IAF Chief’s anger at HAL is justified. The cost of inefficiency is borne by pilots

File photo of Air Chief Marshal AP Singh | Suraj Singh Bisht | ThePrint

February 2025 is proving to be a highly eventful month for Indian geopolitics. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has undertaken two significant foreign visits—one to France and the other to the US—both being key strategic partners for India.

Meanwhile, back home, there is considerable buzz around Aero India, a major platform showcasing various aircraft and technological advancements.

The event has sparked sharp controversy this year, primarily due to certain remarks made by the Chief of the Air Staff of India Amar Preet Singh. His statements, picked by the media’s perpetual gaze, revealed his deep dissatisfaction with the current state of affairs, particularly his unequivocal criticism of Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL).

The Tejas enigma 

The ongoing debate between self-reliance and imports in India’s defence sector is often riddled with misinformation and confusion, where facts become the casualty.

A common criticism is directed at General Electric (GE) for not supplying engines to India, without fully understanding what the Indian Air Force actually requires for specific models of its Light Combat Aircraft programme.

The process of acquiring air assets in India begins with the formulation of user requirements, known as Air Staff Qualitative Requirements (ASQR), called Air Staff Requirement (ASR). The first ASR for the LCA programme was drafted in 1986, recognising the need for India to develop its own fighter jets. It was around this time that the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) programme was initiated, which was later named Tejas.

Generally speaking, a fighter jet development programme comprises four major components: airframe, engines, avionics, and weapons and control laws (software that enables the full exploitation of flight envelope).

Among these, India has made significant progress in airframe development and control laws. Avionics and weapons have seen mixed success, but engines remain a critical weakness. The Kaveri engine, developed domestically, could not meet the objective of powering the LCA. While it is widely accepted that India will someday develop its own engine, achieving this milestone without foreign collaboration is unlikely.  At this stage, there are three contenders—GE (United States),  Safran (France)  and Rolls-Royce (United Kingdom).  The government is expected to make a decision soon on the preferred partner.

But first, what’s the deal with Tejas? 

When it comes to the LCA programme,  1986 ASRs were periodically revised as the programme failed to meet promised timelines and to incorporate advancements in technology, ensuring that the Indian Air Force (IAF) remains aligned with evolving operational demands.

Given the IAF’s critically low squadron strength, a strategy had been adopted to enhance indigenous capabilities. These include the LCA Mk1, LCA Mk1A, and LCA MK 2 fighters, each with a specific purpose and characteristic. 

According to a Press Information Bureau (PIB) release dated 6 August 2018, HAL received an order from the Indian Air Force for 40 LCA Tejas—20 Initial Operational Clearance (IOC) and 20 Final Operational Clearance (FOC) variants. The IOC contract was signed in 2006, with a 2011 deadline, while the FOC contract followed in 2010, targeting 2016. The IOC certification for Tejas was granted in December 2013.

Despite these agreements, the Air Chief’s frustration at Aero India 2025 seems to stems from the prolonged delay in delivering all of these 40 aircraft, even after two decades. He’s right in being disappointed with HAL for not being able to make 11 MK1As, as promised, minus the engines. 

A prevalent misconception, often forwarded by HAL apologists, attributes these delays to engine supply issues, blaming GE. However, this is a misrepresentation of facts. It must be remembered that HAL independently committed to delivery timelines when signing the agreement for 40 Tejas aircraft. Second, GE engines for the Tejas Mk 1 variant were delivered on time, and there were no supply-related disruptions. The delays, therefore, primarily stem from HAL’s production inefficiencies, rather than external constraints.

With the completion of the Mk 1 deliveries now imminent, the IAF has already decided that it will not pursue additional aircraft of this variant. From its inception, Mk 1 was a compromise, and subsequent ASRs emphasised the requirement for the Tejas Mk 1A, a significantly upgraded version.

HAL is now responsible for initiating Mk 1A production, which—like its predecessor—remains dependent on GE’s F404 engines. The IAF has outlined a requirement for approximately 180-200 Mk 1A fighters. The scheduled engine deliveries were expected to commence a year and a half ago, yet they have been significantly delayed due to strain on the US defense industrial base and existing production backlogs. Consequently, penalties have been imposed on GE for its failure to meet contractual deadlines.

Reevaluating the causes of delays

Contrary to speculation, these delays are not the result of geopolitical manoeuvring by the US. The argument that America is deliberately withholding engine supplies for strategic reasons is disingenuous, as India’s dependency on GE engines extends beyond the Mk 1A to future platforms such as the Mk 2 and the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA).

Moreover, GE supplies engines for various global programmes, including commercial aviation. Notably, its LEAP engines power Airbus aircraft used by Indian commercial airlines, further dispelling concerns that supply constraints are politically motivated.

The challenges surrounding India’s fighter jet programmes reflect a broader issue of inefficiencies within domestic production ecosystems rather than external interference. 

Misguided strategic culture 

The IAF Chief’s frustration was not just about delays, it stemmed from a deeper issue of inefficiency and compromised professionalism across key defence institutions—Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSU), Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), HAL, and the broader bureaucracy, including the Service Headquarters. For decades, these institutions have over-promised and underdelivered without major course corrections.

Singh’s concerns highlight a strategic culture of denial, where systemic shortcomings are not fixed while external factors are conveniently blamed. 

Beyond LCA and its three variants lies the AMCA programme, which is coming across as a glaring example of this broken strategic culture. The Project Director, Dr Rajendra Krishnan, has repeatedly assured the public that AMCA will take flight in three years—2028—yet not even a prototype has materialised. Crucial steps required for the first flight, including critical testing and certification, remain absent. This reflects a larger institutional tendency to overpromise without accountability, masking inefficiencies rather than addressing them.

The broader concern here is the persistence of a self-defeating strategic culture that relies on half-truths to appear convincing. 

India’s defence spending is another example of flawed policies and inefficiencies. While it appears that the defense budget is increasing every year, the reality is quite different. Despite increased allocations, India struggles to spend its capital procurement budget due to delays in tendering, bureaucratic red tape, and inefficient processes—as identified by the Defence Secretary himself. Requests for Information (RFI) take years to materialise into actual procurements, often getting stuck in file movement bottlenecks.

It must be understood that the money that remains unspent typically in the range of 8-10 per cent is returned to the government. When the Finance Minister announces a 10-12 per cent budget increment the following year, much comprises of the unspent funds from the previous year— creating an illusion of increasing defense spending without actual impact on modernisation. 

By comparison, unlike the Ministry of Defence of India, the Pentagon follows a different procurement model. Instead of an annual defense budget, the U.S. allocates funding to specific projects, ensuring long-term financial commitment and continuity. This project-based approach allows for focused development, accountability, and sustained progress—something New Delhi could consider. 

Breaking the cycle?

The inefficiencies of India’s defence procurement and production ecosystem have directly impacted national security. However, public discourse often leads to a half-baked binary between self-reliance and imports. 

The IAF Chief’s anger is justified—the true cost of inefficiency is borne by the sailors, soldiers and airmen and not civil servants in offices. 

At this critical juncture, it is unrealistic to reject defence imports. However, a more strategic approach would involve co-production of equipment that not only meets domestic requirements but also facilitates exports. That is at the heart of India’s emerging defence industry cooperation with France, Israel and the US, complemented by strong cooperation on technological innovation.  

The caveat is – none of this makes genuine sense without a cogent and coherent national security strategy and a professional strategic culture that assesses all shortcomings with brutal honesty. 

Swasti Rao is a Consulting editor at ThePrint and a foreign policy expert. Views are personal.

(Edited by Ratan Priya)