Pakistan Foreign Minister Bilawal Bhutto Zardari’s remark calling Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi “the butcher of Gujarat” received a mixed response in the country. While some in the establishment corridor welcomed it, others weren’t too excited. But Bhutto’s seemingly thoughtless comment was made consciously. It showed that Pakistan’s India policy has not shifted from its traditional stance and remains under Shehbaz Sharif more or less where it was under Imran Khan.
Several geographic and domestic political considerations can explain the remarks. More importantly, it explains where Pakistan’s powerful establishment sees its short-term and long-term dividends.
Not everyone jumped on the remarks with the same excitement as Islamabad-based journalist Nasim Zehra, who welcomed Zardari’s intervention as an example of Pakistan always taking a principled position. She equated the young foreign minister’s performance with Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s position in 1947-48 regarding Israel.
Even for the naysayers, Zardari’s comment helps make sense of Pakistan’s National Security Policy 2022, which one should read more cautiously as not representing any shift from geo-strategy to geo-economics.
Notwithstanding the fact that the sharp remarks may not benefit Pakistan or damage India, the position was viewed by many in the establishment as a necessary pincer movement aimed at countering India’s move at the UN meeting presenting Pakistan as perpetuating terrorism in India.
The brief for the foreign minister and his team was to attain an equaliser with India and dispel the idea that it was Pakistan alone that caused terrorism. Of course, Pakistan would have to put consistent effort to produce greater evidence and convince the UN and other international forums to expand the terrorism debate.
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Negotiating policy change
Zardari and his team came well-prepared with a brief based on a policy consistently followed since the removal of the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) government in 2018. Even though there were rumours that former army chief General Qamar Javed Bajwa (retd) wanted to initiate trade relations with India or the sense that Islamabad’s economic condition would inspire it to establish economic ties with New Delhi, there was never any shift. It could be argued that there was no change after 2008 when another army chief, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani was known for wanting trade with the bigger neighbor.
While Imran Khan was made to look like the fool who wasn’t able to decide whether he wanted to import much-needed food items from next door or for being generally indecisive, the fact is that the policy never changed.
The former Director General of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Lt. General Asad Durrani (retd), told me in a conversation that neither side has experienced a policy shift in years. He doesn’t think there was any noticeable change during the previous PML-N government (2013-18) either. This is probably because, despite the rhetoric, Nawaz Sharif did not manage to negotiate a policy change amongst domestic stakeholders.
Interestingly, Durrani does not give a lot of credence to Modi’s 2015 visit to Lahore, seeing it more as theatrics than a change of heart. Sharif, on the other hand, could not move forward due to the error of trying to do things alone.
Hence, Zardari’s hawkishness flows from an appreciation of the negative cost of not raising the bar of hostility in diplomatic relations, especially because there is little to be gained from not responding in kind. Islamabad, sources argue, was conscious that it would get blamed for terrorism, so there was a need to counter the Indian foreign minister.
Moreover, any effort to talk to Delhi had not borne any dividends in the form of reciprocation or changes in Kashmir policy. Despite the fact that Islamabad was explained through Track II diplomacy not to expect a change in India’s Kashmir policy, irrespective of which party is in power, Pakistan’s establishment is not convinced that India can’t be made to rethink. Even if the establishment understood that India won’t budge, there is a total inability to review the India policy. There is no inspiration nor concern to change.
Notwithstanding India’s new standing in the US’s Indo-Pacific strategy and its relative populism, Islamabad does not think India is in a comfortable position where it could get rid of the Kashmir issue. Nor does it want India to forget that it must solve the matter.
Also read: US wants constructive dialogue not ‘war of words’ between India, Pak
Traditional political formula
Delhi’s new global links could also be used for dialogue. Its evolving relations with the Middle East, for example, could be used to negotiate on outstanding issues. The recent visit of the Secretary General of the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) to Pakistan-administered Kashmir may be an indicator that Islamabad could still get Muslim states or multilateral organisations based there to support its stance and not entirely abandon it, as was felt perhaps a couple of years ago. This is not about expecting immediate gains but not surrendering its position.
Given the consistency of the policy, a young politician like Zardari and his Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) view it as an opportunity to piggyback to greater prominence and ultimately power.
This is indeed the approach that his maternal grandfather and former prime minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto used. On 13 October 1967, British diplomat Nicholas Barrington described Zulfiqar as a ‘strong nationalist’ who ‘put forward a rigid line on Kashmir’ in a note sent to London. The hardline, as the diplomat further reported, was to ‘not rush into a settlement and to wait it out until the balance of forces in the world changed’.
It was this nationalism that helped Zulfiqar gain popularity in Rawalpindi and win votes in the 1970 elections. The PPP, especially since 2008, has negotiated more carefully than the PML-N on the India policy, mainly because it is increasingly dependent on the establishment for help. Even in 2011, it was keen but cautious while negotiating the most-favoured nation status for India. Traditionally, the PPP is more India-centric than the PML-N.
Zardari, who incidentally held the press briefing on the same day as his grandfather gave his highly theatrical speech at the UN 51 years ago, was also driven by domestic political compulsions.
He expects to make political gains in Punjab where he needs power to be able to form the government in the center. plans to make gains in order to form government in the center.The new army chief General Asim Munir and his team, which is currently grappling with its Imran Khan problem, could get attracted towards the young Zardari especially if the army feels that its Shehbaz Sharif experiment is not working and there is continued anxiety with Nawaz Sharif and Punjab gradually mellowing towards India. After 2004, which is when Musharraf opened up dialogue with India, the ‘anti-Indianism’ in Punjab has softened considerably. Bhutto-Zardari’s remarks were meant to push a kind of politics that would position him as ‘the man for the job’ in the establishment circle.
Moving away from Punjab to Zardari’s home constituency of Sindh or other parts of the country, there is little excitement felt by ordinary people faced with economic burden.
But should the young Zardari be taking this belligerent approach and not think about retaining some political space for himself as a politician and not entirely follow the establishment’s perspective? The fate of Zulfiqar Bhutto should be a lesson. But in an environment where the military establishment’s power seems to remain constant, all political parties are tempted to follow a traditional formula rather than experiment. While many thoughtful people feel he shouldn’t have been so aggressive, norms of power politics justify the attitude. After all, nothing works better than power.
Zardari’s remarks will undoubtedly sour relations with India and put brakes on any new initiatives that the Sharif brothers expected to take in improving the ties. Nawaz Sharif, when he returns to Pakistan, will have to follow a similar trajectory.
Ayesha Siddiqa is Senior Fellow at the Department of War Studies at King’s College, London. She is the author of Military Inc. She tweets @iamthedrifter. Views are personal.
(Edited by Tarannum Khan)