The Indian government put the Indus Waters Treaty in ‘abeyance’ following the horrendous Pahalgam terror attack that killed 26 tourists. The perpetrators had links with Pakistan-based terror outfit, Lashkar-e-Taiba. India responded with Operation Sindoor, targeting nine terror camps in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.
In this heated environment, statements about the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) flowed from both sides. “Blood and water can’t flow together,” said Prime Minister Narendra Modi—a remark similar to the one he made in the aftermath of the Uri attack. Pakistan responded with provocative statements.
“Any attempt to stop or divert water flows will be an act of war,” Pakistan’s National Security Council declared. “The Indus is ours and will remain ours. Either our water will flow through it, or their blood will,” said Bilawal Bhutto-Zardari.
After India’s declaration of holding the treaty in abeyance, many questioned its ability to follow through, as the IWT was mediated by the World Bank. But a recent comment by World Bank President Ajay Banga raised the speculation that it may be legally possible for New Delhi to act independently in managing the Indus River system. “We have no role to play beyond a facilitator,” Banga said.
Legal and political considerations aside, it’s worth examining what India can and should do from the perspective of river engineering and hydraulics. If New Delhi wants to use the Indus water as a strategic tool in the long run, it must take a pragmatic and realistic approach beyond the temporary jingoism.
There are two ways to use the Indus as a strategic tool: releasing excess water to cause an artificial flood or restricting water to cause scarcity.
Pertinent questions
Before discussing this further, it is important to shed some light on the IWT and its current status. As per the document signed in 1960, India has rights to three eastern rivers (Ravi, Sutlej, and Beas) of the Indus River system. The three western rivers (Indus, Chenab, and Jhelum) are allocated to Pakistan.
India is allowed to use the waters of western rivers for limited irrigation (as mentioned in Annexure C), hydroelectric power generation (Annexure D), and storage (Annexure E). Similarly, Pakistan may use water from the tributaries of the Ravi River (Basantar, Bein, Tarnah, and Ujh) for agricultural purposes, restricted to a maximum of 44,400 acres annually (as mentioned in Annexure B).
With this context, some questions become pertinent. Is India currently using all the allocated water under the treaty? The answer is a resounding no—Pakistan gets approximately 3.3 billion cubic metres of water from eastern rivers every year. Does India currently have the capacity to control the flow of the western rivers in terms of storage and infrastructure? It does not. Does it have the financial and engineering capabilities to build this infrastructure in the future? Yes, it does. Now, the critical question is this: If India, being the upper riparian, decides to control the waters of the Indus River system as a strategic tool, how can it do this? And what challenges is it likely to face?
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A question of capacity
On the eastern rivers, India currently has various projects and about 40 per cent storage capacity through large dams. This includes the Bhakra Dam on the Sutlej, Ranjit Sagar Dam on the Ravi, and Pong Dam on the Beas River. Water from these dams is diverted at barrages through canals. The Indira Gandhi Canal, one of India’s largest, originates from Harike Pattan Barrage at the confluence of the Beas and Sutlej near the border.
On the western rivers, India has tried to tap the potential of hydroelectric power generation. This was done through run–of-the–river projects, where a small amount of storage is kept as dead storage, which is also permissible under the IWT. Projects such as Baglihar, Kishanganga, Ratle, Sawalkote, Kirthai-I, Kirthai-II, Dulhasti-II, Pakal Dul, Kiru, Kwar, and Sach Khas are major initiatives under this effort. Some of these are functional, some are under construction, and some are in the planning stage.
The average annual flow of western rivers is about 136 MAF (million acre–feet). To put this in perspective, the Bhakra Dam has a gross storage capacity of 7.5 MAF, including dead storage. With a permitted storage capacity of 3.6 MAF and an actual capacity of 0.7 MAF, India cannot stop the flow of western rivers without constructing large-sized dams or water diversion structures.
In these circumstances, India should create more storage capacity on eastern rivers or divert outgoing flow using its canal system. Storage capacity can be increased by constructing new dams and optimising existing structures. These decisions depend on the cost, feasibility, and other factors involved.
It is not an easy task to build a large dam in mountainous terrain. The exercise is costly and time-intensive, with a possible risk to the stability of the structure. It also involves a risk of flooding due to structural failure, triggered by seismic activity or geological instability. However, the Tehri Dam in Uttarakhand showcases India’s capability in the domain.
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Gaining leverage
A critical factor that often gets overlooked is that the Indus River system doesn’t have the same flow throughout the year. It is at its peak during the monsoon season, which spans two to four months. If India creates a large storage capacity and decides to release water during peak flow, it could create an artificial flood on the other side of the border.
Water is abundant during the monsoon season, but Pakistan faces scarcity during the lean season—typically lasting 5 to 6 months. If a large storage capacity is built in the future, sufficient enough to create water scarcity on the other side, it may give India some leverage.
India has chosen the word ‘abeyance’ for ambiguity. There is a possibility that New Delhi might renegotiate the treaty in the future or may simply put some conditions, subject to political or diplomatic process. So, it is far–fetched to speculate that India might plan a large gravity dam or any other superstructure to control the flow on western rivers. But in the future, it may plan to build more hydroelectric power generation structures with some storage capacity.
India also needs to utilise all available water from the eastern rivers with a greater storage capacity and more lift canals, which can irrigate additional regions in Punjab, Haryana, and Rajasthan. It should also extend the current canals, as the demand for water is only going to increase.
If India does decide to renegotiate the IWT, it must press for a higher share of water, so it can meet its own irrigation and domestic needs.
There are concerns that if India, being the upper riparian, uses water as a political tool against Pakistan, China may also consider similar tactics against it. Beijing is the upper riparian for the Brahmaputra as well as the Indus—both rivers originate in China–controlled Tibet. It should be noted that most of the Brahmaputra’s water (approximately 80 per cent) comes from tributaries and precipitation originating in India. This is not the case with the Indus River system. The India-Pakistan and India-China cases are significantly different, so one does not need to indulge in a false equivalence.
Akshay Nayak is a doctoral research fellow, Centre for Transportation Systems (CTRANS) at IIT Roorkee. His X handle is @akshaynayak2011.
Vishal Mishra is a post-doctoral research fellow, International Centre of Excellence for Dams at IIT Roorkee. His X handle is @VishalGeomatics.
Views are personal.
(Edited by Prasanna Bachchhav)