Trump is offering India stale weapons. Not in sync with Aatmanirbharta

On the face of it, the joint statement on defence ticks all the right boxes. However, the two-decade-long India-US defence cooperation has promised much and delivered too little.

A US Air Force F-35 fighter jet taxis during the Aero India 2023 air show at Yelahanka air base in Bengaluru, on 13 February 2023 | Reuters

According to the joint statement after the Modi-Trump meeting, military partnership will be one of the three essentials which will define the future India-US relationship. The newly launched strategic initiative, ‘COMPACT’—Catalysing Opportunities for Military Partnership, Accelerated Commerce & Technology—highlights this. However, US President Donald Trump seems to be looking at the military partnership as a lucrative commercial transaction.

“Starting this year, we’ll be increasing military sales to India by many billions of dollars. We’re also paving the way to ultimately provide India with the F-35 stealth fighters,” Trump said at the joint press conference.

During his telephonic conversation with Prime Minister Narendra Modi on 27 January, he also “emphasised the importance of India increasing its procurement of American-made security equipment…”

India has never sought the F-35, which is costly to buy and operate. Trump’s own advisor, Elon Musk, described it as “an expensive & complex jack of all trades, master of none”, even dubbing its creators as idiots in light of the emerging drone technologies.

India’s expectations from the defence partnership are very different, as 

highlighted by Modi when he said, “America plays an important role in India’s defense preparedness. As strategic and trusted partners, we are moving forward actively towards joint development, joint production, and transfer of technology.” Even the prime minister missed the most important issue: jointly developing and sharing future military technologies.

In light of the above, I analyse the future course of India-US defence cooperation and the way forward for India.

Contours of defence agreement

Reaffirming their unwavering commitment to a dynamic multi-domain 

defence partnership, Trump and Modi announced plans to sign a new 10-year “Framework for the U.S.-India Major Defence Partnership in the 21st Century” in 2025. It was agreed that the US would expand defence sales and co-production with India to strengthen interoperability and defence industrial cooperation.

During 2025, in order to rapidly meet India’s defence requirements, the two leaders announced plans for new procurements and co-production arrangements for Javelin Anti-Tank Guided Missiles (ATGM) and Stryker Infantry Combat Vehicles (ICV) in India. They also expect to complete the procurement of six additional P-8I Maritime Patrol aircraft to enhance India’s maritime surveillance reach in the Indian Ocean Region. Though not specifically mentioned in the statement, India is also seeking GE-414 jet engines for its LCA Mark 2. This engine may also power its fifth-generation Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) programme and pave the way for the development of an indigenous aero engine.

Both countries agreed to review their respective arms transfer regulations, including the US’s International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), in order to streamline defence trade, technology exchange, spare supplies, and in-country repair of US-provided defence systems. A Reciprocal Defense Procurement (RDP) agreement will also be negotiated to better align respective procurement systems.

The countries also agreed to accelerate defence technology cooperation across space, air defence, missile, maritime, and undersea technologies. The US will review its policy on releasing fifth-generation fighters and undersea systems to India. Keeping in view the rising importance of autonomous systems, a new initiative—the Autonomous Systems Industry Alliance (ASIA)—was announced to further promote industry partnerships and production.

Mismatch of aspirations

On the face of it, the joint statement on defence ticks all the right boxes. However, the two–decade–long India-US defence cooperation has often promised much while delivering too little. Even the proposed ‘10–year framework agreement’ isn’t new. Similar 10-year framework agreements were signed in 2005 and 2015. These led to procurements worth $20 billion, including 11 C‑17 Globemaster III; 12 C‑130J Super Hercules; 12 P‑8I Poseidon aircraft; 15 CH‑47F Chinook; 24 MH‑60R Seahawks; 28 AH‑64E Apache helicopters; 53 Harpoon anti-ship missiles; 145 M777 howitzers; and 31 MQ‑9B strategic UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles).

In pursuit of defence cooperation with the US, India had two aims. The first was to modernise its armed forces with state-of-the-art weapon systems to be purchased through government-to-government contracts. The second was to seek future military technologies through co-development and co-production. In both cases, the transfer of technology was sought for the Make In India initiative, with the exception of some one–time contracts. Retention of strategic autonomy is a core national security principle for India, so it did not want to formally ally with US. This has been the biggest stumbling block in defence cooperation. Consequently, the cooperation has been transactional and commerce–driven.

The US does not participate in any competitive bid when India seeks military equipment through a global tender. Instead, it cleverly assesses India’s requirements and makes offers from time to time during bilateral defence interactions. At times, India too expresses interest. Indeed, New Delhi has purchased military equipment worth $20 billion, as highlighted earlier, but there has been no notable progress in co-development or co-production of future technologies.

Though the weapon systems already procured as well as those in the pipeline are in current use by the US and its allies, however, most are based on ‘yesterday’s technology’. 

They were developed over the last three decades. A case in point is the procurement and joint production of Javelin ATGM and Striker ICV, which is to begin this year. Javelin was developed in 1989 and introduced into service in 1996. While it remains, without a doubt, one of the best ATGMs, it is certainly not a futuristic technology like drones. In the Ukraine war, for instance, drones accounted for more tank, ICV, and other weapon platform kills than any other system. Similarly, the Stryker ICV was developed in the 1990s and introduced into service in 2002. These two systems were not sought by India—it’s a price we are paying in the hope of securing future military technologies and that too at the cost of Aatmanirbhata. Indigenous anti-tank drones and an upgraded version of WhAp ICV will serve the same purpose as the Javelin and Stryker.  

In his 2.0 avatar, Trump is transactional to the core and deeply focused on MAGA (Make America Great Again). He is shaping a new world order dominated by three powers—the US, China, and Russia. His approach to India-US defence cooperation will be short–term and commerce–driven, with no incentive for militarily empowering India as a bulwark against China.

From the tenor of the 13 February meeting, it is clear that Trump seems to be focused on ‘military procurement and sales’. His approach is not in tune with India’s national security strategy.

What should India do?

It is too early to pass judgement on the outcome of Trump’s tenure on the international security environment and its long–term impact on US foreign policy and relations with India. In my view, New Delhi must weather the storm and wait out the chaos, particularly with respect to defence engagement.

India does need state-of-the-art weapons that remain relevant for the next 10-15 years to reduce the differential with China, and the US has the best of them. So, our dealings with Washington must also become transactional, putting the rider of co-development and co-production of futuristic weapon technologies with every current weapon deal. Any deal that does not meet this requirement must be scuttled by dragging the negotiations.

The US is doing us no favours. If it does not oblige us with future technologies then we should get them from elsewhere.

The military environment in the near future will comprise a mix of the existing weapon technologies with upgradations and emerging AI-driven drone and autonomous weapon systems, apart from electromagnetic and cyber technologies. The current state-of-the-art weapon systems have become prohibitively expensive due to the desired perfection in diverse parameters. On the other hand, future asymmetrical technologies like drones can be produced at a fraction of the cost. The cost of one Javelin ATGM is $2,16,717 or about Rs 1.9 crore. The cost of the cheapest Ukrainian anti-tank drone is only $500  or about Rs 43,685. For the Indian Army, the Javelin is a White Elephant.

According to General Petraeus, former head of CIA and US Central Command, Ukraine is the world leader today in military drones. In the Cipher Brief interview, Petraeus said that Ukraine is fighting today’s war with tomorrow’s technology and the US tends to produce yesterday’s technology for tomorrow’s war. Should we, then, not head for Kyiv rather than Washington for futuristic drone technology? Europe is set to rearm itself in light of its breaking alliance with the US. The focus is likely to be future technologies developed by multi-nation consortiums. India must seize this opportunity to join as a partner for co-development and co-production.

India needs to remain steadfast with Aatmanirbharta in defence, particularly with respect to futuristic asymmetrical technologies. There are no permanent friends or enemies. India must not suffer the same fate as Ukraine and the US allies of 80 years in Western Europe. With or without the desired defence cooperation of the US, our military transformation goal must remain the military capability to challenge China by 2035 and parity with the world powers by 2047.

Lt Gen H S Panag PVSM, AVSM (R) served in the Indian Army for 40 years. He was GOC in C Northern Command and Central Command. Post retirement, he was Member of Armed Forces Tribunal. Views are personal.

(Edited by Prasanna Bachchhav)