An unprecedented churning has been underway in Europe since war returned to the continent in February 2022. Europe took the onus of humanitarian aid upon itself and relied largely on the Joe Biden administration to send weapons to Ukraine.
Billions of dollars in military assistance from the US, no matter how slow, has indeed kept Ukraine afloat for nearly 21 months throughout the war.
For a long time, the US has been pressing European countries to shoulder military responsibility. The reason is simple—not many in the US are convinced of supporting an endless war in Ukraine. Military aid has finite limits, materially and temporally.
As the US is gearing up for elections in November 2024, it is unlikely that its military support for Ukraine will continue as it has under the Biden administration, regardless of who becomes the next president. A bleeding crisis in West Asia has already added burgeoning pressure on the US security assistance.
In the wake of all this, the Ukraine war is likely to continue for a few years. And European countries realise that they need to start helping Ukraine militarily even without the US. London has backed Ukraine as well but its support has largely complemented that of the US.
However, despite announcements of increasing defence budgets and agreeing to send old and rusting weaponry to Ukraine, the bureaucracy in Brussels has spent most of its time racking its brains to rise to the occasion. While there has been considerable improvement in Europe’s inertia to send heavy weaponry—particularly in the case of France and Germany—it is still not enough.
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The dysfunction
How come a continent that houses one of the most advanced defence industries in the world has such a paltry record of standing up for its own security promises? Perhaps the military-industrial complex in Europe is so enmeshed in trading weapons with the rest of the world that they are finding it cumbersome to agree to common practice, common standards, and common production and supply chains to help Ukraine. Several manufacturers have confessed that they are prioritising the export market rather than scaling up production.
European Union (EU) member states had agreed on a € 2 billion ammunition plan for Ukraine but they are not able to produce one million 155 mm artillery shells promised to Kyiv by spring next year. On the other hand, Russia reportedly imported a million of those from North Korea since august.
Back in February, while the EU was confident that its supply chains would be able to mass-produce the ammunition by fast-tracking financial and permit incentives, they failed to address the structural problems of the defence industry.
Europe’s response to supply gaps
The security awakening that was invoked with the much-touted Strategic Compass in 2021 did not materialise into palpable action. That push, even though half-hearted at first, came only after Russian President Vladimir Putin ticked the European security order off balance in February 2022.
Corporatised governments of powerful countries like Germany have come a long way from playing safe by providing 5,000 helmets to Ukraine to grand speeches on the Zeitenwende. Europe’s post-war re-awakening sounded tone deaf to outsiders until major countries finally started doubling down on military assistance to Kyiv. However, that alone will not be enough.
Drawing upon the objectives of the ambitious Strategic Compass, the EU leaders had a Versailles declaration.immediately after the war. This declaration was singularly directed at fortifying the EU’s defence capabilities by systematically identifying investment gaps, increasing budgets, closing shortfalls, enhancing innovation, and strengthening and developing the European Defence Industrial and Technological Base (EDTIB).
To revitalise the EDTIB, member states agreed to establish the European Defence Industry reinforcement through Common Procurement Act (EDIRPA). As recent as October 2023, the member states have brought out a new regulation that stipulates a partial reimbursement from the EU budget for European states engaging in joint military purchases through a consortium. The aim is to enhance common procurement in the EU defence industry.
Where other countries become relevant to this discussion is in the challenges that EDTIB faces in meeting the demands at the required speed and volumes. While the US is likely to get most of the contracts, the American defence industry is under pressure due to demands from American security assistance and the need to replenish old stocks.
That is where third-party players like Turkey and South Korea have stepped in. Seoul has secured significant contracts from Poland for K2 battle tanks and artillery ammunition. It has also entered partnerships with Romania that reiterates its readiness to contribute to the European defence market. Turkey, on the other hand, is preparing larger batches of Bayraktar TB2 drones that have proved crucial in several conflicts including the ongoing Ukraine war.
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India’s time to usurp
India, which has emerged as a significant defence exporter to countries like Poland and Armenia, can also exploit the window of export opportunity under the latest regulation pushing for common procurement for the EU under EDIRPA through financial incentives. The EU, at least in the shorter run, will need more third-party contracts to meet the demands of its off-the-shelf procurements.
India and Europe’s defence relations have been on a multi-dimensional upswing. India has joined Europe’s coordinated maritime presence in the Indo-Pacific and Brussels has appointed a military attaché in New Delhi. Both have been significant developments in EU-India defence ties that would have seemed impossible until a few years ago.
However, defence cooperation between the two sides is often limited to India buying equipment from Europe through strategic partnership models or joint production as stipulated under the Ministry of Defence’s defence acquisition procedure guidelines. There is hardly any discussion on how India can usurp the supply vacuum in Europe for off-the-shelf common procurements in at least ammunition, soldier systems and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) equipment.
What has led to this gap is the lack of evaluation in India about Europe’s new structural mechanisms to revamp its defence industry. Like South Korea and Turkey, India could also step up its exports to the EU under the stated goal of the Ministry of Defence to emerge as a net defence exporter.
Defence cooperation with the EU also entails a more thorough analysis of how export controls are evolving in the continent after the amendment of Regulation 2021/821 by Delegated Regulation 2022/699. It removed Russia as a destination from the scope of EU general export authorisations in 2022.
The war in Ukraine has vindicated Europe’s worst premonitions about relying solely on economic statecraft for regional integration. Whatever was earlier dismissed as ‘alarmism’ has now become scathing facts of life.
As the bloc staggers anxiously into the complex matrix of hard security, structural reforms are underway in the European defence industrial theatre. It can potentially usher in a new era of defence collaboration with third parties. India, with its expanding defence and diplomatic footprint in Europe, can ride this wave with a multi-pronged approach.
However, whether these changes in Europe will meet the expectations of Ukraine cannot be a foregone conclusion.
The writer is an Associate Fellow, Europe and Eurasia Center, at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. She tweets @swasrao. Views are personal.
(Edited by Ratan Priya)