scorecardresearch

Friday, November 20, 2026
YourTurnSubscriberWrites: The Neighbour India Took for Granted

SubscriberWrites: The Neighbour India Took for Granted

Sheikh Hasina's reported plans to return to Bangladesh in December have revived a diplomatic dilemma for India. But beyond her fate lies a larger challenge: China's growing influence, Pakistan's renewed engagement and the erosion of New Delhi's once-privileged relationship with Dhaka.

Stay updated with ThePrint:

Thank you dear subscribers, we are overwhelmed with your response.

Your Turn is a unique section from ThePrint featuring points of view from its subscribers. If you are a subscriber, have a point of view, please send it to us. If not, do subscribe here: https://theprint.in/subscribe/

In December 1971, I was visiting Calcutta for a family event when war broke out between India and Pakistan, delaying my return to England until civilian air traffic resumed. Back in England, I noticed a discernibly warmer relationship between the Indian and Bangladeshi (formerly East Pakistani) communities.

India’s close relationship with Bangladesh was interrupted by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s assassination in 1975 and continued to fluctuate until Sheikh Hasina and her Awami League returned to power in 2009.

Sheikh Hasina’s government transformed India’s eastern security. It acted against insurgent organisations, including the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) and the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB), whose leaders had found sanctuary in Bangladesh. Intelligence cooperation improved, while Bangladeshi roads, railways, waterways and ports offered alternative routes to India’s northeast.

The advantages were considerable. India’s eight northeastern states depend on the narrow Siliguri Corridor, or Chicken’s Neck, for their land connection to the mainland. Bangladesh lies to its south, while China’s strategically sensitive Chumbi Valley approaches from the north. Cooperation with Dhaka provided security reassurance and logistical flexibility.

For fifteen years, India enjoyed these advantages under a government whose strategic priorities largely coincided with its own. New Delhi was unprepared for the cessation of this relationship.

In August 2024, a student-led uprising ended Hasina’s increasingly authoritarian rule and forced her to flee to India. Muhammad Yunus’s interim administration began recalibrating Bangladesh’s foreign relationships. The February 2026 election brought Tarique Rahman’s BNP to power, but elected government did not restore India’s privileged position.

Rahman’s diplomatic choice was revealing. Although India had extended an invitation, Rahman chose Beijing for an early official visit in June. The June 2026 communiqué envisaged cooperation on the Teesta River project, Mongla Port and defence exchanges. Beijing is already a major supplier of Bangladesh’s military equipment.

Writing in War on the Rocks, Wolfgang Petermann highlighted Bangladesh’s dependence on Chinese military systems, its Chinese-assisted submarine facility near Cox’s Bazar and the cancellation of a $21 million Indian naval tug contract.

Pakistan is also rebuilding defence relations with Bangladesh. Following a trilateral meeting in Kunming in June 2025, Harsh V. Pant and Aditya Gowdara Shivamurthy argued in the Observer Research Foundation that Beijing was seeking to restore Pakistan’s regional relevance and upset India’s strategic calculations.

Bangladesh denies any alliance directed against India. Yet selective cooperation among the three countries could be consequential even without a formal military pact. India’s former Chief of Defence Staff, General Anil Chauhan, has warned of such a convergence of interests.

India’s vulnerability lies in the potential loss of strategic advantages secured during the Sheikh Hasina years. Renewed sanctuary for northeastern insurgents, weakened intelligence cooperation and restrictions on transit through Bangladesh could increase India’s dependence on the narrow Siliguri Corridor. Meanwhile, closer Chinese military ties with Dhaka could complicate India’s naval security in the Bay of Bengal. Even without a formal hostile alliance, India’s eastern frontier could become considerably more difficult to secure.

Yet China cannot replace India’s geographical importance. The two neighbours share more than 4,000 kilometres of border and 54 transboundary rivers. Electricity supplies, trade, transport and commercial access bind their economies together. Beijing can finance infrastructure and supply military equipment; it cannot alter geography.

But proximity does not guarantee goodwill.

The Teesta dispute illustrates the problem. A water-sharing agreement has remained stalled since 2011. Bangladesh has consequently explored Chinese assistance for a major river restoration project, earlier estimated at approximately $747 million for its first phase. China’s state-owned PowerChina conducted preliminary technical studies, and Dhaka sought substantial Chinese loan financing. However, a fresh feasibility study is now planned, and the government has not committed to a funding source. The project nevertheless illustrates how unresolved bilateral disputes can open opportunities for Beijing. The 1996 Ganga Water Sharing Treaty expires in December 2026, adding urgency to an already difficult relationship.

India’s domestic politics has added to the estrangement. Undocumented Bangladeshi migrants have become a recurring theme in electoral campaigns, often accompanied by rhetoric about infiltration, demographic change and national security. Citizenship verification exercises, disputed expulsions and the tendency to conflate Bengali language with Bangladeshi nationality have further complicated matters. India has legitimate concerns about illegal migration and border security. But when domestic political messaging spills across the border, it risks alienating the very population whose goodwill New Delhi needs to regain. India’s influence in Bangladesh depends on public sentiment as well as government-to-government relationships.

Then there is Sheikh Hasina.

Sheltered in India since August 2024, Sheikh Hasina has been sentenced to death in absentia over the suppression of the uprising. Through her London-based lawyers, she has approached the Bangladesh High Commission in New Delhi for a new passport and identity card, intending to return to Bangladesh in December. Bangladesh’s Home Ministry says the authenticity and legal basis of the request are under review, although its junior foreign minister has ruled out issuing the documents and insists that she return through extradition procedures. India must weigh its treaty obligations, due-process concerns and the consequences of returning a longstanding ally who faces execution. The development adds a new dimension to an already difficult diplomatic relationship.

Bangladesh now has the freedom to pursue competing partnerships. India’s mistake was to confuse fifteen years of close cooperation with Sheikh Hasina for lasting influence over Bangladesh itself. New Delhi secured substantial strategic advantages, but failed to build relationships that could survive a change of government.

India helped Bangladesh achieve independence in 1971. That history matters, but historical gratitude cannot substitute for contemporary diplomacy.

China can write the cheques. India has the enduring advantage of geography. But neither money nor proximity guarantees political influence. The neighbour India took for granted now has choices—and New Delhi must learn to negotiate with them.

Author Bio: Aloka Sengupta is an independent  commentator on international affairs, geopolitics and societal issues.

These pieces are being published as they have been received – they have not been edited/fact-checked by ThePrint.

Subscribe to our channels on YouTube, Telegram & WhatsApp

Get your voice heard.

You’ve just read a piece written by someone like you: a reader with something to say and the clarity to express it. ThePrint subscribers can submit their own article for publication under their own byline. Your ideas, in your own voice, in front of ThePrint’s readers.

Write & Publish

LEAVE A REPLY

Please enter your comment!
Please enter your name here