The question of municipal leadership in Indian cities recurs in policy discussions and academic debates alike. This discourse gained momentum against the backdrop of the New York City mayoral election, which concluded in November 2025. The prevailing view was that Indian cities—especially the top metropolises—needed a strong mayor along the lines of New York’s. The case for an elected mayor with executive powers remains compelling; however, the debate now needs to move beyond the office of the mayor to the institutional autonomy of the municipality the mayor is expected to lead.
The Case for a Strong Mayor
The various strands of thought woven into this opinion were ably articulated in the Second Administrative Reforms Commission’s (SARC) sixth report on local governance. The report addressed the very question at the heart of the current debate: who should be the chief executive of an urban local body (ULB)? It argued that, given rapid urbanisation and the multifaceted challenges facing cities, good governance requires an enduring vision and stable leadership. It therefore recommended that executive power be exercised by the elected mayor. SARC further contended that empowering local governments rests on the principles of subsidiarity and people’s participation in democratic processes. It emphasised that vesting executive powers in an unelected official appointed by the state government risks reducing local governance to mere symbolism.
SARC also favoured a powerful mayor, directly elected by all voters in a ULB, especially in big cities, with a five-year tenure. It was wary of an indirectly elected mayor, arguing that this could make the municipal system prone to ‘horse trading’, thereby eroding the mayor’s authority and undermining the quality of governance. It recommended that the mayor’s cabinet should become the apex decision-making authority in the ULB. The mayor should select the cabinet from among the councillors, and it should function directly under the mayor’s direction. The mayor should also have final authority over any executive matter.
It also addressed concerns that such a powerful mayor might act unchecked, noting that the municipal corporation would maintain checks on the mayor. The corporation would have final authority over budget approval, regulation-making, major policy decisions, and oversight. Public opinion and a free media would provide added protection. Above all, the office of the independent Ombudsman, suggested by SARC in its report on ‘Ethics in Governance’, would be charged with ensuring mayoral accountability.
SARC did not envisage a simple substitution of the mayor for the commissioner. It also recommended that the commissioner exercise functions delegated by the mayor and that ULBs progressively assume responsibility for appointing their commissioner and staff. These recommendations therefore went beyond changing who occupies the executive office, envisaging greater functional, financial, and administrative autonomy for ULBs. Selective implementation of SARC’s strong mayor recommendation, without its accompanying proposals for functional, financial, and administrative devolution, would amount to little more than changing the occupant of an already constrained office.
Why a Strong Mayor Needs a Strong Municipality
Replacing India’s appointed municipal commissioner with an elected mayor as the chief executive, however, would amount to little more than a symbolic change if ULBs remain subject to extensive state government control and have limited institutional autonomy. In most states, municipalities cannot independently decide which functions to perform or which taxes to impose. These decisions rest with the state government. Nor can ULBs approve a master plan for their cities, since that authority rests with the state government. Their chief executive is a state appointee, and many other top functionaries either need state approval or are deputed from state services.
In essence, ULBs must perform only what the state government assigns, in the manner it prescribes. Against this backdrop, appointing the mayor as chief executive, whether directly or indirectly elected, is unlikely to improve the quality or independence of decision-making in ULBs. An elected mayor cannot provide effective leadership if the municipality itself lacks meaningful autonomy.
This situation further underscores a deeper problem: under the prevailing statutory framework, ULBs neither have nor ‘require’ real leadership. Appointed municipal commissioners may provide capable administrative leadership, but cannot substitute for the democratic political leadership needed to govern local self-governments. This is because in democracies and popularly elected bodies, true leaders are elected. Municipal commissioners are not. First, leaders have a pre-ordained, statutorily mandated tenure; the state government controls the tenure of municipal commissioners. It is reported that the all-India average tenure of municipal commissioners is 10 months.
Second, the leader is answerable to the people. The municipal commissioner, on the other hand, is answerable to the state government. As career bureaucrats, municipal commissioners perform a managerial role. They direct municipal employees, set tasks and targets, and monitor performance. Replacing the commissioner with a mayor would change only one fact: unlike the commissioner, the mayor would be elected. However, the mayor’s functional freedom would remain as constrained as the commissioner’s. Such a mayor may not be able to lead the city but would remain subject to the direction of the state government.
The Mayor’s Limited Constitutional and Statutory Role
Unfortunately, the 74th Constitutional Amendment Act did not attempt to rectify the situation. It constitutionalised municipalities but left the procedures for electing chairpersons or mayors, and the powers municipalities would actually exercise, to state legislatures. It neither created a constitutionally empowered mayoral office nor mandated substantive devolution.
The implications of this framework become apparent in the way state statutes define the mayor’s role. For example, the Tamil Nadu Urban Local Bodies Act, 1998, which repealed the Chennai City Municipal Corporation Act, 1919, formally recognises the mayor as a municipal authority and confers certain coordinating, inspection, and approval powers on the office. However, it provides for the commissioner’s appointment by the state government, which continues to have complete municipal executive power. The mayor is assigned the duty of presiding over the corporation’s meetings. The mayor has the right to call for reports on municipal matters from the commissioner and is an ex officio member of all municipal committees. The state government retains the power to remove the mayor. Thus, despite the mayor’s official recognition in the statutory structure, her role, without executive powers, is confined to a ceremonial and procedural presence.
The Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation Act is another example of the limited role assigned to the mayor. Sections 36 and 37 of the Act provide that the corporation shall, at its first meeting after general elections, elect one of its councillors as the mayor. Further, the mayor is responsible for convening and presiding over a monthly meeting of the Corporation and can be removed by the state government if the mayor fails to convene two such consecutive meetings. The provisions governing the mayor’s removal further illustrate the limited authority assigned to the office. In summary, no one in the city fulfils the role of a true leader—neither the ceremonial mayor nor the executive commissioner.
The institutional structure frequently positions the elected body as an adversarial counterweight to the commissioner rather than as the political authority to which the administration is accountable. The municipal commissioner, in turn, tends to view the mayor, councillors and local political actors as working towards a single objective: securing a commissioner who is responsive to their interests or seeking the commissioner’s removal when that is not the case. This carries serious consequences for governance and municipal performance. The situation becomes more critical for the commissioner when the local political majority rests with the same party that rules the state. In such situations, the state government could be compelled to transfer the commissioner. In many instances, state governments have been known to intervene to maintain political cohesion within the party. Irrespective of how the situation plays out, the city ultimately bears the consequences.
Conclusion
This brings us back to the usual conclusion: when an ailing ULB can be revived only through major structural intervention, a change in leadership alone will not resolve its underlying weaknesses. Cities, saddled with substantial day-to-day responsibilities, require a system that enables rapid, high-quality decision-making. ULBs, however, remain burdened by complex structures and unclear delineation of responsibilities, creating accountability gaps. Such a structure can be fixed only by first making ULBs self-governing and empowered. Replacing a constrained commissioner with a constrained mayor will not resolve the underlying institutional limitations of the municipality.
A strong mayor can provide effective political leadership only when supported by a strong, autonomous municipality with clear authority, resources, and accountability. The case, therefore, is not simply for stronger mayors, but for stronger municipalities that enable elected leaders to govern effectively.
Ramanath Jha is a Distinguished Fellow at Observer Research Foundation.
This article was originally published on the Observer Research Foundation website.