China may have dropped an ‘opinion bomb’ with the Global Times commentary, ‘India’s diplomacy has a S. Jaishankar problem’. While this may not be the first attempt by the Chinese state media to find a way to criticise India’s diplomatic establishment, the swift retraction of the article reveals a significant embarrassment for Beijing and underscores its discomfort with India’s evolving assertiveness.
The article left many China watchers disappointed, considering it targeted one of India’s finest career diplomats, Minister of External Affairs S Jaishankar. However, this presents an opportunity to delve deeper into Beijing’s perspective on India and, more crucially, New Delhi’s strengthening partnership with the US.
There are three key takeaways from the commentary that, while critical of India, acknowledges that New Delhi is effectively addressing the ‘China threat’ by incorporating key strategic elements.
First, the absence of any political dialogue with Beijing since the military standoff in the Galwan Valley in 2020 has come at a cost for Chinese investors, who see tensions at the Line of Actual Control (LAC) as affecting their business with India.
Even if India’s trade with China grew in 2024, New Delhi’s attention to ‘de-risking’ its investment space from China reflects what Jaishankar said in 2022: “The state of the border will determine the state of the prelateship.” This underscores India’s strategic approach to managing its ties with China while safeguarding its national interests.
In the last two meetings of the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination (WMCC) on India-China Border Affairs—a key institutional mechanism for consultation and coordination for the management of India-China border areas since 2012—India has strongly conveyed that “restoration of peace and tranquility, and respect for LAC are the essential basis for the restoration of normalcy in bilateral relations.”
Going by the Chinese narrative, Beijing wants the world to believe that tensions at the LAC are an Indian problem, more largely a Jaishankar problem, as his counters to the Chinese bluff convey an envious notion toward China.
But this may be an opportune time for Beijing not to mince words and acknowledge the growing pressure from local investors looking for the Indian market.
India-US partnership
The second key takeaway is Beijing’s acceptance of India’s nuanced diplomacy, which is driven by its need to maintain multiple partnerships. For starters, India’s growing partnership with the US has the potential to define New Delhi’s diplomatic decade, and it certainly does not please Beijing.
On 9 September, the US State Department announced a partnership with India Semiconductor Mission to “explore opportunities to grow and diversify the global semiconductor ecosystem under the International Technology Security and Innovation (ITSI) Fund, created by the CHIPS Act of 2022 (CHIPS Act).”
It is worth recalling that the CHIPS Act of 2022 is part of the larger ‘derisking’ strategy of the Biden Administration. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said, “We’ve [the US] implemented carefully tailored restrictions on the most advanced semiconductor technology exports to China … Key allies and partners have followed suit, consistent with their own security concerns.”
Moreover, initiatives like iCET—the initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology in 2023—have brought Washington and New Delhi closer in sectors such as space, semiconductors, advanced telecommunications, and artificial intelligence.
Against China’s disruptive posturing on the border, India’s partnership with the US is growing in the trade, tech, and defence sectors. India and the US have found ways to build a more reliable, forward-looking partnership with a two-way transaction.
This partnership has the potential not just to counter but reshape China’s ambitions in Asia—turning the Indo-Pacific into a region where Beijing’s dominance faces its strongest resistance.
Delhi’s strategy of ‘derisking’ and ‘decoupling’ has seen incentives with big-tech giants looking at India for manufacturing. The Economic Survey of India 2023-24 highlights this diversification, adding, “While India may not be an immediate beneficiary of the trade diversification from China, it has witnessed a substantial increase in its electronic exports over time.” Currently, India contributes around 14 per cent of Apple’s total global production, which can only grow, considering India is working toward capacity building.
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Multi-faceted diplomacy
Traditionalists in India continue to caution against placing too much trust in the US, advocating for a return to the historical “Non-Alignment” stance. However, India’s cooperation with the US should not be viewed as a singular focus of its diplomacy but as part of a broader strategy forging multiple partnerships.
The same pessimists who advised against a partnership with the US once saw Pakistan’s projection of its ‘Islamic identity’ as a barrier to India’s relationships with the Islamic world. Yet, the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi recently concluded a successful visit to India. Prime Minister Narendra Modi was warmly welcomed in Brunei and the Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar bin Ibrahim completed his visit to New Delhi last month.
India’s recent engagements with Islamic countries, including Malaysia—which had previously supported Pakistan on the Kashmir issue—signal a shift in their approach, primarily driven by India’s market potential.
India’s economic pragmatism aligns with External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar’s firm stance that the “era of uninterrupted dialogue with Pakistan” is over and that Article 370 is a settled matter. This reflects a broader shift in India’s foreign policy toward one of ‘appease none’ while leveraging its economic strength.
Moreover, the prospect of a potential Trump presidency reinforces India’s ASEAN centrality, where New Delhi is aligning with like-minded partners in the Indo-Pacific—such as the Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia—both to counter China and expand trade opportunities.
Even though India may not have a foolproof strategy, its multi-faceted diplomacy ensures it remains agile and capable of leveraging key partnerships to balance regional power dynamics while securing its economic and strategic interests.
To say the least, Beijing’s annoyance over India’s top diplomat—must be seen as an approval of the right decisions made by the current dispensation in India.
Third, Wang Daming’s now-removed Global Times article highlights the comfort China enjoyed under former Prime Ministers Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi, contrasting it with Jaishankar’s more assertive approach. Wang’s critique, stating that “Jaishankar’s diplomatic wrangling has won him some ‘fans’”, but lacks the “moral sense” of Nehru or the “ethic sense” of Indira Gandhi, overlooks a crucial element of great power diplomacy: effective public engagement.
Just as the US drives narratives to strengthen its foreign policy, India’s assertiveness reflects its evolving China policy, grounded in a proactive approach to safeguard its strategic interests and global positioning.
Wang’s article may not represent the Chinese state, but it is a reflection of how China sees India’s diplomatic establishment. At the same time, it is a testament to India’s growing influence and effectiveness. Viewed through the right lens, such critiques validate New Delhi‘s strategic manoeuvres and underscore China’s discomfort with India’s rising stature.
Rishi Gupta is the Assistant Director of the Asia Society Policy Institute, New Delhi. He writes on the Asia-Pacific affairs, strategic Himalayas, and South Asian geopolitics. He tweets @RishiGupta_JNU. Views are personal.
(Edited by Prasanna Bachchhav)