On 20 January 2026, China’s top two military officers, Generals Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli, did not participate in a ministerial-level seminar convened to study the spirit of the Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Such an absence raised intense speculation in China’s carefully scripted political system by the next evening, suggesting that both officers were under investigation. Later, China’s Ministry of National Defense confirmed on 24 January that both officers were indeed under investigation for suspected serious violations of Party discipline and law.
The episode has amplified uncertainty over the state of civil–military relations in China. Xi Jinping’s prolonged anti-corruption campaign within the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) appears to have reached the apex of the military’s command structure. This article, therefore, evaluates three interrelated questions: Does the current round of purges reflect a contingent response to corruption, or is it structural to party–army relations under Xi’s rule? Does the removal of top commanders introduce regime security risks, whether through elite fragmentation, institutional suspicion, or coup dynamics? And finally, how do frequent leadership removals affect the PLA’s combat effectiveness, command cohesion, and personnel morale over time?
Leaders Under Investigation in Xi’s Latest Crackdown
Zhang Youxia, the only remaining Vice-Chairman of China’s Central Military Commission (CMC) and the sole military representative on the Politburo, was arguably at the pinnacle of his career. Liu Zhenli, a CMC member heading the Joint Staff Department, was responsible for combat operations, joint warfighting, unit movements, and intelligence. Both Zhang and Liu are among the few combat-experienced officers in the PLA from the China-Vietnam conflict era and have closely collaborated over the years, especially during Xi’s repeated anti-corruption drives in the PLA.
In addition, Zhang is part of the red nobility and a childhood friend of Xi; both their fathers served in the same army formations, sharing close family ties. Predictably, even after crossing the PLA’s retirement age limit at 76 years, Xi retained Zhang on the CMC as a trusted power base while netting scores of PLA generals and admirals under the banner of anti-corruption.
Two Waves of Leadership Decapitation in the PLA
Xi ran his first decapitation wave during 2014-18, targeting corrupt and entrenched Jiang Zemin-era officers who had hollowed out and subverted Hu Jintao’s authority and key initiatives. In the second wave, underway since 2023, Xi has toppled senior military officers from his own patronage network. In total, more than 110 of the PLA’s senior-most officers have fallen in the Xi era. Some prominent names are listed in Tables 1, 2, and 3, reflecting the widespread nature of these eliminations.
Table 1: Prosecuted CMC Vice Chairmen: Xi Jinping Era
| Year | Vice Chairmen Prosecuted | Status |
| 2014 | Xu Caihou | Died |
| 2015 | Guo Boxiong | Jailed |
| 2025 | He Weidong | Under Prosecution |
| 2026 | Zhang Youxia | Under Prosecution |
Table 2: Prosecuted CMC Members: Xi Jinping Era
| Year | Name | Position | Status |
| 2017 | Zhang Yang | Former Political Work Dept (PWD) Director | Committed suicide |
| 2018 | Fang Fenghui | Former Chief of Joint Staff Dept (JSD) | Sentenced to Life Imprisonment |
| 2024 | Li Shangfu | Former Defence Minister | Under Prosecution |
| 2024 | Wei Fenghe | Former Defence Minister | Under Prosecution |
| Oct 2025 | Miao Hua | PWD Director | Under Prosecution |
| Dec 2025 | Wang Renhua | Political & Legal Affairs | Expelled |
| Jan 2026 | Liu Zhenli | Chief Joint Staff Dept (JSD) | Under Investigation |
Table 3: Prosecuted Senior Military Officers: Xi Jinping Era
| 2014 | Liu Zheng | Deputy Director, General Logistics Department |
| 2016 | Wang Jianping | Former Commander of the People’s Armed Police |
| 2016 | Tian Xiuquan | Former Political Commissar of the Navy |
| 2023 | Li Yuchao | Commander Rocket Force |
| 2023 | Zhou Yaning | Former Commander Rocket Force |
| 2023 | Xu Zhongbo | Political Commissar Rocket Force |
| 2023 | Ding Laihang | Former Commander PLA Air Force |
| 2023 | Ju Xinchun | Commander South Sea Fleet (Navy) |
| 2024 | Feng Yi | Deputy Commander Rocket Force |
| 2024 | Ju Qiansheng | Commander Strategic Support Force |
| 2025 | Wang Xiubin | Commander Southern Theatre |
| 2025 | Qin Shutong | Political Commissar PLA Ground Force |
| 2025 | Yuan Huazhi | Political Commissar PLA Navy |
| 2025 | Wang Chunning | Commander People’s Armed Police |
| 2025 | Lin Xiangyang | Commander Eastern Theatre |
| 2025 | Wang Houbin | Commander Rocket Force |
No Ordinary Case
By targeting Zhang, Xi has shown that no person in China is untouchable and that everyone is vulnerable, even if they are a lifelong ally. In addition, the purge is being led by the CCP office, which accuses Zhang of trampling on the ‘Chairman Responsibility System’. This is code for Zhang challenging Xi’s supreme authority, and the episode therefore has telltale signs of a political power struggle. Moreover, the PLA is a secretive organisation and has historically often been at the forefront of resisting Party initiatives, even during Mao Zedong’s era. Therefore, even individuality and independent expression of thought can be interpreted as defiance, especially by Xi, who has become extremely apprehensive in the run-up to next year’s leadership renewal.
Another noticeable feature of this investigation is the media drip-feeding of multiple allegations, including the leak of nuclear secrets, corruption in promotions, and other reasons cited for the case. However, this also reflects Beijing’s concealed anxiety and a weak justification for this round of top-level removals. Predictably, Zhang and Liu are being accused of exceptionally grave, unpatriotic conduct, intended to discipline elite dissent, the rank and file, and the wider military community.
Self-Revolution: The Cave Dwelling Question
In 1945, Mao Zedong posed the ‘Cave Dwelling Question,’ the essence of which was: “How can a revolutionary party avoid degeneration after it comes to power, when it leaves the cave and governs the country?” Mao suggested three methods: permanent revolution, ideological rectification, and self-transformation through struggle. This effectively introduced a siege mentality in the CCP, which has endured through generational changes in its leadership.
Xi’s response to this fundamental question has been encapsulated in his concept of ‘self-revolution’: treating corruption and disloyalty not as governance failures but as existential political threats. Xi, therefore, drives a vertical self-revolution through surveillance, discipline, fear, and bureaucratic penetration, keeping technological control over economic and administrative domains while enhancing ideological purity in political and military realms. This also underpins his continuous search for adversaries, real or imagined, reining in corporate czars such as Jack Ma, pursuing dissidents abroad, and sidelining elder politicians such as former President Hu Jintao.
His anti-corruption campaigns are a crucial part of the permanent struggle, ensnaring thousands of “tigers and flies,” especially in the PLA. Gradually, Xi has dismantled the entire CMC, barring Zhang Shengmin, his anti-corruption enforcer. If Zhang and Liu were not spared, there is no guarantee that Zhang Shengmin himself will not eventually fall. Chinese history is replete with examples of emperors purging their top aides and lieutenants, along with their family and patronage networks, once doubts arose over their loyalty or continued utility.
Regime Security
The recent purge is bound to create anxiety in the PLA, eroding trust in promotions, command structures, and institutions. The worst sufferer is the CMC. Xi will eventually strive to populate the CMC with a younger generation of military officers untainted by the politics of the old guard — a much more difficult vetting exercise. Even the more enterprising recruits in the future are likely to be cautious after observing the predicament of their predecessors.
However, coup fears or an immediate leadership threat to Xi from the military remain low, as the PLA is institutionally fragmented into theatre commands and party-controlled organs and remains answerable to Xi through parallel command structures. Nevertheless, elite fragmentation will occur, as officers allied to or promoted by purged generals may feel insecure or sidelined, thereby creating space for factionalism. This could lead to micro-level disobedience, leaks, sluggish implementation of directives, and a loss of cohesion, accompanied by copious mistrust in the PLA.
Conclusion: PLA’s Predicament
The PLA appears to be entering a phase where institutional cohesion, professionalism, and higher command effectiveness may become brittle. The pre-eminent emphasis on political work and ideological purity risks political commissars dominating the PLA rather than commanders. This renewed emphasis on the ‘Red Over Experts’ dynamic will be net negative in the long run.
The PLA faces a significant imbalance between its hardware and human capital. While its inventory and force structure have rapidly modernised, command quality and professionalism remain subpar. If the current trend of purges continues, the Chinese military may appear strong yet increasingly resemble a force of paper tigers — disciplined but lacking initiative, independent insight, and command innovation.
Officers’ personal loyalty to Xi for advancement is likely to outweigh organisational norms and professional competence. Military officers may become risk-averse and promote politically safe subordinates, leading to a gradual erosion of military capability. Commanders may hesitate to report adverse outcomes; decision-making may slow down, and conducting joint operations is likely to become harder. In effect, the PLA may become reliable as a political instrument but compromised in warfighting. These dynamics will have a major impact on regional security.
Atul Kumar is a Fellow – National Security and China Studies with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
This article was originally published on the Observer Research Foundation website.