India has a solid defence structure on paper. But it lacks a national security vision

After Operation Sindoor, there is a realisation that the Indian Air Force has been good but needs to be better both in quality and quantity.

Representational image of Indian Army | Wikimedia Commons

The hallmark of the 16th Combined Commanders’ Conference on the theme ‘Year of Reforms—Transformation for the Future’ was the unveiling of ‘Indian Armed Forces Vision 2047’ by Prime Minister Narendra Modi on 15 September. This strategic vision harmonises with the consensual national goal of ‘Viksit Bharat 2047’, which will require transformed armed forces to safeguard India’s strategic autonomy and national interests.

Surprisingly, neither the PM nor Defence Minister Rajnath Singh mentioned ‘Indian Armed Forces Vision 2047’ in their addresses. The media also reduced it to a two-line perfunctory mention.

The PM reviewed the progress of reforms undertaken in the last two years. In tune with 2025 being the ‘Year of Reforms’, he directed the Ministry of Defence and the armed forces to swiftly implement concrete steps to achieve greater jointness, ‘aatmanirbhata’ and innovation in defence to meet future challenges. These directions come in the wake of dissonance from the Indian Air Force on tri-Service integration and creation of the theatre commands that came to the fore at the Ran Samwad seminar at Army War College, Mhow, in August.

The details of the ‘Indian Armed Forces Vision 2047’ are apparently classified and not available in the public domain. It can be presumed that the vision includes broad timelines for transformation, including the integration of existing and emerging technologies, to address immediate, short-term, medium-term, and long-term security threats. However, the more important issue is the process through which this vision has been formalised. Is it a standalone exercise by the armed forces, or has it flown out of the government’s national security vision, strategy and policy?

Core national interest

Security is the core interest of any nation. A rising power like India should logically formalise a national security vision, strategy, policy and create the requisite military capability to secure its rightful place in the comity of nations.

The BJP government which has been in power since May 2014 with a clear majority along with its alliance partners, is ideologically committed to national security. PM Modi is a very strong leader who has a clear national security vision and is focused on the transformation of the armed forces, as is evident from the excerpts of his address at the Combined Commanders’ Conference(CCC) in 2014 and 2015, which were placed in the public domain, a practice which unfortunately stopped thereafter.

India has all the required instruments to formally manage its national security—Cabinet Committee on Security, National Security Council (which includes Strategic Policy Group, National Security Advisory Board and Joint Intelligence Committee), Defence Planning Committee and the Chief of Defence Staff.

Despite the political vision and the higher defence structure highlighted above, surprisingly and inexplicably, India does not have a formalised national security vision, strategy and defence policy. The armed forces struggle to evolve a military strategy based on ‘strategic thoughts’ emerging from rhetoric-laced political speeches or generic speeches (mostly prepared by the armed forces and vetted by the Ministry of Defence/PMO) made at the CCC and other military forums.

A classic case in point is the “new normal” against Pakistan, spelt out by the PM in a political rally. Imagine deciding a security strategy after a conflict is over. A formal national security strategy would have clearly spelt out this strategic option, facilitating an immediate response to Pahalgam. In fact, the “new normal” was assessed by the armed forces as a strategic option 25 years ago, but due to political and at times military dithering, it was never formalised or executed.

The primary reason for not formalising these inescapable conceptual and execution instruments is to avoid accountability by successive political governments.

National security planning

National security is an overarching concept that encompasses various elements, including geo-strategic, military, economic, resource, energy, informational, food, health, environmental, cyber security, etc. The military instrument provides physical security and acts as an enforcer when national interests are threatened. Its vision is a 15-20 year perspective based on the strategic environment and the possible threats that could emerge. With respect to the armed forces, it broadly spells out the short, medium and long-term goals for transformation. National security strategy is more focused on the short and medium-term and is normally reviewed every five years. Both are preceded by a strategic review. Goals for the transformation of armed forces are spelt out accordingly. As the comprehensive national power grows, the development of force shifts from being threat driven to capability driven.

Formalising the national security vision or strategy is the responsibility of the government. It also has to cater to the budget to execute the national security strategy. Logically, the National Security Council(NSC) should be responsible for formalising it, but for inexplicable reasons, the responsibility has been given to the Defence Planning Committee, headed by the National Security Advisor (NSA) and chaired by the defence minister, who should actually be responsible for formalisation and execution of the national defence policy.

National security strategy paves the way for the national defence policy to achieve the national security objectives specified. It lays down the framework, which links the national security strategy to the development and continuous refinement of the military instrument in terms of planning, management and execution. National defence policy ensures the optimum utilisation of the defence budget to build up the armed forces’ capabilities. Military strategy is guided by both national security strategy and national defence policy and deals with the actual application of the military instrument. National defence policy should be formalised by the Defence Planning Committee, headed by the defence minister.

The above process logically should be top-down in terms of concept, policy, timelines and coordination, and bottom-up in execution. To avoid accountability, successive political governments have never formalised the above process. Consequently, the armed forces by default become responsible for the entire national security process, leading to a bottom-up approach except for financial approval and the decision to use force to safeguard national interests.

As a result, what we have is a functional system more suited for set-piece wars of the 20th century. This system results in piecemeal incremental change and cannot manage the required transformation of the armed forces for the high-technology-driven wars for the future. For example, after Operation Sindoor, there is a realisation that the performance of the IAF was good but it needs to be better both in quality and quantity. In our functional system, the requirement of 114 MRCA has been languishing for 13 years, which includes eleven-and-a-half years of the BJP. A formal system would have ensured timely induction by 2020. Now we will procure the fighters at twice or thrice the price. Also, India walked out of the joint development of the fifth-generation fighter with Russia in 2018 and is now showing interest to procure the same aircraft.

Vision 2047

Barring incremental changes forced by crisis, the development of military capability has been at a standstill for the last two decades. Meanwhile, there has been a quantum jump in military technology, which is evolving by the day. India cannot fight the wars of the 21st century with a military of the 20th century. Consequently, the armed forces require a transformation to restructure, reorganise and infuse technology. To this end, ‘Indian Armed Forces Vision 2047’ is a step in the right direction, which should lead to a detailed transformation plan with timelines and a committed defence budget. Logically, it should have emerged out of a formalised national defence policy.

In the absence of a formalised national security vision, strategy and defence policy, the fate of ‘Indian Armed Forces Vision 2047’ is ordained. It will get sucked into the quagmire of the existing functional system. In due course, it may be approved in principle to facilitate detailed planning to produce an integrated long-term capability development plan, each major item of which will be approved piecemeal. No doubt progress would be made, but it would be incremental and just enough to keep our heads above water.

At present, we barely have a military edge over Pakistan and face a huge capability differential against China. India should have the overwhelming capacity and capability to enforce deterrence on Pakistan as and when required. It should also be in a position to challenge China by 2035 and seek parity in military prowess by 2047. To achieve this, the defence budget must immediately surge to four per cent of the GDP up to 2035, and be maintained at no less than three per cent thereafter.

‘Indian Armed Forces Vision 2047’ presents the government with another opportunity to formalise the national security vision/strategy and the contingent national defence policy to rapidly transform the armed forces with a committed defence budget.

Lt Gen H S Panag PVSM, AVSM (R) served in the Indian Army for 40 years. He was GOC in C Northern Command and Central Command. Post retirement, he was Member of Armed Forces Tribunal. Views are personal.

(Edited by Saptak Datta)