India-Pakistan re-hyphenated under Modi. Work of successive govts has gone out the window

Modi went all-in on the US with Trump brokering a ceasefire when Pakistan was on the back foot. Now India will pay the price of it.

US Vice President Vance with PM Modi | X/@narendramodi

India’s actions to punish the perpetrators of the Pahalgam terror attack began with a military bang but ended, four days later, with a diplomatic whimper. With full support from across the political spectrum, the Indian armed forces launched Operation Sindoor in the early hours of 7 May, attacking nine Pakistani targets linked to terrorist groups and engaging Pakistani forces in a series of air and land battles.

But just as Indian operations appeared to be making headway in imposing a heavy cost on the Pakistani military, US President Donald Trump announced on 10 May that India and Pakistan had agreed to a ceasefire, “after a long night of talks mediated by the United States.”

This came as a surprise — not only to those in the Indian media who had been fantasising about flattening Karachi and retaking Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK), but also to many Indians who were taken aback by the fact that they had to learn about the ceasefire from Trump and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, rather than their own government. After all, Prime Minister Narendra Modi has described Trump as a “true friend”.

Conflicting narratives

We now have two narratives about how the war ended. Rubio unambiguously stated on 10 May that he and Vice President JD Vance had engaged “over the past 48 hours” with Modi, Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar, Pakistani Army Chief General Asim Munir, and the respective National Security Advisors. Trump has repeatedly stated, most recently on 13 May in Saudi Arabia, that he had held out the carrot and stick of trade and sanctions to convince both countries to come to the table.

Meanwhile, the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) said the story began with a call from the Pakistani High Commission to the MEA at 12:37pm, which led to a call from the Pakistani Director General of Military Operations (DGMO) to his Indian counterpart at 3.35 pm, and a ceasefire from 5 pm onwards. The MEA spokesperson contradicted Trump’s assertion, saying that “there were conversations between Indian and US leaders on the evolving military situation” but that “the issue of trade did not come up”.

Whatever the truth, it is obvious that DGMOs do not have the power to end conflicts without authorisation from their respective political leaders. And we know that a series of talks did occur in the background, including with Saudi and Emirati officials. The MEA has yet to shed any light on what convinced India to agree to a ceasefire, considering that Pakistan was on the back foot following successful Indian strikes on its airfields the previous night. If not the carrot of trade (or the stick of sanctions), what convinced Modi to end the conflict?

There is another possibility. In his 12 May speech, Modi stated that Pakistan has committed “कि उसकी ओर से आगे कोई आतंकी गतिविधि और सैन्य दुस्साहस नहीं दिखाया जाएगा” (it “will not indulge in any sort of terror activities or military recklessness from now on”). If it is true that Pakistan gave guarantees that it would no longer support terrorism in India, why is this not the biggest story and cause for celebration? By whom was this guarantee given, and to whom? One hopes this is based on something solid, unlike Modi’s “न वहाँ कोई हमारी सीमा में घुस आया है, न ही कोई घुसा हुआ है” (“neither has anyone entered our territory nor is anyone currently inside our territory”) falsehood following the Chinese intrusions in 2020.

Either way, the arrival of the US at the front and centre of what was previously a bilateral conflict has created many complications for India. Whatever the Prime Minister might say about the conditions under which talks will be held (viz. ending terrorism and the status of PoK), the door has been opened to the internationalisation of the Kashmir issue.

Furthermore, the work of successive Indian governments to “de-hyphenate” India and Pakistan has gone out the window. Far from acknowledging that India’s military operation was in fact a response to a terror attack by Pakistan-sponsored groups, Trump heaped praise on the leaders of both countries, while Rubio commended “Prime Ministers Modi and Sharif on their wisdom, prudence and statesmanship”.

Looks like Modi’s all-in bet with the US is extracting some unexpected costs. Which is why he must take the country into confidence and clarify these matters in a special session of Parliament. Whether it was Jawaharlal Nehru, Lal Bahadur Shastri, Indira Gandhi, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, or Dr Manmohan Singh, all previous prime ministers have discussed and debated such issues in Parliament.

India’s new anti-terror doctrine

How are we to analyse the success of Operation Sindoor? India has clearly demonstrated the ability to strike deeply into Pakistan, damage the adversary’s infrastructure, and also to defend against mass counterattacks via missiles and drones. But inflicting costs on an adversary is not a goal in itself — it is a means to an end.

The first statement of goals came from Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri on 7 May. He said that India had “exercised its right to respond and pre-empt, as well as deter more such cross-border attacks.” Operation Sindoor certainly achieved tactical success by damaging jihadist facilities and Pakistani military infrastructure. But the true gauge of strategic success will be whether Pakistan desists from sponsoring future terror attacks in Jammu and Kashmir and in the rest of the country.

Modi elaborated on a new doctrine in his 12 May televised speech. He said that:

1. Any future terrorist attack would be given a “befitting reply”;

2. India would not tolerate nuclear blackmail; and

3. India will no longer differentiate between terrorists and their sponsors.

In an oblique rebuttal of Rubio, he added that the only talks with Pakistan would be on ending terrorism and returning PoK to India.

This is a textbook example of what economist Thomas Schelling called “commitment” — the act of voluntarily reducing your own freedom of action (via a public declaration, in this case) to alter the opponent’s expectations and thereby convince them to change their behaviour. A public statement makes this a credible commitment, the theory goes, because the PM will have to pay a political cost if he fails to respond militarily to a future terror attack.

There are three implications

1. Higher risk of war: India will now face huge pressure to respond to a terror attack with military action, regardless of the economic or political situation. Which means that whatever costs India imposes on Pakistan, it will also have to accept the military and economic costs of carrying out its threat. Conversely, deterrence could fail if Pakistan, for instance, embraces China even more closely in anticipation of future conflict.
2. Empowers spoilers: It gives huge power to spoilers and third actors who might want to spark war between India and Pakistan. Were China or ISIS-K — or even a group of homegrown lunatics — to decide they want to drag India into war with Pakistan, it would be far easier to do so. Not every terror attack comes with a clear fingerprint.
3. Strategic restraint: Pakistan has long accused India of supporting Baloch and Pashtun separatists. It is unlikely to cooperate on terror if it believes India is backing those groups. Therefore, a stronger Indian stance on cross-border terror will also necessitate strategic restraint.

The new doctrine is politically attractive. But the fact is, successive prime ministers have been forced to talk to Pakistan based on the logic that you need both carrots and sticks to change an opponent’s behaviour. It’s unclear whether Prime Minister Modi and his advisors have fully thought through the implications, or are simply responding to immediate political requirements.

Indians are uniformly proud of the performance of their armed forces in the recent conflict. But there are serious concerns about the conditions under which the fighting ended and the possible compromises Modi may have made — whether it was the internationalisation of the Kashmir issue, the re-hyphenation of India and Pakistan, or even the practicality of the new doctrine. There is also the question of accountability for the many security lapses that allowed the Pahalgam massacre.

Accountability, however, is the last thing on the mind of the Modi government. The Bharatiya Janata Party has now shifted its focus to extracting maximum political mileage from the military operation. But voters and the opposition must continue to ask difficult questions in the interests of the nation.

Amitabh Dubey is a Congress member. He tweets @dubeyamitabh. Views are personal.

(Edited by Prashant)