Countering Pakistan isn’t India’s only challenge. We need doctrinal clarity on China factor

India is in a strategic matrix of discomfort. All-party delegations aren't enough to counter it.

One of the all party delegations in Abu Dhabi. Their formation signals a clear attempt to counter India’s growing strategic isolation. | ANI

In the aftermath of Operation Sindoor, India has launched a multi-pronged diplomatic initiative by sending seven all-party delegations to several foreign capitals. This outreach, primarily aimed at clarifying India’s position on cross-border terrorism emanating from Pakistan and justifying its military response through Operation Sindoor, can best be described as a post-facto diplomatic push. The delegations feature many parliamentarians, notably Shashi Tharoor, who has emerged as a unifying statesman capable of bridging partisan divides during moments of national crisis.

The countries selected for outreach are a mix of vital strategic and trade partners, as well as current or incumbent members of the United Nations Security Council—where Pakistan presently holds a non-permanent seat. These parliamentary delegations are also being supported by a cadre of seasoned retired diplomats.

There is, however, no clear benchmark to assess what tangible outcomes these delegations are expected to achieve. Yet, their formation signals a clear attempt to counter India’s growing strategic isolation, as tensions with Pakistan peaked following the Pahalgam terror attack and India’s subsequent military escalation to signal its tough posture on terrorism.

Strategic matrix of discomfort

In the current strategic landscape, India finds itself in an increasingly complex position, marked by several disconcerting developments.

First, despite India’s growing stature and influence in global affairs, the aftermath of the Pahalgam attack served as a stark reminder of the limits of that influence. Not a single major power agreed to link the attack to Pakistan, even as China and Turkey extended unequivocal diplomatic and military support to Islamabad. More troubling, however, was India’s inability to persuade the International Monetary Fund to delay a $1 billion bailout package for Pakistan—delivered while India was engaged in Operation Sindoor. The optics of such a decision were damning: A country fighting the epicenter of terrorism watching the same state receive a major financial reprieve from an international institution. This not only undermined India’s narrative but also reinforced a sobering truth—that this is, and will likely remain, a solitary fight for India.

Second, while India’s decades-long practice of “dossier diplomacy”—submitting documented evidence of Pakistan’s role in harbouring and abetting terrorism—has had limited immediate success, it remains a long-term strategy to chip away at Pakistan’s global credibility. The current multiparty parliamentary delegations are continuing in this tradition, attempting to “explain” Pakistan’s behaviour to the world. Perhaps the task now should be less about proving Pakistan’s culpability—which is well known—and more about exposing how it misuses international aid and financial bailouts to sustain its destabilising activities.

Third, the more subtle but serious challenge lies in preventing the re-hyphenation of India and Pakistan in global strategic discourse. The danger is not rooted in formal policy documents but in narratives—particularly ones like those put forth by US President Donald Trump, who publicly claimed credit for brokering a “ceasefire” between India and Pakistan. His comments mischaracterised a serious national security situation as a bilateral squabble requiring external mediation. India unequivocally rejected such characterisations, yet the damage to perception was done. That such remarks came from India’s most critical strategic partner made them all the more problematic. Many in India’s diplomatic and strategic circles now recognise the need to navigate the Trump era with minimal collateral damage, as his unpredictable style can often blur the lines between strategic partnership and performative diplomacy rooted in strategic narcissism.

Fourth, India’s response to the overarching impact of the China factor remains rather self-referential than objective. This point will be elaborated upon later as well, but a quick run through of recent diplomatic activities in the last week alone will help underscore the contrast that gets reinforced by the fault lines in the subcontinent today. These portray an inherent disbalance that faces India when trying to counter it in the lack of doctrinal clarity.

Countering optics, building narratives

Alongside the deployment of multiparty delegations to explain India’s position post-Operation Sindoor, External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar embarked on his first overseas visit since the operation. His chosen destinations were Germany, Denmark, and the Netherlands—three key European nations. This visit came just days after he publicly criticised the EU High Representative’s comments urging de-escalation, dismissing them as “preaching.”

In sharp contrast, the first foreign visit by a senior Pakistani official following Operation Sindoor was made by Pakistan’s Deputy Prime Minister—to its longstanding strategic partner, China. This juxtaposition highlights the divergent diplomatic paths being taken by both countries in the aftermath of heightened tensions.

India’s response, therefore, appears aimed at countering not just narratives, but also diplomatic optics—by engaging multiple strategic theatres simultaneously. That said, Pakistan goes first to the indispensable partner.

Let’s explore these efforts one by one.

While Germany and Denmark are already part of the countries being visited by India’s all-party delegations, the Netherlands stands out as the sole exception—though it remains a crucial partner for India within the European Union. Germany, now under the leadership of Chancellor Friedrich Merz, is undergoing a significant political and military overhaul, with formal commitments to transform its national and EU defence posture. As India’s largest trading partner in Europe, Germany also wields considerable influence in Brussels, where India is currently advancing negotiations for an “early harvest” free trade agreement with the EU.

The Netherlands, India’s second-largest trading partner in Europe, has become increasingly aligned with India in high-tech sectors such as semiconductors and the role of artificial intelligence in military applications. Meanwhile, Denmark, another important EU player, offers significant collaboration potential in green technology and sustainable investments.

The External Affairs Minister’s choice to engage with these three European nations—despite parallel outreach by parliamentary delegations—reflects a sound strategy to deepen bilateral ties across areas of economic, technological, and defence cooperation. But these outreaches fall short of countering China breathing down on India’s strategic choke points.

India’s Afghanistan problem

Although Indian media noted the absence of a grand welcome for Pakistani PM in Beijing, the more pressing issue lies in the deepening China-Pakistan engagement involving Afghanistan. A joint statement from their trilateral framework indicates that the Taliban-led Afghan government is willing to integrate Gwadar into its connectivity plans under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

This development runs counter to India’s efforts, which have been aimed at reducing Afghanistan’s reliance on Pakistan’s Karachi Port by promoting connectivity through Chabahar—a port in which India has made substantial investments as part of its India-Afghanistan-Iran trilateral cooperation. The strategic rationale has been to retain influence in Afghanistan, leveraging factors like Pashtun nationalism and the presence of anti-Pakistan militant groups such as the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which have historically strained Afghanistan-Pakistan ties.

Meanwhile, China has moved far more assertively in Afghanistan since 2021, significantly outpacing India through trillions of dollars of investments, high-level visits, and a strong focus on managing extremist groups like the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) and Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) to safeguard its interests in Xinjiang.

Retaining and expanding strategic depth in Afghanistan remains crucial to China’s broader connectivity ambitions through Gwadar. Beijing is also playing the role of mediator, ensuring that tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan over TTP and Pashtun nationalism do not escalate into full scale war. Both Kabul and Islamabad remain attentive to China’s interests—Pakistan due to its strategic indispensability, and the Taliban because China offers a quicker and surer pathway to economic development.

At the same time, playing all sides, the Taliban is also reaching out to India, primarily as a means to counterbalance Pakistan at a sub-conventional level, while carefully maintaining its strong economic ties with China.

Add to the above China’s growing leverage in Bangladesh, Nepal and Bhutan; India’s strategic environment in its neighbourhood has become more precarious. India’s engagement with the Taliban is cautious, and for good reason, given the historical precedent of Pakistan and Afghanistan co-sharing terrorism as a statecraft tool. India must engage the Taliban without getting so close that it weakens India’s position to call out Pakistan’s complicity in cross-border terror.

At the core of this dilemma lies a fundamental clash of visions: China’s push for a unipolar Asia and Indo-Pacific dominated by its influence, versus India’s vision of a multipolar regional order. This tension is further complicated by Russia’s declining ability to help India balance China. Russia’s protracted involvement in Ukraine has weakened its global standing and eroded the reliability of its defence export sector, which has long been central to India’s military preparedness.

There is now a growing need for India’s foreign policy discourse to shift toward a more clear-eyed, pragmatic analysis. One that is rooted not just in diplomatic outreach but doctrinal clarity on how India will implement the “new normal” with Pakistan while countering China in the region. This is a feat India’s ruling establishment still shies away from.

Swasti Rao is a consulting editor at ThePrint and a foreign policy expert. She tweets @swasrao. Views are personal.

(Edited by Theres Sudeep)