India’s defence relationship with the US has been maturing over the last decade – from cautious engagement to structured partnerships, driven by shared strategic interest. What was once a purely transactional partnership, a buyer/seller relationship involving specific procurement contracts, has now assumed a pivotal role in the global geopolitical calculus. However, this evolving alliance is under stress, especially in light of President Donald Trump’s sudden imposition of a 25 percent tariff on Indian exports, with additional as yet unspecified ‘penalties’ for importing oil from Russia.
Yet even as economic ties fray, the depth of security cooperation, and the numerous formal agreements that sustain it, offers India both an opportunity and a challenge. The key question is whether India can deepen its defence cooperation with the US, without ceding its strategic autonomy or aligning it with shifting political agendas.
How reliable is US support?
At the heart of India–US defence ties lies an architecture of agreements, joint exercises, and co-development initiatives that extend well beyond symbolism. The signing of foundational accords such as COMCASA (Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement), BECA (Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement), and the Industrial Security Annex have facilitated real-time intelligence sharing, logistical interoperability, and protected access to cutting-edge military technology. These treaties, once perceived as intrusive or incompatible with India’s traditional non-alignment posture, are now actively deployed to bolster maritime surveillance, domain awareness, and air defence capabilities.
Operational collaboration has also deepened. India’s acquisition of MQ-9B Predator drones, MH-60R multi-role naval helicopters, and the proposed co-production of GE-414 engines for indigenous fighter jets signal not just defence modernisation, but also a convergence in regional threat assessments, especially vis-à-vis China’s assertive posture in the Indo-Pacific. Initiatives such as INDUS-X and iCET are moving beyond procurement to include co-development, startup incubation, and collaborative research in emerging technologies like Artificial Intelligence (AI), Quantum Computing (QC), and Autonomous Weapons Systems (AWS). These engagements point to a long-term strategic partnership rather than short-term expediency.
However, there is a fly in the ointment. The July 30 announcement of 25 per cent US tariffs on Indian exports, couched vaguely in terms of India’s ongoing defence and energy cooperation with Russia, reveals a recurring dilemma: how stable and reliable is US strategic posture and unconditional support when tested by domestic political imperatives or ideological shifts like MAGA?
The tariffs, affecting nearly three-quarters of India’s exports, suggest that economic retaliation may be used as a convenient foreign policy tool for strategic coercion. That the current proposed tariffs were triggered not by any rupture in defence ties, but by dissatisfaction over India’s continued import of Russian oil and military platforms, underscores the complexity of American reliability.
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Targeting India’s strategic autonomy
This tension exposes the somewhat hypocritical duality of US diplomacy, in that it seeks convergence on strategic goals while retaining coercive tools to enforce alignment. For India, such moves raise critical questions and strike at the heart of its policy of strategic autonomy. Can the US-India defence partnership flourish in an environment where India’s broader economic or foreign policy decisions invite punitive countermeasures? Will access to US platforms and supply chains be withdrawn or restricted, especially in times of conflict, if India continues to pursue a multi-pronged foreign policy that includes countries like Russia and Iran, which the US views as enemies?
The answer probably lies in separating the institutional depth of security cooperation from the dynamic volatility arising out of political posturing. Unlike trade, which is often driven by electoral considerations and domestic imperatives like MAGA, defence collaboration is sustained by bureaucratic processes, institutional memory, and mutual threat recognition.
The US Defence and State Departments, and India’s Ministries of Defence and External Affairs, operate on longer timelines and are often shielded, though not immune, from the ups and downs arising out of political turnarounds. For example, platforms like the Reciprocal Defence Procurement (RDP), offset clauses, and co-development agreements are more likely to endure and evolve, perhaps with some tweaks, than suffer abrupt reversals. The 2+2 dialogue has endured many political hiccups. The MEA’s statement — “This partnership has weathered several transitions and challenges” — reflects the long-term nature of the relationship.
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India understands US duality
India’s recent strategic decisions suggest a pragmatic reading of this duality. While defence cooperation with the US has accelerated, India continues to diversify its military suppliers, including France (Rafale jets), Israel (missile defence), and Russia (S-400 systems). This hedging reflects India’s understanding that a strategic partnership does not mean strategic dependence. The refusal to proceed with the proposed F-35 acquisition, despite its symbolic value, signals India’s intent to avoid politically sensitive purchases that may jeopardise its diplomatic flexibility or trigger regional escalations.
At the same time, India could astutely use its defence commitments as a bargaining tool. By advertising possible future purchases – from Predator drones and GE-414 engines to naval platforms – as strategic inducements, India has levers to secure tariff concessions, obtain market access, and reduce regulatory barriers in trade negotiations with the US. The trade-off is clear. Defence offsets, which require US firms to invest a portion of contract value in India, can be portrayed domestically in the US as job-creating and strategically aligned, softening opposition to trade waivers or procurement reciprocity.
Yet this ‘carrot’ strategy can only go so far. US negotiators remain dissatisfied with India’s high tariffs on agriculture, digital localisation policies, and resistance to GM crops, which are seen as barriers to open trade. Even if India were to boost its defence purchases from the US, these unresolved economic grievances will persist. More critically, India’s energy and defence ties with Russia and its refusal to adhere to US-driven sanctions create minefields that defence collaboration alone may not be able to navigate. In essence, while defence cooperation may enhance trust, it cannot insulate India against broader disagreements in foreign policy or trade philosophy.
Ensure no dependence on external factors
This reality compels India to recalibrate its long-term defence-industrial strategy. Indigenous co-development of key platforms, innovation in avionics, and investment in domestic manufacturing are no longer optional, but strategic imperatives. Initiatives like Make in India and Atmanirbhar Bharat must overcome bureaucratic lethargy, ensuring that India’s military modernisation does not remain dependent on external suppliers, however friendly. Defence diplomacy with other partners — EU (France, Germany, Italy), Japan, South Korea, and the ASEAN bloc — must be exploited to reduce dependence on the US and expand India’s options.
Despite the present turbulence, the US remains a vital partner for India on account of its defence ecosystem and technological edge. Diplomatic support, especially in multilateral forums like the Quad, are vital to India’s long-term interests. Ultimately, the reliability of the US as a long-term security partner depends not only on consistency, but also on India’s ability to maintain strategic autonomy without compromising the deepening defence relationship and operational interoperability.
General Manoj Mukund Naravane PVSM AVSM SM VSM is a retired Indian Army General who served as the 28th Chief of the Army Staff. Views are personal.
(Edited by Prashant)