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Three recent defence industry headlines indicate what India should be wary about. The first
is that of the Chinese balloons that made their way across much of the North American
continent (and reportedly elsewhere, including India) till the Americans shot two of them
down off their coast. The second commented upon in a recent article by Snehesh Alex Philip in The Print, refers to the spurt in Indian defence exports, with the additional caveat that India remains the largest arms importer. The third headline, again by Snehesh Alex Philip in The Print, is of the CAG hauling up the DRDO for inordinate project delays.
The connection between the last two seems obvious. While there has been considerable
progress in developing a robust industrial ecosystem for defence production in India,
reflected in the rapid growth of defence exports, at the same time, the limitations of this
ecosystem are quite obvious. They show up in the scale of Indian arms imports. Although
much work is required before the ecosystem matures, it is only a matter of time before India reaches its immediate objective of $ 5 billion. To the credit of the current government, there is a push towards adequate policy support for this objective.
However, export volumes are a matter of policy support and putting in place the necessary
infrastructure and logistics. What is less conspicuous is the nature of the industry – is it
driven primarily by closing or creating technological gaps? Technical expertise and creativity are the two main ways an industry creates value. The defence industry is no exception, only its stakes are higher. It comes as no surprise that much of defence technology is proprietary and closely held. Critical technologies may not be patented for fear of leakages and reverse engineering. Adversaries are less likely to be squeamish about violating intellectual property rights. Technology followers often supplant hard laboratory work through reverse engineering and espionage. Given proper support, closing a critical technological gap on the part of an adversary is possible, as evident from the proliferation of nuclear weapons and missiles.
Yet, this precludes the second, more critical route to creating competitive defence advantage- technological gaps through inventions. Throughout history, battles have been won not only by closing technology gaps but because an advanced technology (e.g. gunpowder) or, more interestingly, a very inventive approach (e.g. the Trojan horse – whether this was a historical event or not is a separate debate), was brought to bear on a more powerful or entrenched adversary. Inventions and innovations are close connected yet distinct. One can be inventive, yet inventions must be useful and scalable to transition into innovations. The challenge in crossing this invention-innovation bridge is not trivial, as evident from the fact that the number of patents (that represent inventiveness) far surpasses the number of innovative products at any given time. Therefore, inventors seek technological gap creation by investing in the next level of defence inventions.
Technological gap creation connects us to the first of the three headlines I referenced while
opening this article. The Chinese balloons are not hi-tech products. However, the fact that
they attracted serious, and some would argue, disproportionate (hi-tech fighter jets and
missiles against low-tech balloons) countermeasures from the Americans suggests an
important point that needs to be recognised. They show a level of inventiveness that goes
beyond technologies per se. Undoubtedly, the depth and scale of Chinese technological
innovations and the maturity of its defence ecosystem are both enviable and worrisome.
While they are still dependent on certain key technologies, it is also certain that they will
catch up in the near foreseeable future. Their rapid strides in space, hypersonic, and
computing technologies are pointers.
While other countries, including India, can almost certainly catch up, the pace may vary and be constrained, as highlighted by the CAG observations on the DRDO’s performance.
However, the mute point is that this catching-up, even when accelerated, will produce
something already out there. How can this give India any competitive edge in a future
conflict? A competitive advantage can come only from inventiveness and technology gap
creation – a point often missed in commentaries and debates. India needs to transition from closing to creating technology gaps. Such a shift requires a fundamental relook at the
governance, funding, and mode of functioning of defence R& D. While these issues merit a
separate discussion, inventiveness requires a different set of institutional and organisational design elements than current policy thinking recognises at the moment.
These pieces are being published as they have been received – they have not been edited/fact-checked by ThePrint.
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