New Delhi: A year after Bangladesh’s ruling regime led by South Asia’s oldest ruling leader Sheikh Hasina, collapsed in a student-led uprising, the country stands at a volatile crossroads. The old order is gone, but a coherent democratic future has yet to emerge.
On 5 August 2024, Sheikh Hasina’s government, accused of authoritarianism, election rigging, and suppression of dissent, fell amid violent nationwide protests over student quotas. The tipping point came when the army defied orders to fire on demonstrators. Civil institutions fractured. Hasina fled into exile. What was once unthinkable became inevitable.
Twelve months later, the mood is less euphoric.
“Bringing down a regime is hard. Building a democracy in its place? That’s even harder,” Asif Bin Ali, Atlanta-based geo-political analyst working with Georgia State University, told ThePrint.
The transitional government, led by Muhammad Yunus, was formed to stabilise the country, initiate reforms, and prepare for free elections in 2026. Yet a growing number of citizens and observers worry that the revolution’s momentum is fading and with it, the clarity of its mandate.
Now, the interim government’s legality is in question. Experts say they’re trying to ‘legalise’ themselves through institutional fixes, possibly even rewriting the constitution, to justify future elections.
“Public frustration is mounting. People want financial stability, order, and fair law enforcement, not laws wielded by politicians, but laws that work for them,” Rezaur Rahman Lenin, a Dhaka-based human rights activist, told ThePrint.
“What we’re seeing now is effectively multiple governments within the government. The interim administration has its own agenda, but each of the three main political blocs supporting or engaging with it—the BNP, the Islamists, and the NCP—also have their own competing priorities. When you combine all four agendas, what you get isn’t a unified chain of command, but several parallel ones, each operating in its own interest,” Asif Bin Ali said.
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A battlefield of blocs
The fall of Hasina left behind a bureaucratic vacuum. Under her, ministries had become politicised tools of party loyalty. Institutions barely functioned without direct orders from the Prime Minister’s Office.
“This is the weakest government since 1975, since the Khondaker Mostaq regime,” said Asif. “Its control over the state apparatus, judiciary, police and administration is extremely limited.”
According to Zillur Rahman, president of the Centre for Governance Studies, “While we are no longer in the grip of one-party domination, we have yet to construct a coherent and inclusive pathway toward democratic reconstruction.”
Reform commissions were announced, task forces launched, but implementation has lagged. Eleven panels submitted reform proposals; none have been enacted.
“Hasina is gone but there is still palpable insecurity on the streets,” said Ali. “Before, we feared the government. Now, we fear what comes next: Criminal groups, rogue non-state actors, the sense that no one is in charge.”
With the Awami League banned from electoral participation and its leadership in disarray, a new political configuration is emerging. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), sidelined for over a decade, is positioning itself for a return. So are new actors—the National Citizens’ Platform (NCP) and an emboldened Islamist coalition, led by Jamaat-e-Islami and Hefazat-e-Islam among others.
But ideological clarity is giving way to deal-making.
According to political analysts, when the interim government first assumed power, there was a faction within it that clearly intended to stay in office for at least three to four years. This wasn’t officially declared, but it was evident in both rhetoric and behaviour. Some pro-government outlets and spokespersons even began floating the idea that since the 2024 elections had already taken place, and Sheikh Hasina was ousted just one year into that term, the remaining four years could be claimed by the interim administration.
“While no conclusive documents or recordings have surfaced to confirm this plan, political intent is often revealed not through leaks, but through patterns in speeches, public messaging, and silences,” Asif said.
Meanwhile, during the Army Durbar led by Chief Waker-Uz-Zaman in May this year, the military leadership made it clear that elections should be held as soon as possible and that troops should return to the cantonment.
This intervention triggered serious pressure on the interim government. At one point, there was even talk of Dr Yunus stepping down. What followed was both unusual and revealing: Yunus reached out informally to the head of the National Citizens’ Party (NCP)—a minor political player—and conveyed this possibility. The NCP leader then publicly revealed the conversation to the media—an unprecedented move.
According to Ali, this prompted a wave of performative drama in public discourse and op-eds, with commentators pleading, “Yunus, please don’t go.” It played out like political theatre, but beneath it lay a more sobering realisation within the interim government—they couldn’t hold on to power much longer.
Two major forces, the military and the BNP, both with substantial influence on the ground, were aligned in their demand for early elections. In contrast, Jamaat-e-Islami and the NCP were more hesitant.
It was in this context that Yunus met Tarique Rahman, acting chairman of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, in London. That meeting resulted in an informal consensus: An election roadmap would soon be announced, and the process toward elections would begin. Since then, the election timeline has become clearer, though no exact date has been announced yet.
That absence of a specific date is not without consequence. Setting a clear election date would add much-needed certainty to the process. But delaying that announcement allows political maneuvering to continue behind closed doors.
Currently, there are two main blocs in reform negotiations. On one side is the BNP, which commands a strong electoral base. On the other side are smaller players—including the NCP and Jamaat—which have political presence but lack similar grassroots support. Despite this, they are exerting considerable pressure on the BNP to accept the majority, if not all, of their reform proposals.
Jamaat, while less overt, is actively participating in this push. Their shared stance is that unless the BNP agrees to broad reforms, they may withdraw from the process altogether. They are aware they are unlikely to win power outright, their goal is to shape the system from within, ideally as the Opposition.
This dynamic creates significant uncertainty. If the election proceeds without full consensus, especially on the reforms demanded by the NCP and Jamaat, there’s a risk these groups could boycott the polls. And Awami League, given the public backlash and allegations of serious rights violations under Sheikh Hasina, is unlikely to contest the elections in its current form.
Behind closed doors, the BNP is negotiating possible coalitions. The NCP, born out of student activism, and Islamist parties are seeking strategic entry points.
This is no longer just about vision or ideology. It’s about leverage.
Zillur Rahman agreed: “BNP faces a delicate balancing act. It cannot afford isolation, yet coalition-building with ideologically diverse forces risks diluting its reformist credibility.”
The fall of Awami League & Islamism in the vacuum
One year after Hasina’s fall, her party has neither reorganised nor repented. Sheikh Hasina remains chairperson. No transitional leadership has emerged. Publicly, the party maintains silence; privately, some loyalists speak of betrayal.
“There’s no indication that the Awami League intends to reform or replace its leadership. It’s hard to see how they could re-enter politics with the same faces who presided over mass killings and election rigging,” Asif noted.
For now, the Awami League exists in political limbo. It is legally suspended, and socially vilified. “The Awami League no longer has the resources, mobilising capacity, or political infrastructure to compete at the national level,” Lenin said. “Claims of 30 percent vote share are pure conjecture. We really won’t know until real democracy returns.”
Outside Dhaka, retaliatory violence against Awami loyalists has flared. “There’s still a great deal of public anger. And a sense of revenge in some places,” Asif noted. “That dynamic could explode if not carefully managed.”
In the ideological void left behind, Islamist forces have surged. Once repressed, groups like Jamaat-e-Islami have resurfaced with renewed confidence. “Islamist groups are more organised, more vocal, and more powerful than at any point in the last few decades,” said Asif. “They are now claiming the lion’s share of credit for the uprising which simply isn’t true.” Still, their appeal resonates with some, especially among disaffected youth and rural constituencies.
“There is an ideological vacuum at the centre. After the collapse of a hyper-centralised secular autocracy, centrist and progressive forces have yet to regroup with coherence. This has allowed Islamist parties, with their disciplined networks and populist messaging, to re-enter the mainstream more forcefully. However, their rise is more a reflection of political vacuum than ideological dominance,” Zillur Rahman said.
Their ideological platform remains ambiguous for now. Conservative on social issues, radical in tone, yet silent on economic policy or regional diplomacy. “We know their positions on women and minorities, but not on foreign policy, the economy, or regional cooperation,” Ali said. “The Islamists are merely riding on emotion.”
The India-Bangladesh thaw, Pakistan and China
According to experts, regional players remain wary of what comes next. And while most focus on the aspect of growing bonhomie with Pakistan, the real player remains subtle—China.
According to Asif, in conversations with China experts and Chinese officials in Dhaka, a clear view emerges: They see the current interim government as strongly pro-American. Because of this perception, they’ve chosen to prioritise relationships with political parties rather than the government itself.
The Chinese interpret the recent uprising as a kind of “Colour Revolution”—Western-backed and strategically aligned with U.S. interests. As a result, their approach has shifted. They’re building ties with both major political parties, anticipating that one will form the government and the other will become the Opposition after the election. By engaging both sides, they hope to safeguard and advance their interests regardless of the election outcome.
China was quick to act. Within days of the transition, its ambassador visited Jamaat’s headquarters, signaling Beijing’s pivot toward emerging power centres.
“They didn’t go to BNP first, they went to Jamaat,” Asif observed. “That tells you where their priorities lie.” Since then, China has launched a full-spectrum outreach, courting student leaders, clerics, and media influencers.
According to Asif, the Bangladesh–Pakistan relationship has been exaggerated in media narratives, but in reality, Pakistan is a weak economy with minimal influence in Bangladesh. Islamist groups often inflate this connection, claiming Pakistan has more sway than it actually does. It’s more propaganda than substance—part of a broader narrative war. These groups want to project an image of Pan-Islamic unity and strategic alignment, but on the ground, their reach is extremely limited, he analysed.
“Don’t waste time fearing Pakistan’s role in Bangladesh,” Asif said. “China is the real player.”
Against this backdrop, the future of India–Bangladesh relations looks far from straightforward. Tensions, recalibrations, and competing alignments will likely shape what comes next.
India, meanwhile, has chosen caution over engagement. Yet signs of a diplomatic thaw are emerging. India recently sent assistance during the Milestone air crash two weeks ago that saw 27 dead, and reengaged in the traditional “mango diplomacy”.
Ali credits that shift not to top-level policy, but to Ambassador Riaz Hamidullah, Dhaka’s envoy in New Delhi.
“He’s a professional diplomat who understands how to de-escalate. The embassy under him and with Dr Yunus’ cooperation, took quiet but significant steps to restore working ties.”
Still, India appears to be betting on the long game. “They’re thinking—let’s wait a year, get an elected government, and rebuild the relationship then,” Ali said.
He also added that the BNP is positioning itself around this principle—calling for a respectful, working relationship between the two neighbors based on sovereignty and cooperation. In contrast, the Islamist parties have taken a distinctly anti-India stance, even though they’re yet to present any formal foreign policy. Their rhetoric is loud, but it’s not backed by policy documents, whether on foreign relations, the economy, or broader governance. Instead, their politics is mostly defined by social issues like women’s rights or minority status.
“My concern is: If India uses Bangladesh as an election talking point (in Assam and West Bengal), and if Bangladesh delays its own election while right-wing forces gain ground, the space for constructive foreign policy will shrink. Timing and clarity will be key for recalibrating the relationship,” Asif said.
Looking to 2026
With elections now confirmed for June 2026, attention is turning to what kind of democracy Bangladesh might emerge with and who will lead it. “BNP is the only party actively pushing for elections, because they believe they’ll win,” said Ali.
But the real question isn’t just who wins, it’s whether the transition will be seen as credible. “The road ahead is full of promise—but also fraught with the risk of another cycle of disillusionment if meaningful change does not come soon,” Zillur Rahman noted.
For now, the road to democracy, experts say, is incomplete. The Hasina regime has fallen, but no replacement has fully arrived. Bangladesh’s next chapter remains unwritten. “We’re living through a moment of possibility but also danger,” said Lenin. “It’s not enough to tear down the old. We have to build anew.”
This is an updated version of the report.
(Edited by Viny Mishra)
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