The attack by Naxals in the Sukma-Bijapur region of Chhattisgarh last week that killed 22 security personnel and injured 31 others was nothing short of a massacre. It calls for deeper scrutiny of what went wrong.
However, CRPF DG Kuldiep Singh was quick to come in and issue a statement ruling out any lapses, both at the operational and intelligence front. He will of course say there were no lapses because he is the man with whom the buck stops when it comes to operations in the CRPF. But he wasn’t alone. Chhattisgarh Chief Minister Bhupesh Baghel also said it was not a failure.
Talk to any counter-insurgency or counter-terrorism operator and they will tell you that the Chhattisgarh operation was an intelligence and tactical failure. The death of the personnel in the ambush shows the team’s lack of knowledge about its adversary and terrain. After a few days of hue and cry over the deaths, India will move on to other issues with the dastardly attack behind us.
That is exactly what happened in 2017 when the Naxals struck in Sukma, killing 25 CRPF jawans. It happened in 2013 too when 25 lives were lost including that of top Congress leaders in a Naxal ambush, and in 2010 when 76 CRPF jawans were killed in an ambush at Dantewada, almost wiping out an entire company of a battalion.
Forget the Naxal attacks. Even if we take into account the brutal 26/11 attack, Pulwama blast, Uri attack, Pathankot strike, there have been visible lapses that led to the loss of so many lives.
However, the one thing that is common in all these attacks is the lack of accountability. These incidents will keep happening till India develops a culture of accountability.
Also read: UPA to NDA, India still confused on how to fight Naxal insurgency. Maoists know that
Armed forces better at accountability than khaki
In the Indian armed forces, at least the officers are posted out and adverse remarks entered into their files if anything serious happens under his/her watch, which affect their promotion in an already pyramidal structure. Even though the effort usually is to stop the buck at the least inconvenient officer rank.
In the police setup, even this does not happen. An IPS officer will be transferred elsewhere, but also be given the usual promotions and growth eventually.
Following the Dantewada attack in 2010, Nalin Prabhat, then CRPF DIG in-charge of Chhattisgarh, was transferred out for lapses. It is a different thing that the officer, who has three gallantry medals to his name, is now the IG Ops in the CRPF.
As a young reporter in 2008, it was shocking for me that the chiefs of the Intelligence Bureau (IB), Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW), and the National Security Advisor continued with their jobs despite the deadly Mumbai attacks that brought India to a standstill. The Mumbai attacks should have led to multiple heads rolling and a complete revamp of India’s security establishment. None of that happened. The National Investigation Agency (NIA) was set up, and the NATGRID was created, which is still a work in progress. But have we developed the capacity to prevent another terror attack? You can answer on your own.
Even after the 2019 Pulwama attack, no one in the security setup was made accountable for the loss of 40 lives. G. Kishan Reddy, Minister of State, Home Affairs, even said in Parliament that there was no intelligence failure in the Pulwama attack.
If there was no intelligence failure, then how and on what should anyone be held accountable?
The same holds true for the Ladakh incursions across the Line of Actual Control by the Chinese in late April last year. People in the establishment still insist that there was no intelligence failure. When asked whether accountability needs to be fixed within the Army for letting things come to this point, the common counter is that the very same team in Leh later coordinated and planned the daring operations in August because of which Indian troops outflanked the Chinese and captured the heights of the southern banks.
If one is asked if the Ladakh incursions were an intelligence failure, then the common counter by the agencies is that it was not because the authorities were aware of PLA presence but the Chinese had the element of surprise and moved in suddenly.
Also read: The lesson for RAW, IB from Kargil to Ladakh — fix responsibility
1971 — golden era for Indian defence
This is in stark contrast to what happened in 1971 when India had precise dates of Pakistan’s plan to launch airstrikes. Because of this intelligence — then developed by the newly set up R&AW headed by India’s finest intelligence officer R.N. Kao — the Air Force moved out all aircraft from the bases in the west and north to safer locations in hardened shelters.
In their new book, The War that Made R&AW, Anusha Nandakumar and Sandeep Saket write about how India deceived Pakistan in 1971 into launching an operation so that Indian forces could get directly involved in the Bangladesh Liberation War rather than operate clandestinely.
The 1971 war is actually the finest moment of the Indian defence and security establishment where the Army, Air Force and the Navy came together as one unit in collaboration with the intelligence setup. Such was the intelligence that the Navy knew exactly which Pakistani vessels were at the Karachi harbour and where.
Incidentally, the first officer that Kao hired to set up the R&AW was Sankaran Nair from the Intelligence Bureau. What made Nair stand out was his ability to accept and fix responsibility. He was a member of the commission that was set up to investigate the allegations of the IB’s inefficiency following the 1965 war. He submitted detailed reports outlining in painful detail where his agency had fallen short. Although it won him enemies within the IB, he won the admiration of Kao.
Even if we keep aside issues of security forces and the intelligence, this culture of accountability is entirely missing now – be it in the police or the civil setup.
Also read: Calling LAC conflict ‘intelligence failure’ is lazy. It ignores India’s real problem
India needs culture of accountability
I feel strongly about cases, including alleged terror incidents, where the accused are freed after years in jail by the courts because the police officers had cooked up the cases for various reasons. The officers who led these investigations have moved on with their promotions and perks. Why should they not be held accountable and punished for the years lost and the time wasted of the judiciary besides the cost of prosecution borne by his/her own department?
Take, for example, the infamous ISRO spy case. The three-decade-old ISRO case that shocked India in the ’90s came to an end last year with the government agreeing to pay former scientist S. Nambi Narayanan Rs 1.3 crore in compensation. According to the court order, “no personal liability can be fixed on defendants 6 to 111 (officials accused of falsely implicating him) and no recovery will be effected from any of the defendants to realise the amount”. The officers who handled the case in which Narayanan was fixed have retired from their high positions and are enjoying their post-retirement life. Should these officers not be held accountable?
Accountability is a must, be it in the armed forces, intelligence, police, or the bureaucracy. Because if India does not adopt a culture of accountability, incidents like the Naxal attack in Chhattisgarh, Pulwama, or the Chinese backstabbing will continue to happen.
Views are personal.
(Edited by Neera Majumdar)