The debate on whether the world has returned to spheres of influence by great powers is complicated, as one can argue that the world never truly left that model. Nonetheless, the Trump administration’s recent actions have sharpened the edges of the sub-geographies in its influence based on its assessment of what constitutes U.S. interests.
Whether the Trump administration has officially embraced the spheres-of-influence approach at the cost of conceding global dominance is unclear, but that ambiguity could itself be a strategy. Both the National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy signal that the Trump administration’s doctrine is one of reprioritization rather than definitive spheres of influence.
The Indo-Pacific region has received substantive policy attention from successive U.S. administrations, particularly since the George W. Bush administration, because of its centrality to three U.S. priorities: trade and connectivity, supply chain resilience, and the of strengthening allies to deter China. It could, and arguably should, be at the heart of ongoing policy reorientation in Washington. From that lens, the United States’ hemispheric withdrawal seems temporary, and its return to the Indo-Pacific could be a function of time, not strategic calculations. The United States could turn its attention back to the region following a new NSS. Regardless, the policy changes will affect the countries of the Indo-Pacific, potentially shifting regional policies out of alignment with Washington’s priorities.
For India, which is centrally located in the vast Indo-Pacific region, its strategic challenges remain the same regardless of rapidly shifting externalities. If anything, the Trump administration’s stark reversals have provided momentum on internal reforms, trade diversification, and regional strategies that reposition New Delhi vis-à-vis other key geographies such as the EU, Latin America, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia.
Washington’s apparent reversal from its Indo-Pacific commitments could also be seen in New Delhi as an opportunity to provide the necessary rubric to the rules-based international order. When the United States—traditionally the world’s foremost champion of the rules-based order—reneges and falls back to carving out geographies of interest, it does not only advantage other great powers. It also challenges the normative underpinnings of how power and responsibility have been associated with the world’s leading power.
As the United States turns back the clock on power assertion and style, China stands to gain from the relevant narratives of state power by being ironically catapulted to a player that plays by the rules rather than one that flouts them. If that strengthens China’s position in the Indo-Pacific, India’s constraints are only likely to grow. As such, a reliance on partnerships with other like-minded partners in the region and beyond is a strategy that could gain momentum. For India, which has never relied upon American largesse for its own security interests, this is a position that is not as challenging as it is for the treaty alliance partners of the United States.
Professor Harsh V Pant is the Vice President at Observer Research Foundation.
Vivek Mishra is Deputy Director – Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
This article was originally published on the Observer Research Foundation website.