Most recent discussions on national security have centred on three topics. The remarkable third term for National Security Adviser Ajit Doval, who is close to 80 years old. The appointment of former R&AW chief Rajinder Khanna as Additional NSA. And the continuing salience of three retired mandarins—Doval, from the 1968 batch of the IPS; PK Mishra, the recently reappointed principal secretary to the Prime Minister, of the 1972 batch; and External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar from the 1978 batch of the IFS.
Of the three, Mishra is the most reticent. Doval and Jaishankar, however, frequently expound on security issues through press conferences, valedictory addresses, columns, and interviews. But do any of their pronouncements, including Jaishankar’s recent book Why Bharat Matters, spell out what India’s national security doctrine (NSD) is? Do their statements reflect the collective will of the government?
The wait continues for the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS), now in its 25th year, to produce an NSD for parliamentary discussion. It has adequate manpower, abundant resources, and is housed in the Sardar Patel Bhawan on Parliament Street itself!
In all fairness, however, the NSCS initiated the first steps toward preparing the NSD late last year by seeking inputs from ministries, state governments, academia, and science and technology establishments. The idea was to have a public document outlining India’s strategic intent and foundational security policy, along the lines of those established by countries such as the US, UK, France, Germany, Australia, China, and even Pakistan, among many others.
There are several reasons why such an NSD is not only of urgent importance, but also needs to be made available in the public domain.
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What is an NSD—glimpses from US, China, Pakistan
A national security doctrine defines a country’s approach to safeguarding its national interests, lists various threats, and lays out strategies for contending with them.
Let’s take the example of the US. Its national security policy states explicitly:
“Although the international environment has become more contested, the United States remains the world’s leading power. Our economy, our population, our innovation, and our military power continue to grow, often outpacing those of other large countries. Our inherent national strengths—the ingenuity, creativity, resilience, and determination of the American people; our values, diversity, and democratic institutions; our technological leadership and economic dynamism; and our diplomatic corps, development professionals, intelligence community, and our military—remain unparalleled. We are experienced in using and applying our power in combination with our allies and partners who add significantly to our own strengths. We have learned lessons from our failures as well as our successes. The idea that we should compete with major autocratic powers to shape the international order enjoys broad support that is bipartisan at home and deepening abroad.”
Through this passage alone, the US positions itself as a democracy opposing the autocratic regimes of China and Russia, seeks alliance partners globally, and articulates bipartisan support within the country.
China, on the other hand, stresses the role of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in creating a “Rich Country with a Strong Army”. It has published a document on its comprehensive national security, which includes: political security (read: CPC’s undisputed hegemony), territorial security, military security, economic security, cultural security, social security, scientific-technological security, information security, ecological security, resource security, and nuclear security. Its investments in the Belt and Road Initiative and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) are part of this framework.
The document makes it quite clear that the CPC will continue to hold and exercise power, with all organs of governance— the army, public sector, judiciary, press, provinces, and investors—subordinate to its diktats and directions.
Pakistan’s national security paper also makes for interesting reading. Its India obsession is clear. While it devotes four lines to Iran, six to Afghanistan, and ten to China, no fewer than 14 lines are dedicated to the relationship with India. (Fortunately for us, it has now accepted the term “Indian Ocean” when discussing the Exclusive Economic Zones.)
Substantial parts of the report, especially those on gender equality, inequality, human security, and leveraging the demographic dividend, seem to be extracted from World Bank papers. However, the paper consistently conveys that the state will model itself on Riyasat-e-Medina. It also talks about Pakistan’s diversity, multi-ethnic composition, and strategic location bridging West Asia with Central Asia. It identifies violent sub-nationalisms as a major challenge to its territorial integrity, but is silent the fragile situations at the borders with Iran and Afghanistan. It refers to its “provincial governments” as distinct from Gilgit-Baltistan and “Azad Jammu and Kashmir”— suggesting it does not consider the parts of these regions under its occupation as integral areas of Pakistan.
This is in sharp contrast to India’s stated position, where all territories are clearly defined in the first schedule to the first Article of our Constitution. This should also be clearly articulated in our national security doctrine—which is a document that addresses all a country’s stakeholders, including internal constituents.
Inherent in the logic of strategy documents is the fact that they will always be dynamic and subject to continuous revision. Drivers of change will come from diverse quarters: new innovations will render existing technologies redundant, global alignments will call for new alliance configurations, and demographic changes, or the threat thereof, will have a deep impact on domestic policies. These are precisely the areas that the NSCS should be looking at on a regular basis.
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What NSD can achieve for India
It is imperative that the national security doctrine for Viksit Bharat is discussed in the public domain. This will have several clear advantages.
First, it would compel the government to undertake a comprehensive strategic assessment—a review of the country’s threats and opportunities and an evaluation of India’s short-, medium-, and long-term interests in the context of our energy and food security needs. Our relations with China, Russia, the US, NATO, and our immediate neighbourhood would be part of a holistic strategy rather than a series of one-off engagements. We would also realise that many issues—like the CPEC, LAC, and LOC—are interconnected. We must recognise that the contest with China is not just on the borders but also in the grey zones of all our neighbours—Nepal, Bangladesh, Myanmar, the Maldives, and Sri Lanka. We need to ask ourselves: can our industry be critically dependent on component imports from China? How do we ensure that our media houses, think tanks, and academic institutions are not compromised? It is very important to send a clear signal, lest some of our own institutions are drawn into the embrace of the Dragon.
Second, an NSD would provide a coherent framework for long-term planning regarding our borders and coastline. Does our naval armada have blue-water capabilities? Which sea lanes are we willing to protect against piracy? What are the costs and benefits? What should we expect from the Quad alliance? All this requires intense peacetime work to secure India’s expanding interests, deter adversaries in the SLOC (sea lanes of communication), and develop requisite military capabilities and international partnerships.
Third, a strategic doctrine gives the government a rationale for allocating resources within the defence forces. Even within theatre commands, there would be intense competition—say between an aircraft carrier, a long-range bomber squad, a mechanised infantry brigade, or a new division devoted to drone surveillance and warfare. The NSD would give the Integrated Defence Staff and future joint organisations a clearer top-down mandate to better align the work of the Indian Forces. It would establish common goals and plans so that various national security agencies, including the ministries of Defence, External Affairs, Home Affairs, and the intelligence agencies, could better coordinate daily at the working level rather than episodically at the Cabinet level.
Fourth, the NSD will send clear signals not just to nations but also to non-state actors engaged in terrorism, drug trafficking, cybercrime, and money laundering. All money and drug trails will be followed to the end, and their operatives and handlers in India will face the consequences. Financing and supporting terror in any form will be crushed. It would help clarify India’s strategic intent—for example, declaring that India will not tolerate any breach in its security apparatus and will act as a security provider in the Indian Ocean, countering armed coercion against smaller countries.
Last but not least, it will ensure that India’s bureaucratic, diplomatic, academic, corporate, and military leadership is fully aligned with a policy paper approved by Parliament.
The NSD should be debated threadbare in Parliament rather than in the cloistered confines of a few think tanks and policy groups. The citizens of Bharat have a legitimate right to know how their government plans to safeguard national security and how well it is performing. It will also encourage a healthy debate among political parties, factoring in the concerns of state governments. It will augur well for the nation since an informed citizenry is also a responsible citizenry.
Sanjeev Chopra is a former IAS officer and Festival Director of Valley of Words. Until recently, he was Director, Lal Bahadur Shastri National Academy of Administration. He tweets @ChopraSanjeev. Views are personal.
(Edited by Asavari Singh)