Major General J. M. Singh suggested a forward posture in the Zimithang sector and requested for 1,200 mules but Army chief Sundarji gave him helicopters.
A Cold Start doctrine would only have been possible if the given equipment and thinking was already available, and that is where Gen K Sundarji must be credited.
While we roll our eyes at the lyrical disaster of Ghafoor, the beat drops, and suddenly we are nodding our heads like we have discovered the anthem of the season.
SEBI probe concluded that purported loans and fund transfers were paid back in full and did not amount to deceptive market practices or unreported related party transactions.
While the IAF remains committed to the Tejas programme and has placed orders for 180 Tejas Mk1A, the force is eagerly waiting for the Tejas Mk 2 version.
What Munir has achieved with Trump is a return to normal, ironing out the post-Abbottabad crease. The White House picture gives us insight into how Pakistan survives, occasionally thrives and thinks.
Only a Kargil like war or a full-scale war with Chinese would prove our mettle. There is little doubt that v were weak in 1962. But Chinese have also moved far ahead in 58 years and they r further close to Pakistan and even Burma. S, the ignominy of 1962 will not b repeated. There will b great loss on both sides. Ultimately it would b lose-lose with both sides claiming victory. In the present scenario President Trump may support us but Russians would keep mum. Pakistan would render all support at least indirectly. Pak may even allow Chinese to use POK. So, v need to do a lot more. Now that v have Chief of Def Staff things r different. Both sides r nuclear. Both have a large military though Chinese have an edge in many respects. But Chinese can ill-afford to ignore the economic consequences. Pak has also lost East Pakistan. But Tibet is under the full control of Chinese. Chinese r also close to our neighbours, incl Nepal. Bhutan keeps a studied silence. Thus, a gamut of things need to b consciously considered.
The comment of @G B Reddy is not correct. It happened in Jun 1986. As I have mentioned in my previous comment that I was in the Brigade HQs of the Brigade which was first to reach the area of conflict. Own 5 Div Bdes were moved later and the other Div came almost a year later for ex Chequrenoard.
I was posted as Staff Officer in the Brigade that was first launched in to the action, the Battalion of which occupied the ridge overlooking the Chinese post which had been disputed between the two armies/nations.
Being a part of the Forward Brigate, I was totally involved in making Helipads/ DZ ( The DZ which had been used during 1962. Our Brigade HQs was located west of Zimithang in area of village Lumpo. Incidently the same area was also the HQs of 7 Brigade of Brig Dalvi in 1962.
The Chinese were shit scared with oir offensive move. And we had complete battle zone dominance. Our heli-bridge was very effective. And we (the brigade was fully prepared for attack in many a nights.) which never materialized.
The skirmish incident date is wrongly quoted. It was in 1987. As a reserve brigade commander, I had the opportunity to plan for a number of
roles including establishing a road block opposite Bumla. Accuracy of reporting is critical please.
How are you sir after a long time hearing your voice
Regards
Kcreddy
Yes
Was in that area myself. Haven’t seen that type of sustained training for offensive operations in mountains again ever.
Was part of mule maintained bde for outflanking manoeuvres.
Remember walking 7 days self contained over huge distances. Truly remarkable time.
can’t understand why we meed to be provoked to build offensive or defensive positions.
I think as army generals they should be thinking how a Chinese / pakistani general would think and be ready with such positions.
the least the should do is have roads ready .
Sad that we are always reactive rather than be preemptive.
I was a Major and part of the Infantry battalion which formed part of the Brigade tasked to evict the Chinese from Sumdro Rong Valley. The Operation , ultimately, was not launched for reasons best known to the Higher HQs and Central Govt. Let me state the following:-
1. Lt Gen N S I Narahari and Maj Gen J M Singh were the best possible Corps Cdr and Div Cdr for that operation. Truly GREAT combination.
2. Chinese Army, those days, was definitely neither well trained nor physically fit enough or motivated to withstand an Indian Offensive in that limited area.
3. I commanded an Infantry Battalion in the same area 4 years later. Standard of Chinese Army had not improved. It was in just a satisfactory state of preparedness.
4. We should not be unnecessarily awed of Chinese Military . We are equally good, even better, I assure you that.
Compare and contrast military leadership then with what it is now, Instead of all this false 56-inch rhetoric ask why current military leadership has lost its warrior ethos and become bootlickers of politicians.
Makes good reading. Gives insight into military operations. Regrettably, in India military matters cannot be studied as a part of academic curriculum. All this knowledge is confined to uniforms. This writer’s book “India’s Wars” is a very good military history of independent India upto 1971.
A step moved back to do what , if Wangdung grazing ground had been evicted by the Battalion sent up immediately from Chuke GG on the detection of the intrusion , maybe the results would have been totally different from what later happened.
A lesson learnt late. Wangdung grazing ground’s eviction by the unit inducted in on foot overnight from Chuje GG would have changed the course of the Operation Falcon something different altogether. All that happened later was a counting of Mule Trains, Chopper Landings and an odd skirmish here and there. With nothing worthwhile to show. Maybe the Dragon of Two score years ago stilll sent chills
It was very well conducted operation. Such bold actions only general JM Singh could have taken. Unfortunately we lost such dynamic general for wrong reasons. From major general v s Karnik(retd)
1862 lt regt was the first artillery regiment to be deployed in the operation, after gen sunderji visited Twang along with Gen jm singh.
Only a Kargil like war or a full-scale war with Chinese would prove our mettle. There is little doubt that v were weak in 1962. But Chinese have also moved far ahead in 58 years and they r further close to Pakistan and even Burma. S, the ignominy of 1962 will not b repeated. There will b great loss on both sides. Ultimately it would b lose-lose with both sides claiming victory. In the present scenario President Trump may support us but Russians would keep mum. Pakistan would render all support at least indirectly. Pak may even allow Chinese to use POK. So, v need to do a lot more. Now that v have Chief of Def Staff things r different. Both sides r nuclear. Both have a large military though Chinese have an edge in many respects. But Chinese can ill-afford to ignore the economic consequences. Pak has also lost East Pakistan. But Tibet is under the full control of Chinese. Chinese r also close to our neighbours, incl Nepal. Bhutan keeps a studied silence. Thus, a gamut of things need to b consciously considered.
The comment of @G B Reddy is not correct. It happened in Jun 1986. As I have mentioned in my previous comment that I was in the Brigade HQs of the Brigade which was first to reach the area of conflict. Own 5 Div Bdes were moved later and the other Div came almost a year later for ex Chequrenoard.
I was posted as Staff Officer in the Brigade that was first launched in to the action, the Battalion of which occupied the ridge overlooking the Chinese post which had been disputed between the two armies/nations.
Being a part of the Forward Brigate, I was totally involved in making Helipads/ DZ ( The DZ which had been used during 1962. Our Brigade HQs was located west of Zimithang in area of village Lumpo. Incidently the same area was also the HQs of 7 Brigade of Brig Dalvi in 1962.
The Chinese were shit scared with oir offensive move. And we had complete battle zone dominance. Our heli-bridge was very effective. And we (the brigade was fully prepared for attack in many a nights.) which never materialized.
The skirmish incident date is wrongly quoted. It was in 1987. As a reserve brigade commander, I had the opportunity to plan for a number of
roles including establishing a road block opposite Bumla. Accuracy of reporting is critical please.
How are you sir after a long time hearing your voice
Regards
Kcreddy
Yes
Was in that area myself. Haven’t seen that type of sustained training for offensive operations in mountains again ever.
Was part of mule maintained bde for outflanking manoeuvres.
Remember walking 7 days self contained over huge distances. Truly remarkable time.
India need some general, like ( General JM Singh ) to take iron/bold action against China and Pakistan
can’t understand why we meed to be provoked to build offensive or defensive positions.
I think as army generals they should be thinking how a Chinese / pakistani general would think and be ready with such positions.
the least the should do is have roads ready .
Sad that we are always reactive rather than be preemptive.
I was a Major and part of the Infantry battalion which formed part of the Brigade tasked to evict the Chinese from Sumdro Rong Valley. The Operation , ultimately, was not launched for reasons best known to the Higher HQs and Central Govt. Let me state the following:-
1. Lt Gen N S I Narahari and Maj Gen J M Singh were the best possible Corps Cdr and Div Cdr for that operation. Truly GREAT combination.
2. Chinese Army, those days, was definitely neither well trained nor physically fit enough or motivated to withstand an Indian Offensive in that limited area.
3. I commanded an Infantry Battalion in the same area 4 years later. Standard of Chinese Army had not improved. It was in just a satisfactory state of preparedness.
4. We should not be unnecessarily awed of Chinese Military . We are equally good, even better, I assure you that.
Why is it whenever we hear of Indian Army acting decisively. Only two names crop FM Sam Bahadur and Gen. Sundarji.
Lost general JM Singh, for wrong reasons!? How, where and why?! Can some honourable military officer, detail please.
Compare and contrast military leadership then with what it is now, Instead of all this false 56-inch rhetoric ask why current military leadership has lost its warrior ethos and become bootlickers of politicians.
Makes good reading. Gives insight into military operations. Regrettably, in India military matters cannot be studied as a part of academic curriculum. All this knowledge is confined to uniforms. This writer’s book “India’s Wars” is a very good military history of independent India upto 1971.
Excellent operation
Only general JM Singh could have taken such bold step
A step moved back to do what , if Wangdung grazing ground had been evicted by the Battalion sent up immediately from Chuke GG on the detection of the intrusion , maybe the results would have been totally different from what later happened.
A lesson learnt late. Wangdung grazing ground’s eviction by the unit inducted in on foot overnight from Chuje GG would have changed the course of the Operation Falcon something different altogether. All that happened later was a counting of Mule Trains, Chopper Landings and an odd skirmish here and there. With nothing worthwhile to show. Maybe the Dragon of Two score years ago stilll sent chills
It was very well conducted operation. Such bold actions only general JM Singh could have taken. Unfortunately we lost such dynamic general for wrong reasons. From major general v s Karnik(retd)