As President-elect Donald Trump prepares for a dramatic return to the White House, the world is watching how his administration will reshape geopolitics. Among the pressing questions is the fate of the Quad—a strategic alliance of India, Japan, Australia, and the United States.
Reports suggest that Quad foreign ministers, invited to Trump’s inauguration on 20 January, may convene the following day. Meanwhile, in China, discussions swirl around what Trump 2.0 might mean for the Quad, which was reinvigorated during his first term to counter Beijing.
As the China-US rivalry intensifies, the Quad’s potential to act as a check on Beijing’s ambitions remains under scrutiny.
Diverging views on Quad in China
Often dubbed the “Asian NATO” by Chinese officials and analysts, the Quad has sparked fierce debate in China for over five years. Discussions on Chinese platforms frequently refer to the group by its original name, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, underscoring its security-driven purpose of countering China. The consensus within Chinese discourse is clear: the Quad’s revival was primarily driven by concerns over Beijing’s growing influence.
Upcoming coast guard exercises involving the Quad countries have only heightened Chinese concerns. Chen Yang, a visiting researcher at Liaoning University, criticised these drills as a pretext for meddling in regional conflicts under the guise of ensuring freedom of navigation.
- Trump’s Second Term and Quad: The Quad may see renewed focus as Trump emphasises burden-sharing and countering China’s influence.
- Chinese Perceptions of the Quad: Diverging opinions persist, with debates over its effectiveness, symbolism, and potential as an “Asian NATO.”
- Internal Dynamics of the Quad: Challenges include differing priorities among member nations like Japan, India, and Australia, affecting cohesion.
- Potential Changes in Strategy: A shift toward security-focused approaches is likely under Trump, influenced by figures like Marco Rubio and Mike Waltz.
Yet, opinions within China’s strategic community, media, and social media platforms remain divided. Many question the Quad’s purpose, effectiveness, and future trajectory, raising doubts about its ability to serve as a credible counterbalance to China. Critics argue the Quad’s reluctance to explicitly name China in its statements reflects hesitance among its members to confront a rising power directly. Qian Feng of Tsinghua University’s National Strategy Institute noted that India, Japan, and Australia have been strengthening bilateral ties with China, which perhaps stops them from explicitly naming China and provoking a strong backlash. This cautious approach means the Quad remains a largely symbolic alliance, with limited tangible achievements that often fall short of expectations.
A commentator on Baidu argued that the Quad is far from an “ironclad alliance,” a term China reserves for its partnership with Pakistan and which outgoing US Secretary of State Antony Blinken used to describe US-Philippines relations. Instead, the Quad is perceived as a US-led initiative, with Japan closely aligned, while India and Australia often assume secondary roles, participating selectively.
The commentary identifies five key factors shaping the Quad’s cautious approach: China’s rise, necessitating indirect strategies to counter it; the unpredictability of US policies, which encourage prudence; Japan’s desire to improve relations with China; India’s ambitions to bolster its global standing; and Australia’s economic interdependence with China, fostering restraint.
Ning Tuanhui, an associate researcher at the China Institute of International Studies, suggested that while Trump’s second term could reshape US diplomacy and strain alliances, the Quad is likely to endure. He emphasised two constants: the US will remain focused on containing China and will continue to rely on its allies for this purpose.
This sentiment is echoed by Yan Xuetong, Director of the Institute of International Studies at Tsinghua University, who predicts Trump will retain many policies from the Joe Biden administration, with US-China tensions over trade and technology expected to escalate. Similarly, Li Haidong, a professor at China Foreign Affairs University, argued that the Quad’s evolution is influenced by US ideological trends in alliance-building, with its intensity and priorities shifting with each administration. While Li anticipates the Quad will persist under Trump, he expects its progression toward a formal alliance to be less pronounced than during Biden’s tenure. He also noted that the Quad is entering a phase of high uncertainty, with internal cohesion likely to weaken, though disbandment remains improbable.
On Weibo, most users contend that the concept of a free and open Indo-Pacific and the Quad are integral to Shinzo Abe’s political legacy. The US, however, views this strategy as essential, regardless of whether Republican or Democratic are in power.
A minority view suggests that the Biden administration’s anti-China policies may be reaching their end. Trump, often regarded as more ideologically driven, is expected to placing greater emphasis on the tangible interests of the US. Consequently, he could reassess the Quad, potentially diverging from Biden’s approach toward China.
Also read: Indo-Pacific, NATO, Russia to China — how the world is bracing for Trump 2.0
Will the Quad weather the Trump storm?
Despite the uncertainties surrounding Trump 2.0, many in China view his policies as potentially beneficial. Wang Wen, Dean of the Chongyang Institute of Financial Studies, described Trump’s return as a potential “magic weapon” for China, likely to accelerate technological advancements and strengthen global partnerships. He pointed to Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba’s openness to improving Sino-Japanese relations, noting Japan’s key role within the Quad and its impact on the group’s dynamics.
Lin Minwang, professor and Vice Dean of the Institute of International Studies at Fudan University, argued that while the Quad—or the Indo-Pacific strategy—is unlikely to be abandoned under Trump, bilateral ties between the US and the other Quad nations could strain, indirectly weakening the group.
China remains a vital economic partner for both India and Australia, with Beijing nurturing this dependency over time. The Quad could see renewed focus under Trump’s leadership, with figures like Marco Rubio and Mike Waltz advocating for a more security-focused approach. This shift would aim to counterbalance China while leveraging the collective efforts of the Quad to ensure peace and stability—in alignment with Trump’s emphasis on “burden sharing.”
While Chinese discourse on the Quad’s fate remains divided, the grouping appears resilient enough to weather the storm of a second Trump administration. For now, it seems the Quad is here to stay.
Sana Hashmi is a fellow at Taiwan-Asia Exchange Foundation. She tweets @sanahashmi1. Views are personal.
(Edited by Prashant)
President Trump’s emphasis on burden sharing … In his first term, he urged members of NATO to increase defence spending to 2% of GDP. Now expects 5%. What if stiff targets are set for Quad members.