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HomeOpinionIndian Army’s first brush with the PLA was in 1951. The windfall...

Indian Army’s first brush with the PLA was in 1951. The windfall was Chushul airfield

The incident of 1951 in Ladakh's Chushul is a lesser-known historical fact. It was India's first brush with the PLA under unusual circumstances.

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As per eminent scholar of Tibetan affairs, Claude Arpi, the first intrusion by the People’s Liberation Army into the Indian territory took place in Barahoti Plains in Uttarakhand in July 1954, soon after the signing of the Panchsheel Agreement. Before this, India had allowed transit, and supply of rice to the PLA in the Chumbi Valley for two years. India’s first armed clash with the PLA took place at Longju on 25 August 1959 when the PLA intruded on the Tsari Valley and attacked a post of nine Assam Rifles resulting in two casualties.  

This clash was followed by the Kongka La incident in Ladakh on 21 October 1959 wherein the PLA ambushed a patrol of Indo-Tibetan Border Force (ITBF)—a subsidiary of the Intelligence Bureau—and Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) searching for a missing patrol of two policemen and a porter. Nine personnel were killed and 10 personnel were taken Prisoner of War including the three missing personnel captured earlier.

However, a lesser-known historical fact is that the Indian Army’s first brush with the PLA took place in August 1951 at Chushul, Ladakh, under unusual circumstances when a Kazakh-Cossack Cavalry Brigade of the National Revolutionary Army of Chiang Kai-shek pursued by the PLA sought asylum in India at Chushul. This cavalry brigade consisted of Russian Cossacks who had emigrated to Kazakhstan, which was part of the Imperial Russian Empire and later USSR—hereafter, referred to as the Kazakh Cavalry Brigade.

Neglected security of Ladakh 

After the ceasefire with Pakistan on 1 January 1949, due to a lack of road communications, only limited troops were deployed in Kargil and Eastern Ladakh. However, the threat scenario changed once the PLA invaded Tibet on 6 October 1950, and by mid-1951 began securing the perceived traditional borders of Tibet with India. 

In 1947, we inherited a frontier region shaped by the Himalayan chapter of the Great Game, with dysfunctional Tibet and the semi-autonomous Xinjiang as buffer states. The frontier region wasn’t physically secured. For ownership, reliance was placed on traditional or customary boundaries and the 1842 Sikh/Dogra Empire-Tibet treaty. However, the boundary of the Aksai Chin area along the Kunlun Mountains was shown as “undefined” with dotted lines until 1954, implying non-delimitation.

After China had secured Xinjiang and Tibet in 1949 and 1950 respectively, both sides raced to flag the Himalayan frontier. In the North-East Frontier Agency (note the name), India pre-empted China and secured the areas up to the McMahon Line in February 1951 using the Assam Rifles. In the Western sector, China pre-empted India, secured two-thirds of Aksai Chin, and began building a road linking Xinjiang to Tibet in 1952.

Only two battalions were deployed for the security of Ladakh. One infantry battalion was deployed in the Kargil area and 7 J&K Militia with HQ at Leh was defending the rest of Ladakh. The primary focus was on the Ceasefire Line with Pakistan in the Kargil, Batalik and Shyok River sectors. In June 1951, Kargil Garrison also known as Ladakh Garrison was created at Kargil to control the security of Ladakh, but no additional troops were provided.

The only silver lining with respect to the security of Ladakh was the creation of an intelligence setup. On 7 November 1950, ITBF was created. This organisation consisted of Intelligence Bureau operatives and a small protection force seconded by CRPF. In the wake of China’s takeover of Tibet, the primary role of ITBF was to provide intelligence cover for the entire border with Tibet and in doing so carry out reconnaissance of Aksai Chin and Eastern Ladakh. Extensive reconnaissance of Aksai Chin and Eastern Ladakh was carried out from 1951 to 1959. 


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The first confrontation August 1951

Colonel (later Brigadier) K Bagh Singh of Rajput Regiment took over the command of the newly created Ladakh Garrison on 2 August 1951. The very next day, there were intelligence reports about the location of a Kazakh Brigade of the National Revolutionary Army of Chiang Kai-shek, at Rudok 100 km east of the Spanggur Gap. The PLA was in hot pursuit of the Kazakh Cavalry Brigade and a threat could develop on the border. At that time, there was no LAC and the International Boundary ran 20 km east of the Spanggur Gap. 

Since Ladakh Garrison had no troops to spare, Colonel Bagh Singh approached his immediate superior, GOC 19 Infantry Division, Maj Gen Mahadeo Singh, who was responsible for the defence of Kashmir Valley and Ladakh—for additional troops. The GOC immediately responded by sending an infantry company of 1 Sikh, which was moved to “Baltal by air” and thereafter using 1,000 local ponies over the passes of Zojila, Fotu La, Namika La, and Chang La to Chushul. The company under Major Sardara Singh reached Chushul on 25 August and took up defences close to the International Boundary on 28 August.

These details come from an account written earlier by Brigadier Bagh Singh, which was reproduced by the Vayu magazine in 2020. My research led to a little variance from his account and the official history of 4 Sikh (which I have read) as reproduced on pages 153 -156 of the book Ashes to Glory. The infantry company was from 4 Sikh, located at Pattan, which was part of the 19 Infantry Division and not 1 Sikh which was part of the 26 Infantry Division at Jammu at the time. The company commander was Captain Charan Singh. The column moved by road in four-wheel-drive ‘one ton’ trucks and jeeps to Kargil. There was no airstrip at Baltal and four-wheel drive road existed up to Kargil. Thereafter, the troops moved on foot, carrying stores on mules and ponies to the Spanggur gap and took up defences close to the International Boundary as mentioned above.

Colonel Bagh Singh also appointed Lt Col Karve, Commanding Officer of 7 J&K Militia, as the Commander at Chushul (without any additional troops) to prevent the Kazakhs from entering India. The Kazakh Brigade was engaged in a rearguard action against the PLA to safeguard their troops, families and livestock. The brigade sought asylum in India, which was refused. They carried out a fighting withdrawal from Rudok, setting up defences three kilometres from the International Boundary, where they prepared for a final battle that started on 1 September.

By 3 September, heavy fighting was taking place with machine guns and mortars. Colonel Bagh Singh flew to Srinagar from Leh to brief the GOC 19 Infantry Division. He met the GOC at the airfield who was waiting to receive Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. Colonel Bagh Singh briefed the PM at the airfield. Nehru then took the GOC and Singh to the Chashme Shahi guest house in Srinagar. After consultations with Delhi, it was decided to grant asylum to the Kazakhs. On the night of 3 and 4 September, the Kazakhs crossed over to India, despite “violent protestation” of the PLA. However, Indian troops stood their ground and the PLA withdrew. The Kazakh Brigade moved to Leh and probably went to Kazakhstan, either via the Karakoram Pass or via Pakistan.

Colonel Bagh Singh makes a telling comment in his account, he was convinced that one day India would have to fight China.


Also read: India-China LAC ‘solution plan’ will follow Beijing’s timetable. That’s a different calendar


Windfall—Chushul airfield

It was decided by the Ladakh Garrison to permanently locate one company at Chushul. The company of 4 Sikh was replaced by a company of the Punjab Regiment from Kargil in the last week of October. To maintain this company over 200 km from Leh, which itself was maintained by air, was a Herculean task. Colonel Bagh Singh considered establishing an airstrip when Lt Col Karve reported that stretches of flat terrain were available. 

Colonel Bagh Singh consulted Air Commodore (later Chief of the Air Staff and Marshal of the Indian Air Force)  Arjan Singh, who advised that at 14,000 feet, an airstrip at least 3,000 yards long would be required. The Chushul company commander selected an area of 1,300 yards between Spanggur Gap and the International Boundary and began preparing it. Colonel Bagh Singh travelled on foot from Leh to Chushul, in June 1952. He found the selected airstrip unsuitable and did a detailed reconnaissance. He found a flat piece of ground in the Chushul bowl, 4,000 yards long and 100 yards wide. Local labour and troops prepared the airstrip. Air Commodore Arjan Singh tasked Squadron Leader Dhawan to inspect and approve the airstrip. Dhawan trekked to Chushul and approved the airfield “fit for landing” on 3 August.

On 27 August 1952, Nehru was in Srinagar having dinner with the GOC of 19 Infantry Division. Colonel Bagh Singh asked the GOC to request the PM to inaugurate the Chushul airfield. 

The GOC gave the honour to Colonel Bagh Singh, who told the PM, “I want to present the highest airfield in the world to you”. Nehru evinced great interest and agreed to be on the inaugural flight. On 29 August, Nehru and other VIPs landed at the airfield to make history.  

Lt Gen H S Panag PVSM, AVSM (R) served in the Indian Army for 40 years. He was GOC in C Northern Command and Central Command. Post retirement, he was Member of Armed Forces Tribunal. Views are personal. 

(Edited by Ratan Priya)

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3 COMMENTS

  1. It is gòod that you speak the Ladakh story. From the time of independence sadly each unit / org is just pattinng their backs. KARGIL heights were occupied by the enemy and were annihilated in caves overlooking the Leh Srinagar High Way ; we received 2 SMs , killed several of the en , but NOT A SOUL woke up till the great DRAMA OK KARGIL WAS HIGHLIGHTED by ALL . IT WAS SAD SIR .

  2. A fantastic account of a little known but important incident in the long and complex history of India-China relations!
    However I doubt the Kazakh Cossacks would have returned to Kazakhstan because that was then part of the Soviet Union under Stalin, who was, of course, an ally of Mao. Maybe they just melted away towards various locations scattered all over the West?
    Were these Kazakh Cossacks actually part of the Russian White Army emigrants, many of who had fled to China and Manchuria in the 1920s after being defeated by the communist Red Army during the Russian Civil War?

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