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HomeOpinionIndia’s response to Trump is an emotional one. Tariff damage is psychological

India’s response to Trump is an emotional one. Tariff damage is psychological

India keeps falling into ‘great power’ fantasy trap. Think of the 1950s, when New Delhi mistook its all-too-real potential for actual power, and China brought it down to earth in 1962.

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One of the problems with the Indian foreign policy debate is that it appears not to be based on anything material or solid but on feelings and emotions. So, the discourse shifts rapidly, even when little of substance has changed. It goes through periods of irrational exuberance, followed by periods of unnecessary panicking. What it is currently experiencing can only be described as an emotional depressionone that is not based on any realistic assessment of the international condition. Yes, US President Trump’s tariffs do represent a problem, but it is difficult not to get the impression that the damage is more psychological than material.

I must hasten to add that the contention is not that India is in a comfortable situation and has nothing to worry about. India’s situation is bad and getting worse. But this is nothing new, as I have pointed out elsewhere. Except for those blinded by unrealistic fantasies that India has somehow already completed the ascent to great powerness—assuming that’s even a mountain worth climbing for its own sake—it should be clear that material conditions have not been favourable to India for a while. On the only power balance that matters, relative to China, India’s position has weakened steadily for decades.

Why India constantly falls into such a fantasy trap is worth pondering because this is not the first time the country has gone through this cycle of exuberance and fall. Think of the 1950s, when India mistook its all-too-real potential for actual power, only for China to bring it down to earth in 1962. As interesting as such an investigation would be, I’ll have to put a pin on it for the time being and return to the current issues.

Personalisation of foreign policy

Part of the exuberance comes, at least in the current edition of this fantasy, from the great faith in personalities, especially in Trump. Sections of the Indian political and strategic elite, not to mention social media warriors, celebrated him and his victories as if he were a kindred spirit leading them in a joint battle against a common enemy. As foolish as trust, faith, and loyalty are in international politics, they are even worse when offered to individual leaders, especially to someone like Trump.

He is no doubt unique, but not in a good way. He is not even evil because that requires some consistency in values. Beyond an idiotic faith in tariffs and distrust of US allies, Trump is shorn of any consistent values. He is a charlatan who doesn’t have an honest bone in his body. He is driven not by principles but by avarice, of the narrowest personal kind.

Significant sections of the Indian opinion put their faith in Trump, demonstrating how poor Indian thinking is. A constant theme of the US president’s career has been his betrayal of those who followed him. When Indians who venerated him until just the other day abuse him now, they are only the latest in a long procession of fools to cry bitter tears. It is difficult to sympathise with them.

There is a flipside to such personalisation of strategy and foreign policy, which is to equate difficulties with Trump’s “betrayal”—a strange concept in international politics—with the future of US-India relations. The correct objective for India should always have been to survive the Trump presidency and hope for as little damage as possible to India-US relations from his idiocy.

Admittedly, for all my distaste for Trump, even I did not expect him to plumb the depths that he has. That said, the objective remains the same for one simple reason: India is a relatively weak country whose strategic position is only getting worse with time. This will change—hopefully—at some point, but not in the foreseeable future. India needs the US much more than the other way around, though both sides would benefit from the partnership.


Also read: Trump tariff forces India to shed illusion. Stop conflating status with power


Look beyond Trump

India’s official response has some helpful elements, because it has generally been mild. This recognises that India needs the US if it is not to come under Chinese hegemony. It is getting to a stage where it might be impossible to prevent Chinese hegemony over the Indo-Pacific, so even with American help, this might be a lost cause. But there is an argument to continue to work to prevent it.

Even if Chinese dominance over the region becomes more established, India needs the means to continue resistance. That will require continued US support. Trump may very well cut a deal with China, but this is another reason to look beyond Trump and hope that in 2029, a more sensible government might take over in the White House.

On the less sensible side, trying to sidle back up to Beijing is doomed to failure. This was never going to work, but it was understandable that an initial effort had to be made when the Modi government first came to power a decade ago. It failed then and failed again when the same playbook was tried after the Doklam confrontation. There is little logic to trying this failed path yet again.

Underlying India’s various failed strategies is the refusal to entertain the central lesson of the Kautilyan statecraft in foreign policy, which is the necessity to let power, and especially its limits, shape one’s ambitions. This power is measured in material, substantial accumulation. It is irrelevant whether you host the G20 meeting because that, by itself, is not an indicator of power. Even climbing the GDP rankings does not mean much if you are measuring yourself against faraway powers like Germany or Japan. What matters is how you measure against your neighbour because, as Kautilya explained, it is your neighbour who presents the potential threat. And to deal with China, India’s troublesome neighbour, it will need to look past a troublesome Trump.

Rajesh Rajagopalan is a professor of International Politics at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He tweets @RRajagopalanJNU. Views are personal.

(Edited by Prasanna Bachchhav)

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2 COMMENTS

  1. With such an article, Rajesh Rajagopalan proved that he is an Anti-National from the core. And he can never stand India taking bold decisions and prioritizing national interests. After all, Rajesh Rajagopalan is a well-known leftist, and therefore being a puppet of the West is an expected behaviour from him.

  2. Why India constantly falls into this fantasy trap?
    maybe mohenjo-daro is one of the reasons, the great past thus the delusional perception of great present.

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