Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is on his way to Washington to meet US President Donald Trump — a re-calibrated administration from the one Kyiv encountered eight months ago at the Oval Office fiasco in February.
Meanwhile, US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth has made his first-ever visit to Ramstein, the US airbase in Germany that once hosted the Defense Contact Group’s key meetings on military aid to Ukraine. Once a star stage for former Secretary of Defence (now Department of War) Lloyd Austin’s coalition diplomacy, Ramstein had faded into obscurity after Trump’s return to office and his re-positioning on America’s role in European security.
Since taking charge, Trump has re-engineered the concept of the American “backstop,” warning allies that US security guarantees do not come cheap. To maintain them, he insists, allies must do more themselves.
For Europe, doing more has translated into ‘pledging’ 5 per cent of GDP to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and purchasing US weapons for Ukraine. Yet, while Hegseth’s visit grabbed headlines, Washington’s contribution so far has been largely rhetorical and transactional. The pledged military aid continues to come entirely from European capitals.
In the Indo-Pacific, Trump’s “do more” message has been more subdued, reflected in the softened tone of once-hawkish voices. The Middle East, by contrast, remains the stage for the never-ending Trump Show — a fusion of personal diplomacy, improvisation, and spectacle.
Trump’s pattern in Europe
Back in Europe, Trump’s old pattern of overpromising and underdelivering has returned. He is again talking to both Zelenskyy — whom he will meet on 17 October in Washington today — and Russian President Vladimir Putin, whom he plans to see in Hungary “soon”.
Trump has already decided against sending Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine, a decision some saw as symbolic of escalation. In truth, this is no major setback: a few dozen Tomahawks would hardly alter the battlefield, and only the US can currently operate its complicated launch systems. Zelenskyy’s team knows this. What they truly want is continuity — that Washington’s position does not tilt toward Putin’s narrative.
On the ground, Trump himself has said the war “is not going well for Russia,” citing that the country’s economy is “in trouble.”
Indeed, the Russian economy shows strain. Despite the central bank’s efforts to curb inflation by adjusting interest rates, declining oil and gas revenues and spiralling war costs have produced a fiscal deficit that now continually eats into the sovereign wealth fund. Taxes have risen, export restrictions have been imposed on refined fuels, and domestic fuel prices are managed through rationing — all while Ukraine’s daily strikes on Russian refineries have cut capacity by nearly 30 per cent.
Ukraine’s domestic weapons production has expanded, but its ability to defend energy infrastructure remains limited by shortages of Patriot systems and interceptors. Both sides are adapting, but Ukraine’s vulnerability, especially in the energy grid in the face of approaching winter, remains worrisome.
As long as Trump sells to Europe to keep arming Ukraine — and Zelensky manages to keep US policy from drifting towards Moscow’s narrative — Europe would play along, no matter how hard the choice. That often means indulging Trump’s theatrics, as seen at the recent Egypt peace summit on Israel–Gaza, a largely symbolic spectacle attended by many European leaders to stay in his good books.
Another autumn of un-victory
Russia’s summer offensive has stalled. Europeans call it the 1 + 1 + 1 dilemma — Russia gaining 1 per cent of Ukrainian territory in 1,000 days at the cost of nearly a million casualties. Yet Europe’s satisfaction stops there, because Russia’s capacity to absorb losses — and Putin’s desperation to claim a tangible win — both remain greater for now.
The world, however, yearns for closure and yet, an outcome that can be defined as victory or defeat remains elusive. Tales of resilience and ingenuity abound, but none have changed the battlefield equation decisively.
It is evident that the Russian army cannot deliver a military victory, and Trump cannot force Zelenskyy into submission as long as European financial support continues. Whether Putin admits it or not, he has no path to a decisive win. As another winter approaches, Moscow faces yet another year of un-victory — a stalemate it must sell at home as triumph, rebranded as “strategic space,” wrapped in the elastic semantics of “denazification” and “demilitarisation.” In order to win, Putin must outlast European solidarity, which he correctly sees as fragile, but not fragile enough.
New Delhi aims for soft landing
How does all this affect India? Naturally, New Delhi does not want a humiliated Russia. Every path to stalemate is painful, but a Russian defeat would be far worse for Indian interests.
That said, India’s misreading of the war lies not in its pragmatic neutrality — which remains sound policy under multi-alignment — but in underestimating the long-term consequences of a drawn-out conflict. Strategic discussions in New Delhi have fixated on whether Russia can be “defeated” in a war of attrition, often citing its doggedness in two World Wars. But the binary of victory and defeat misses the point.
The real question is what prolonged attrition does to India’s reliable defence partner. As the war drags on, India’s arms-and-oil partnership with Moscow inevitably suffers. Since Russia started to invade Ukraine, India has placed no new major defense orders. Hopes of acquiring remaining and /or additional S-400 or S-500 systems, or co-producing Su-57 fighter jets, all depend on one prerequisite: the war must end.
Unless sanctions are lifted, none of this can proceed. The Trump administration has imposed no new sanctions — but it hasn’t lifted any either. In their persistence, Russia’s dependence on China for chips, components, and technology deepens — a growing concern for New Delhi, often expressed behind closed doors.
The Ministry of Defence has already directed the armed forces to screen imported equipment for Chinese parts. A recent case involving scraping emergency procurement of drones — found to contain Chinese components — underscores how pervasive this risk has become.
India would not prefer recycled S-400 systems previously sold to Turkey, nor can it ignore the worrying integration of Chinese technology into Russian hardware. Ideally, New Delhi would prefer Western sanctions to ease and Russia to be reintegrated, at least partially, into the global economy. That would allow India once again to reap the benefits of multi-alignment without penalty.
From India’s viewpoint, whether Russia retains or loses the 19 per cent of Ukrainian territory it still controls is immaterial. What matters is the steady weakening of Russian influence across theatres — the Caucasus, Africa, and the Middle East, especially Syria and Iran. The case of Al Sharaa in Moscow has more layers than what meets the eye—but that is another story for another day.
Also read: A futile $100 billion war. Hamas still standing, peace deal with a bad precedent
Re-interpreting multi-alignment
It is increasingly likely that India will have to reduce imports of Russian crude in the months ahead. Trump’s claim of “zero-purchases” promise from Prime Minister Narendra Modi — neither confirmed nor rebutted by the Ministry of External Affairs — may be more posturing than policy. Market logic will ultimately prevail. When costs outweigh benefits, refiners will adjust.
India must also better analyse what Beijing’s position ultimately means for the Ukraine war.
Among all players, China has emerged as the quiet winner. Access to deeply discounted Russian oil and gas has dovetailed perfectly with Beijing’s economic ambitions. The Moscow–Beijing partnership has never been more synchronised. But to mistake it for an unbreakable alliance would be naïve.
China has no desire for the war to end quickly. Peace would mean losing privileged access to cheap Russian energy. India’s own discounts averaged $3–5 per barrel — far below what China likely enjoys. And as Ukrainian drones hammer Russian refineries, cutting output by 30 per cent, Moscow’s first ports of call for refined imports have been China and Belarus.
Beijing thus enjoys a double advantage: it props up Russia just enough to prevent collapse while profiting from Moscow’s dependency — buying crude at bargain rates and selling refined products back at a premium. It is becoming uncomfortably evident that while New Delhi would loathe a “defeated” Russia, Beijing will make sure Moscow never secures a decisive victory either — keeping it confined to a state of managed “un-victory” to prioritise its own economic interests.
The larger challenge for New Delhi lies in rethinking multi-alignment under a Trump presidency. The recalibration must be guided by a hierarchy of interests, not diplomatic posture alone. Balancing Washington, Brussels, Moscow, and Beijing will no longer be a matter of choice, but of necessity.
In New Delhi, opinions remain divided on whether Modi was right to skip the Egypt summit. He avoided an awkward encounter with Pakistan Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, singing charades to Trump— or whether India missed an opportunity to engage Trump and assert influence in a relevant theatre.
It’s a reminder that personality-driven politics can eclipse interest-driven strategy. In Europe, the reverse has been true: leaders have seldom let posture outrun interest. As for India, Modi might soon have a meeting with Trump in Malaysia with fresh ground for prioritising India’s interests.
For now, the world remains caught in yet another autumn of un-victory in the Ukraine War — a season that neither side can claim, and one that India must navigate with quiet precision rather than emphatic neutrality.
Swasti Rao is a Consulting Editor (International and Strategic Affairs) at ThePrint. She tweets @swasrao. Views are personal.
(Edited by Ratan Priya)
A contrarian thought. China is not entirely happy with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Its durable, even growing, partnership with Russia would have blossomed without what one must call an ageing Tsar’s folly. Stuck in a quagmire for almost four years. Lasting damage to Russia’s economy and its relationship with the West. China itself does a lot of business with Europe and USA, will never be the first to initiate disruption. Although, if pushed to the wall with decoupling, deglobalisation, technology denial, will safeguard its vital interests. There is an element of opportunism in India seeking arbitrage through purchase of discounted Russian oil, angering the West. 2. The best outcome for all would be President Putin using the Budapest summit with President Trump to accept the graceful off-ramp being offered to him. Europe will not be so generous. He has its abiding hostility, backed by substantially increased defence spending.
print.in is the voice of NATO’s narratives in India.