The Agnipath scheme has morphed into a game of political football. It is apparent from the discourse trending in Parliament and media platforms. The trend was evident during the campaign of the 2024 Lok Sabha election and could remain in the limelight especially since Nitish Kumar’s Janata Dal (United), a coalition partner of the ruling National Democratic Alliance, is yet opposed to the scheme.
In terms of the gameplay, the scheme is viewed as one in which most Agniveers — 75 per cent of recruits — are denied permanent employment, unlike other government employees. Instead, only four years of government service is guaranteed and only 25 per cent selected for retention. If not selected for retention, a lump sum amount of about Rs 5 lakh is given as ‘Seva Nidhi‘ in addition to compulsory monthly savings and some job options have reportedly been made available through reservation or special schemes in the other agencies of the central government.
Last week, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) reiterated its 2022 commitment of 10 per cent reservation for Agniveers in the Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) and Assam Rifles. The MHA also stated that physical tests will not be required and absorption will be in the rank of constable. The reiteration seems to have been deemed necessary to counter the view that the Agnipath scheme undermines the earlier recruitment model that provided for permanent employment and lifelong pension. This also underscores the fact that in terms of domestic politics, the issue is perceived as a ‘provision of an employment scheme’, which it certainly is not and cannot allowed to be.
The real reason for its introduction
Though Agnipath was politically sold as a platform to provide an opportunity for our youth to serve the country, it was never the reason for the change in the recruitment model and introduction of the scheme. While it was never officially acknowledged, the real and valid reason was the size of the pension outgo that was adversely impacting the ability of the defence budget to meet the demands of modernisation and replacement of military equipment, which, in many cases, were in various stages of becoming obsolescent. This requirement could have been met to some extent by increasing the defence budget. Yet, despite the problem being highlighted by Defence Parliamentary Committees for more than a decade, the successive governments have not opted for the increase and, on the contrary, kept the defence budget more or less the same in terms of the percentage of GDP. For details, see the recent article by the author in ThePrint.
It is time the government took ownership of the real reason behind the introduction of the Agnipath scheme — the burgeoning pension outgo that can only grow due to the increase in longevity and the introduction of the One Rank One Pension (OROP) policy. It must also undertake continuous annual reviews of the scheme and identify the required modifications. This aspect falls within the professional ambit of the leadership of the armed forces and should only be viewed within the framework of the impact of the scheme on military effectiveness. Military effectiveness in the human capital realm is a derivative of efficient and collective functioning by individuals. It includes the ability to operate military equipment as well as function cohesively under a unit/sub-unit commander.
The paramount importance of the human capital segment in the military effectiveness factor as a national security priority is undeniable. Since this judgement is purely a matter for military professionals to preside over, the future of the Agnipath scheme now lies in the court of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and Service chiefs and primarily relates to the increase in the duration of the retention period. For the chiefs, the matter is further complicated as each armed Service has differing standards expected of their rank and file to judge the impact on military effectiveness. As a general rule, the greater the technical skill required to undertake their professional chores, the longer the need to increase the length of service from the present four years. This would vary intra-Service as well as inter-Service.
When harmonisation would be possible
The harmonisation of differing demands would be challenging if the current structure of the scheme is to be retained. Essentially, the variance in demands would relate to the retention period and its impact on military effectiveness. Perhaps, administratively, it would be impracticable to have differing retention periods for different professional trades. With the approaching switch to the theatre command system where integration and jointness are of crucial value, there is no room for different Services adhering to varying retention periods.
The problem would be that each Service would have different views on the retention period. Harmonisation, however, is possible if the minimum longest retention period could be accepted for all three Services. Thus, if the Navy insists on a six-year retention period, but the Army/Air Force could do with five years, the Navy’s view would still be adopted by all. Purely from a professional point of view, the length of the retention duration must be balanced with the youth profile and ability to achieve professional standards required to support military effectiveness.
The ceiling of selection per batch has been presently laid down as 25 per cent and is a factor that could also affect military effectiveness, but its importance is not in the same league as the retention period. Any change in the selection percentage could be taken up after the first few batches have finished their tenure.
The next major step
The immediate and major step the CDS and the chiefs have to take is to decide the length of the retention period. This need not await the near completion of the four-year period. This is so as the military leaders at all levels have sufficient experience in training and leading their personnel to decide what the duration should be. It is obvious that four years is too short a period, as the requirement of technical skills and experience has only grown.
The question that could be posed is: If the military leadership had already known that four years is too short, why did they accept it? The answer to that would lie in the internal dynamics of India’s civil-military relations that have much room for improvement, if not for radical changes.
The imperative to revise the current four-year tenure of the Agnipath scheme due to its impact on national security must be prioritised by the CDS and the chiefs. They will have to arrive at a consensus on the recommended and revised tenure period. Thereafter, the issue should be taken up with the Prime Minister. The outcome will also reflect the proclivity of the political leadership when confronted with decisions that demand national interests be prioritised over narrow domestic political interests. The military leadership must act expeditiously to ensure that the pulls and pressures of domestic politics do not in any way erode the vital attribute of the armed forces — military effectiveness.
Lt Gen (Dr) Prakash Menon (retd) is Director, Strategic Studies Programme, Takshashila Institution; former military adviser, National Security Council Secretariat. He tweets @prakashmenon51. Views are personal.
(Edited by Humra Laeeq)