of artificially imposed restrictions by political executive ( Limited mandate to strike and destroy terrorist infrastructure was found to be limiting as PAF responded by an all out strike). Only when the political mandate unshackled the Indian armed forces that the indian fortune changed. So yes battlefield fluidity demands equal flexibility from political establishment.
What is expected is jointness of force. Airforce is hampered by reduction in force levels from sanctioned levels which itself was designed for 1.5 war fronts, not the 2.5 fronts which we face. Further distributing the IAF assets among theatres will result in diluting Air force till it no longer remains a force.
Same is true for our minimal Sea force levels. In the Andaman and Nicobar Command where the case for theaterization will help the indian navy achieve blue water navy capability of simultaneously defending entire IOR and the trade passing through it.
As a civilian it is clear to me that navy assets deployed over the himalyas was the clearest demonstration of jointness which India needs.
Nato must scale up by investing 4% in defence capabilities and we are a developing country, we make do with 2.6%. This paucity of resource is the gorilla in the room that needs addressing beyond theaterization.
Pak and china are not threats but challenges we must rise to and acquire force levels commensurate with increasing economic stature.
We must be atmanirbhar this vijaydashmi or else the demons of pak china america external hand and color revolutions will keep scaring us.